

#2

Monitoring xenophobic political discourses

A pilot study in Catalonia

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Preliminaries: the need of a “radar” against xenophobic political discourse

Xenophobic political discourses are increasing their presence in Europe. It is even in the front door of several national governments and can even be the next headache of European institutions if they manage to win a parliamentary visibility in the next European Elections. At a time of economic crisis, political uncertainty and distrust of democratic institutions, migrants and ethnic minorities are particularly affected by unemployment and precarious working conditions. Economic downturn also creates fears among the general public that incite racist behavior, while it has led to financial public cuts to anti-racism activities in many countries.

Some political parties are also interested in deviating public opinion attention to the crisis, by raising emotions and negative attitudes towards immigrants. In this sense, we assume that the perceived threatening reality that feeds xenophobic attitudes in society is mainly a political and media construction. Given this reality on how xenophobic discourses affect both at the level of society (legitimizing racist and xenophobic behaviors) and at the institutional level (legitimizing structural racism), there is an urgent need to construct an interpretive framework to help monitor these discourses and make visible the red lines that a democratic society should be able to defend. In this sense, the need to monitor xenophobic political discourse is fully justified, as a way to make public these misbehaviors.

But how can we do that? What methodological tool can we propose that is useful both for the academy and for the main political and social actors? We interpret that such a tool would function similar to a radar

road, which always leaves a margin of excess limits, but automatically takes a picture to those who exceed a fairly obvious way. This tool should provide a picture evidencing discourses that have passed the threshold that a democratic society can tolerate. Behind these thoughts, there are certainly also desires to contribute to an *Ethics of political discourse on immigration*.

At the same time this tool should also have a descriptive and preventive dimension, since it has mainly the objective to *identify and counter any tendency of political parties of radicalizing their position towards xenophobia and racism*. By making visible this behavior, we seek to prevent its extension and trivialization.

Furthermore, within each political party, there might be a combination of positive, neutral and negative approaches to the representation of immigration through the discourse of different political participants. As most literature remarks, there is a hegemonic tendency of political parties that produce xenophobic discourses to become a reference discursive frame with its corresponding contagious effects to other parties or other members of the party. This may force parties or political actors to enter into a debate that they have not created. In this sense, this tool can be useful to minimize hegemonic xenophobic tendencies within and among political parties, by offering a solid conceptual tool to more neutral parties/political actors, so that they can back up their position with objective and academically reliable arguments, avoiding that this hegemonic tendency expands.

In the disciplines of political theory and discourse analysis, there are few studies that have made empirical and theoretical attempts to show some characteristics of racist discourse in politics. In the European context, studies such as the ones of (Charteris-Black (2013) Van Dijk (1997, 2003), Wodak and Van Dijk (2000), Reisigl and Wodak (2009) have done this attempt. Similarly, quite a lot of research has been done in dealing with populist discourses at the European level (Morris, 2013; Fieshi et al, 2013; Barlett et al, 2011). However, there is not a systematic

and precise framework to encode these types of discourses. This is why this pilot study comes so timely, since it serves academics, politics and society. Similarly, in the Spanish context, studies such as the ones of Bañón, (2002), Ribas (2005, 2009), Martín Rojo (2000), Rubio-Carbonero (2010), Zapata-Barrero, González and Sánchez (2008), or Zapata Barrero and Van Dijk (2007) have also identified some linguistic features and patterns that frequently appear in racist political discourse. But once again, an analytical framework that involves such features in a systematic and objective way has not been done yet.

The purpose of this exploratory project is to construct a heuristic framework to monitor xenophobic discourses and apply it to the context of Catalonia as a pilot study. Besides, it is aimed to make this pilot study reproducible in other territories.

This project is a complementary action of two main GRITIM-UPF projects. One National and another European:

- *DIVERSIDAD* project, on *Municipalities and immigration: interculturality and the index of Governability*, funded by the Spanish Ministry of Economy and Competitiveness. Ref.: CSO2011-28885. Main Researcher: Ricard Zapata-Barrero. (<http://www.upf.edu/gritim/projectes/nacionals/estatal/diversidad.html>)
- 18-country *ACCEPT* project: *Tolerance, Pluralism and Social Cohesion: Responding to the Challenges of the 21st Century in Europe* (2010-2013) funded by EU 7th Framework (Main Researcher: Anna Triandafyllidou. Robert Schuman Centre for Advanced Studies (RSCAS), European University Institute, Florence(<http://www.upf.edu/gritim/projectes/internacionals/accept.html>))

This report is divided in **five main parts**. The **first part** deals with the introduction of the problem and the justification why xenophobic political discourses need to be monitored. The **second part** describes the

research design by, firstly, presenting the interpretative framework and the theoretical interdisciplinary foundations of the framework we are proposing; secondly, introducing the analytical framework including a guide on how to practically apply it.

The **third part** of the report has to do with the description of the implementation of the framework. We, hence, start with a general description of the context of Catalonia to later present the particular documentary sources we are considering in the study. Finally, it is explained in detail how the framework will be practically implemented to the selected documentary sources. The **fourth part** of the report describes in general and particular terms the main findings. Finally, the **last part** of the report presents some of the policy recommendations we can offer in the light of the results retrieved and explores possible further research.

I. Introduction. Setting the problem: why we need to monitor xenophobic political discourses? Towards an Ethics of political discourse on immigration

Western societies are fragile in how to perceive and manage diversity in settings with previous identity traditions and social class relations. This study assume as first evidence that in Europe and elsewhere, conflicts related to immigration diversity-related are not a matter of fact, but a matter of interpretation. And when interpretations govern human behavior and political decisions, we enter the realm of hermeneutics, where discourse is better understood as a framework that articulates a set of interpretations that are politically significant. Events related to immigration and diversity generates a great deal of discourses and rhetoric.

From a social psychological point of view, we know that when there is social fear of an unknown community, citizens tend to search for arguments to explain their feelings. These arguments help them rationalize their emotions. In hermeneutic terms, immigration is an interpretable reality where perceptions determine attitudes and behavior to the extent that it is evident that the relationship between “real reality” and “perceived reality” is a variable that should be taken into account in any discursive analysis. W. Cornelius and M. Rosenblum, for example, follow this line of argument, which we will take as basic analytical distinction. For them:

“Evidence suggests that “real or perceived” is an important distinction, as public attitudes about immigration reflect substantial misconceptions—though at least some of these apparent misconceptions actually reflect citizens’ tendency to respond to migration on emotional (or affective) levels rather than on the basis of objective self-interest or personal experience” (2004; 102-103)

The fact that the management of this gap becomes a strategic tool for politicians to influence citizens’ behavior and attitude, and even decide the orientation of citizens voting preference is what we call the “politics of discourse on immigration”. This evidence draws the first contours of the interpretative framework we will try to make operative to monitor xenophobic political discourses. The preliminary assumption is based on the premise that politicians are much more concerned with answering the question of *what to say* than the question of *what can we do*, and then interpretation and rhetoric become an ideological criteria to a political discourse building-process.

The importance of emotions in building public opinion, and orientating behaviour and attitude is always at the centre of debates on negative public opinion on immigration (Zapata-Barrero, 2008, 2009: 165-200). We also show these emotional answers, and then contrast empirically the adequacy of this interpretative framework to understand the results given in public opinion, when citizens were asked “Of every 100 people living in Spain, how many do you think were born outside the country? (Table 1 and Table 2)

In 2010, there were in Spain 12% of immigrants. The following table shows that 39,5% of the population has an exaggerated image of the number of immigrants, with 5,8 % believing that over 50 per cent of the population is immigrant. This case demonstrates that the ‘perceived amount’ is far greater than the ‘real amount’.

Table 1: Q10: Of every 100 people living in Spain, how many do you think were born outside?		
	%	(N)
Less than 10 people	11.0	(312)
10-19	20.0	(566)
20-29	18.9	(535)
30-39	9.2	(260)
40-49	5.6	(157)
50 or more people	5.8	(165)
N.S.	29.4	(834)
N.C.	0.1	(4)

Source: CIS, 2011, Barometer number 2918, Question number 10

For Catalonia, the tendency goes to the same gap between “real reality” and “perceived reality”. According to statistics, in 2010 there were 16% of immigrants from outside Spain. But citizens’ perceptions again showed another reality. Table 1.2 shows data coming from a specific survey on immigration done by the *Centre d’Estudis d’Opinió* (CEO):¹ The question, which is posed in similar terms as in the CIS, asks however “how many people do you think were born outside Catalonia?”. This is why respondents included people born both in and outside Spain. In this case, and given that in 2010 Catalonia hosted 37% of people born outside its borders, 45% of the population has an exaggerated image of the number of people born outside Catalonia, with the incredible data of 30,1% believing that over 50 per cent of the Catalan population is immigrant.

¹ CEO is a public institution of the Catalan administration which carries out regular surveys on different topics of interest. Survey n. 638, *percepció dels Catalans i catalanes sobre la immigració, 2010*. Freely available at www.ceo.gencat.cat

Table 2: Q7. In each 100 people living in Catalonia, how many of them do you think they have born outside Catalonia?		
	%	(N)
From 0 to 9	8,6	138
From 10 to 19	6,9	110
From 20 to 29	13,5	216
From 30 to 39	12,8	204
From 40 to 49	14,9	239
50 or more	30,1	626
I don't know	4,1	66
No answer	0	0

Source: CEO, 2010, Survey number. 638, Question 7

This interpretative framework has also been the guiding thread of one last work written by R. Zapata-Barrero and J. Díez Nicolas (2012) on Islamophobia in Spain, where it is argued and empirically demonstrated that negative attitudes towards Muslims in Spain are more a political construction than a social reality. Xenophobic attitudes have then to be considered as a political construction. The real question to be assessed, thus, is not why citizens are or are not Islamophobic, but rather why Islamophobia, as a rhetorical construction, attracts so much politicians and media. Is it to distract citizens from other problems that really concern society? or is it so attractive because it leaves wide open the emotions of people to gain their support and electoral endorsement?

Managing the feelings and perceptions of individuals has therefore become as much a matter for policy as the reality of immigration, moving us into a research framework which we will call the ‘politics of discourse’ (see Research Design, III, chap. 1). The framework is inspired by the common assumption in the immigration debate that there is a clear gap between political discourse and policy practice (V. Guiradon & G. Lahav, 2006)

One of the methodological motivations and challenges of this study is then a practical key-concern: *how to make operative this framework in a simple and viable way, so that it can accomplish the function to make visible*

xenophobic discourse through established standards. That is, how can we monitor xenophobic political discourses?

Once we establish a first purpose, a first disturbing question comes to our minds. Namely, if it is possible to draw such a framework in an impartial way. That is whether it is possible to demonstrate that the framework is not biased and/or ideological itself.² We introduce this issue because we are aware that the label of xenophobia, as the label of racism, is never accepted by those heralding such positions (Van Dijk, 1997). So the framework we propose tries also to keep the dividing line between these two views, and to set clearly what we consider are the *threshold of the reasonable political discourse on immigration*.

We are fully aware that the criteria informing our framework can be disputable, and even be viewed as partial, but we also think that the full evenhandedness is really difficult to draw both at the level of political discourse, where we are, and at the level of migration policies, where there is a mature debate on the ethics of migration (Zapata-Barrero & Pécoud, 2012). We enter then in the realm of ethics and of what we can call the *Ethics of political discourse on immigration*, since in monitoring xenophobic discourses we are at the same time setting the ethical limits of what we can or not accept as political discourse in our democratic societies in terms of principles for action. This also means, to redress the argument, that what we here offer as theoretical framework and tool to apply, can perfectly belong to a new necessary debate about the ethics of political discourse on immigration, which is a debate that tries to identify the limits of what can be or not said in immigration from the point of view of certain public values and civic principles.

This *Ethics of political discourse on immigration* meets the basic democratic values promoting interaction among people of different national origin

² This question comes to the debate posed by J. Carens during R. Zapata-Barrero presentation of the analytical framework in University Toronto (April 2013)

and culture, and the consolidation of a public space of “living together” in a diversity context. This *ethics* accepts, then, diversity as a context to be assumed and as the basis of a new public culture: the culture of diversity. It is within this context that the traditional categories articulating society needs to be re-assessed, such as cohesion, stability, equality (see Zapata-Barrero, 2013).

We also think that impartiality is an appropriate epistemological and ethical resource to promote objective and acceptable values. In diversity settings we have of course a debate on the power relations, the inequality of social class and certain behaviors and attitudes related to mistrust and distrust. All these dimensions of the debate are related to ethical concerns on how to accommodate diversity within a democratic framework, and how to make visible political discourses that can go beyond this dividing democratic line.

It is within this ethical concern that the study builds its main purposes and drives the main conceptual meanings. In terms of the sociologist of knowledge K. Mannheim in its *Conservatism mentality*, there are periods that encourage certain behaviors, and help explain why people and institutions think in certain ways, there are historic times that favor one ideology over another. It is evident that our historical time is favorable to conservatism and populism, since we are in a deep process of change due to the dynamics of diversity, and this change produce a growing of social differentiations (Mannheim, 1986; 85-86), power relations and difficult intercultural relations, which have today clearly identity components (religion, language, nationality, cultural practices).

In recent years, European policy has tended to be based on the assumption of the “national interest” and focused on arguments based around security, welfare and identity.

These categories drive discourses of xenophobia, which are anchored in arguments generated both by tradition (preservation of tradition and original identity prevails under the pressure of diversity dynamics, and

then the defense of symbolic and identity interests shape new conservative discourse), and emotions (new populism or what we will call *citizenism*³(the interest of citizens prevails over whatever immigrant interest and then the defense of material interest and socio-economic conditions and welfare of “citizens come first”). In both rhetorics, diversity is categorically seen as socially “abnormal”, and as social dynamic that “disturbs” the normal path of history, provoking instability and jeopardizing cohesion. The need to be restricted is then fully justified. In Europe today, it is the interplay between conservatism and populism, covering the entire European discourse spectrum, which fuels the rise of negative public opinion against immigrant-related diversity.

In the European context of economic crisis, the tendency to take a nationalist stance can be seen in the consolidation of a wave of nationalist, state and identity-based discourses by most political parties, and in the rise, in governmental use, of legal instruments to place limits on diversity. These moves have, also, contributed to the consolidation of negative public opinion against immigrants and against immigration diversity-related. In this context, state practices seem to be based on an assumption that states have no obligations to non-native citizens who reside within their territory, and then the (heterogeneous-)immigrants do not deserve the same democratic discursive treatment than (homogeneous-)citizens. Beyond this democratic dimension there is also an undeniable ethical reading that needs to be outlined. Immigrants, as human beings, deserve a minimal of ethical treatment (Zapata-Barrero & Pecoud, 2012; Forst, 2009).

Zapata-Barrero’s previous work defended that there is a contrast between the foundation of certain policies aiming at limiting the public expression of immigrant diversity-related, and public opinion and

³ The use of this neologism is intentional. It seeks to express that the root of political discourse based on the *people* taken as *population* (so *populism*) is now based on *citizenship* category of population (and then the most appropriate term is *citizenism*, since immigrants belongs to the population but not to the citizenship).

attitudes.⁴ In this sense, xenophobia is mainly considered as a political and media construction. Anti-immigrant policies respond much more to the electoral strategy rhetoric, rather than to a channel of answering real needs and demands of citizens, as the recent burqa debate promoted by several European countries (France, Germany, Spain, Belgium).

In this contextual framework we ask two key questions: what is new and what is old in this European discursive trend? And what normative challenges can we identify from this overview, which justify the need to *monitor xenophobic political discourse?*

1. What is new and what is old in this European discursive trends? Four waves

Revising the current discursive context in Europe, we can identify at least four waves. The *first wave* began in the eighties of the past century, with the growing presence of anti-immigrant parties, such as the *Front National* in France. As *second wave*, some of these political parties penetrated into the political system by democratic means and played, in some countries, a crucial role as real power alternatives and even reached government. This is maybe relatively new, but has already 2002 in France as starting point, when Le Pen went to the second tour in national elections. As *third wave*, there is a populist trend in most of the traditional political parties when speaking on immigration, due to the difficulty of managing politically the link between immigration/negative public opinion. This is also relatively new, since right-wing traditional parties, in order to gain electoral space, begin to use populist arguments.

Finally in the *fourth wave* what is really new is the entrance of governments as new actors, and then we are going from political parties to governments as actors reacting against diversity dynamics and its

⁴ On the link between policies and public opinion towards immigrants in Spain, see Zapata-Barrero (2008: 1101)

pressure for changing in some institutional arrangements and structures. We start seeing measures in their strategic actions of managing immigration to limit certain expressions of diversity, creating confusion into the public opinion by mixing citizenship debate and immigration debate (such as Nov. 2005 in France), and irregular immigration and criminality (such as in Italy). Governments as new actors in formulating immigration discourses, trying to propose measures to link their respective discourse is maybe more recent and we can say the potential effects is wide open today. This governance of discourse can even legitimize xenophobia practices in most cities (in Catalonia some cities are claiming, for instance, to allow a certain % of entrance, to avoid concentrations; others are even creating segregating policies that limit the urban space of gardens, public fountains and even public sites arguing that this is used by “undesired people”).

The fact is that the recent Swiss referendum to ban minarets on Muslim worship centers, the current French online debate on national identity and the, also, French and Spanish discussion on whether burqa should be banned in public sphere, or even the Romanian gypsies settlement in France, Italy and Spain, have arisen the unfinished question of the growing phobia against the others categorized basically under Islam, Gypsies, and also black Africans, in Europe. But it is a phobia against Islam/Gypsies/blacks or a general stigmatization of visible immigrants (because of religion, ethnic and skin color differences)? (Bader, 2008; Triandafyllidou, 2010; Vertovec & Wessendorf, 2010).

It might even be argued that phobia is not directed to Muslims/Gypsies/Blacks in general, but to religious fundamentalist terrorism and socio-economic exclusion in particular. The point is not that prejudice against Muslims, Gypsies, Blacks does not exist -it certainly does. However, generalized fears and prejudices are always articulated within specific local contexts and inflected in the process. While this category of otherness might be a particularly vulnerable group, negative reactions to their presence are becoming uniform across Europe. In fact,

and as a matter of example, a national survey conducted immediately after the 11-M train bombings in Madrid showed no significant increase of negative attitudes towards Muslims immigrants. Rather, such reactions must be understood within the broader assemblage of relations present in any given setting (Rasinski, Smith & Díez-Nicolás 2005). Anti-immigrant policies are therefore responsive to the rhetoric of electoral strategy. The current context of economic crisis has made that immigration becomes a less prominent topic in the political agenda, because now economic issues have more presence in Spanish political discourse (Rubio-Carbonero, 2013). Furthermore, as we will see topics related to immigration have changed. While some years ago, before the crisis started, the most prominent topics on immigration was the arrival of immigrants and insecurity issues, with the context of the crisis the focus is on the difficulties the host society has to manage the newcomers who are already here. We will also see that there is a general worry about how to preserve immigrants' rights without damaging autoctonous' rights (especially when it comes to economic issues).

Precisely, the Fundación Encuentro's Report on Spain (2011) points out that the current economic crisis is influencing citizens' opinion about immigrants. Specifically, the representation of immigrants by media and political discourse as unemployed, delinquent and the recurrent topics related to the monopolization of social aids by immigrants are increasing the negative attitudes of citizens towards immigration. Besides, this report states that the general feeling in Spanish society is that immigrants are no longer an economic resource in times of crisis, but they are consider as an economic burden (Report on Spain, 2011: 287).

Given this discursive context where governments are becoming new actors and leading producer of discourses, what are then the main normative challenges we can identify?

2. What are the main current normative challenges in this European discursive context?

Closing this first section, what we cannot avoid and, then, we must incorporate as premise into our focus, instead of leaving it to the idealistic and goodness discourse, is at least two premises in the background of these three challenges: 1) there is an unavoidable link between diversity immigration-related and emotion that invites to build some discourses fuelling this politics/emotion nexus. 2) There is also an unavoidable link between immigration discourse and vote, immigration/electoral behavior, so that political parties (and governments as new actors, according to our argument) instrumentalize diversity immigration-related as a resource for political bargaining.

Summarising this overview, the discursive behaviour of political parties and European governments is at present re-active. Instead of promoting innovation and helping create new linkages between diversity and opportunity, between diversity and positive resource, building confidence and a sense of diversity as a public good and diversity as a new public culture, they reproduce a discourse based on the paradigm of the “diversity disadvantages”. As we will see later, here some categories related to social representation will enter.

In the current framework, we can identify at least three normative questions arising into the current European discursive context where governments become new leading actors.

2.1. *Diversity management, legal, not political*

As we have argued, the new trend is that governments begin to be a new agent in the *politics of discourse*. This *politics of discourse* is being done through speeches, but also through policy initiatives that seek to regulate the dynamic of diversity into the public sphere. The fact that governments begin to use legal rather than policy means to do so is important, since the legal practice means also that governments see that only with policies is not enough and they need to put restrictions at a

juridical level, and so criminalizing actions diversity-related if these rules are not met.

The way Governments justify these legal restrictions are also related to their own view of tradition and national identity, and what is the common good and the public interest, since the legitimating resource are directly related to their own tradition (Republicanism and “laïcité” in France is the main framework justifying the ban of burqa and headscarf in the public arena and in schools; the Swiss religious identity is the main justification to prohibit mosque and minarets; and in Catalonia, the justification of the reception law is directly linked to Catalan language as marker of identity “that need to be protected”). These liberal and democratic procedures (the minarets in Swiss are the outcome of a referendum, the law in France is the outcome of parliamentary consensus) driving these legal measures show also that governments trust more legal means than policy means to manage the limits of diversity into our public spaces.

This legal reading of diversity management is new, and is maybe at the core of most xenophobic attitudes of the people, which only have perceptions and behaviors delimited by these governmental practices legitimizing the limits of tolerance (Zapata-Barrero and Tryandallidou, 2012).

At this first normative discursive challenge some questions arise and need to be answered: Why the use of legal means? Are we now crossing the border of the political arena in solving conflicts diversity-related and entering into the legal means, because we think that political means are not enough? Why policy means are rejected? Why legal means are better than political means in managing diversity? Why the use of legal means to protect and not to innovate?

2.2. Limits of limiting diversity: the great normative discursive challenge

From this first discursive challenge, a second one arises remembering R. Dahl classical question: who governs those who govern? In this case, are there any limits to these limits of diversity? Who limits those who limit diversity practices? In accepting these limits, are we also accepting the consequentialist arguments that are given to legitimize these practices in terms of tradition and national identity, or do we also have to ask for other justifications in terms of social trust, which are clearly not generated?

These limits to the limit of diversity is a serious challenge, since it involves also to transcend the premise that we are in a "discursive laissez faire", where it seems that anything goes in discourse and practice since the scope of discourse and practice against certain practice of diversity dynamics have the only limit the legal framework of the promotion of physical violence. Beyond these legal limits, nothing can be blamed in the practice of politics of discourse. Here the question of what we can find within our democratic and liberal resources to regulate these limits, since equality principles and even freedom of religion are hindered. It is true that here some counterarguments based on effects rather than on national identity and tradition (*conservatism*) and citizen's interest first (*citizenism*) can also be legitimating principles. The application of equality principles and freedom principles into the dynamics of diversity (religious and linguistic, cultural practices and nationality) can pose problems of stability and cohesion into society, and then can also hinder social trust and social capital.

2.3. Citizenship and national sustainability approach

There is today a general discursive trend in Europe. National Sustainability based on security, welfare, identity arguments is the driven force of most diversity management policies. This tendency is becoming increasingly explicit in the current European discourses, characterized by

economical crisis, and then a favorable factor contributing to the rise of negative public opinion, by the consolidation of the wave of nationalist State and identity-based discourse of most of the traditional political parties, and, according to our arguments, penetrating also governments.

This revival of nationalism or neo-nationalism goes back to the heart of the complex concept of citizenship, which does not only refer to a status of membership and the rights which such membership entails, but it is also about identification with shared national values.

The “citizen first argument” of the populist discourse legitimates a restrictive policy based on a revival of a 19th-century state nationalism, which requires immigrants to pass a citizenship test before being allowed access to rights of residence and/or citizenship (for example, the Netherlands, Denmark, Germany, United Kingdom, France). The European debate is wide open. It is now at a crossroads. While the category of citizenship is losing its emancipating dimension and progressive legacy of the 20th century, based on social movements and conflict, it is now used in its more conservative dimension. Why this citizenship policy rhetoric here (Europe) and now (within the crisis of multicultural policy approaches)? Against whom are nation-states reacting? Against a “diverse-other” or against a “we” that is also becoming diverse?

This process of de/re-nationalization of citizenship (see Zapata-Barrero, 2009b in general, but the Introduction pp. 5-21) is not only featuring European discourses, but also European Union, with a Stockholm program directly driven by a national and citizenship-based approach and following only citizenship protection (a “Europe that protects” is one of its devices) legitimated within what we can call the “EU holy trinity” on Security, Freedom and Justice.⁵ At this point we can ask: Can

⁵ See Wolff & Zapata-Barrero (2011). On Stockholm Programme, see the first critical analysis in Carrer., Guild & Geyer (2008), S. Carrera & A. Faure (2009), Scagliotti (2009), Colle (2009), Bigo & Jeandesboz (2009) Wolff (2010), Angenendt & Parkes (2010).

we envisage at least some (moral, political, legal) restrictions to these limits given the liberal values and principles of European national States? Do we have to accept that in this "throws and slackens" between the national dimension and liberal dimension of European Member States, the sovereignty of national States must prevail? Are we not at the beginning of a "conflict" in our national liberal states between the national and the liberal way of legitimating current EU migratory policies?

II. Research design

This chapter aims at offering an overview of the process of research design and it is divided in four main parts. The first part describes the interpretative framework, the second part presents the interdisciplinary approach and how we have combined three main disciplines in order to design the framework. The third part deals with the theoretical and methodological description of the tools and standards that compose the framework. The final part of this chapter aims at offering a practical guide to apply and implement the proposed analytical framework.

1. The interpretative framework: the politics of discourse

The interpretative framework we propose follows what we call “the politics of discourse”. The purpose of this section is to present this framework by first introducing the approach of *discourse as politics*. Then we will introduce the conceptual tools based on a rhetoric of immigration, by distinguishing between re-active and pro-active discourses.

*The approach: discourse as politics*⁶

Interested in the foundation of political discourse on immigration, the first requirement has to be to consider immigration discourse as politics, which basically aims at reinforcing a negative interpretation of the social dynamics it involves. This is what we call *the politics of discourse*, and this fundamentally means that “discourse becomes a political option, a common and deliberate practice for most traditional European political parties, especially when they have to communicate their positions on cultural diversity” (Zapata-Barrero & Qasem, 2008; 73). This involves that it is an intentional discourse, contextual-based, which seeks to provoke certain reactions in citizens. It is here that the so called power of discourse takes place.

The idea of *politics discourse* is based on the argument that politicians are much more concerned with answering the question of *what to say* than the question of *what can we do*, and then interpretation and rhetoric become criteria to a discourse building-process. We are then assuming the premise that the power of discourse has a double function: to legitimate and convince about public policy and legal frameworks, and social behaviors. As we know the basic problem of xenophobic discourse is that it is not typified as criminal behavior while not exceeding the legal limits of physical violence. In this sense, only objectified and visible violence can be a criterion of legal sanction. Furthermore, xenophobic discourse is not generally recognized as existing in political discourse. It is normally the case that racism in society is reformulated as “fear” or “mistrust”. Therefore, if the existence of racism or racist discourse is rejected, it is obvious that it cannot be typified as criminal behavior.

⁶ The theoretical framework comes from several works by Ricard Zapata Barrero that we will try to summarize.

Discourse on immigration diversity-related is a political gambit, since political statements of European governments serve a clear purpose: to avoid losing voters in favor of the far right parties and this is the main intentional logic that directs the politic body. By the same token, political discourse against immigration and diversity is politically motivated. This *politics of discourse* aims to gain and maintain power, by securing the majority of votes.⁷

The *politics of discourse* has de purpose to consolidate and generate many interpretations.⁸ For instance, if we take the case of Muslims in Europe, we have argued that Islam is not a source of social and political instability, but rather the perception citizens have of Islam and the interpretation that politicians intentionally and tacitly follow constitute the main sources of instability. That is, it is not the presence of a mosque in a city that provokes instability, but the perception that citizens have of a mosque, which transforms this previous contact zone into a conflict zone. Interpretations of what is unknown create a feeling of insecurity – and this is then turned into downright fear by discourse.

In this sense, we could say that political discourse is strategic. These discursive strategies are mainly based not only on stereotypes and

⁷ According to discourse analysis literature that centered on politics in particular, by "politics of discourse" we understand discourse as intentionally and strategically constructed by main political elites and political representatives. On discourse analysis and political discourse, we follow two kinds of literature. On the one hand, literature coming from the history of political ideas and conceptual analysis. For instance, among others, the seminal works of Skinner (1989; 1999) Pocock (1981) Connolly (1993). On the other hand, the literature coming from linguistic and qualitative sociological analysis, such as, among others, Fairclough, (1993), Chilton (2004), Howarth (2000); Tannen, Schiffrin & Hamilton (2001); van Dijk & Rodrigo (1999), and Wodak & Meyer (2003).

⁸ As It is argued in Zapata-Barrero & Díez Nicolas (2012; 83), "there is a contrast between the foundation of certain policies aiming at limiting the public expression of Muslims, and public opinion and attitudes. Xenophobia is then considered as a political and media construction, rather than a social fact. Anti-immigrant policies respond much more to the electoral strategy rhetoric, rather than to a channel of answering real needs and demands of citizen".

negative representations of immigrant people and the differences they hold (as well as other defense mechanism of the current social and public space and structure) but also on a simplistic, reductionist, generalized and monolithic interpretation of immigrant communities. Political discourses generate problems instead of solving them, dividing society in two, pro and anti immigrants, interpreting diversity as an asset or as a threat. In citizens' terms, the difference between immigrants and national citizens by itself becomes an explanatory category. In short, the argument is that this differentiation governs the *politics of discourse* towards immigrants and is at the forefront of the management of diversity, as it has been overviewed in the previous section. The *xenophobic politics of discourse* upholds a religious view of culture and diversity, rather than a cultural and diverse view of religion.⁹

In Europe, “circumstances of diversity” are mainly related to immigration and the interactions between immigrants and national citizens in a normative framework of diverse minorities and national citizens. This study argues that reflections on immigration and political management of diversity require analysis not so much on the *discourse of power*, but on the *power of discourse*. What makes the immigrant-problem in Europe is the distorted and hostile discourse on immigration and diversity that sprung up from historical misrepresentations as well as contemporary misperceptions. Despite the fact that these images are based on gross generalizations and stereotypes, they have shown durability and continuity over time to the extent that they have dominated the European discourse as facts.

1.1. Conceptual tools. Re-active and pro-active politics of discourse

Within the previous theoretical approach, we distinguish between pro-active (PD) and re-active (RD) discourse. The first criterion of distinction is related to the interpretation of the historical process immigration supposes. The pro-active discourse tends to assume this

⁹ We can say that the *politics of discourse* tends to take an essentialist form of culture (Modood, 2000).

historical dynamic and then it will try to highlight positive consequences of this phenomenon, which is interpreted as an opportunity for social change and innovation. The re-active discourse basically centers its attention on the negative consequences.

Combining these two senses, a "rhetoric of immigration" can be a new research program. At this point, we borrow an interesting analytical distinction from an author that has not worked directly on immigration. A. O. Hirschman in his *The Rhetoric of Persuasion* (1991) studies the process of acquisition of rights by citizens throughout history, picking authors who have addressed the issue from the beginning, based on the known analytical distinction of TH Marshall between three types of rights (civil, political and social). Hirschman focuses on the discourse not on those who defended the acquisition of rights, but rather on those who reacted against, and was interested in knowing the arguments that gave the re-active discourse. In this line, he uses this image of Newtonian mechanics behind that an action is inevitably a reaction (Hirschman, 1991, 8). His argument is that the mechanical logic of action/reaction, can help us understand the formation of discourses and political rhetoric.

In our line of argument, in front of the current historical and globalization process of diversity of European States, two kinds of discourses can be categorized: one re-active and another pro-active. Our argument is that the rhetoric of the first kind of discourse is typical of a new conservatism and new populism; the rhetoric of the second discourse illustrates the new progressivism. The analysis of discursive reaction/pro-action becomes a research program itself.¹⁰ In this study the monitoring of re-active discourse is what we seek to make operative.


But first I would like to clarify that this framework of analysis is not neutral, since our starting premise is that in issues related to immigration and diversity we are always within an interpretable reality, and, therefore,

¹⁰ See R. Zapata-Barrero (2009a) as the main theoretical formulation of these two discourses, applied in several work (see bibliography)

the criterion of objectivity is also part of the rhetoric of persuasion. Therefore, to characterize a discourse as re-active and pro-active, objective criteria are needed, if we want to avoid entering in an endless circular rhetoric ourselves, which is in a "mirror game" depending on which framework one is situated. To understand what we meant let us pick the quote from an interview that was done to J. M. Le Pen, leader and founder of the National Front, a French party avowedly anti-immigrant discourse: "I'm not racist or xenophobic, but Francophile" (Heffer & Samuel, 2007). Given these statements, the mechanisms of discourse analysis have difficulties to identify this statement as re-active or pro-active. There are two possible frames of reference, the historical process or native citizenship and national identity. These two frameworks help distinguish the re-active and pro-active discourses. Ultimately, the re-active discourse reacts against the historical process, while pro-active discourse supports the historic character of the process. The discourse behind the words of Le Pen is in this sense re-active, conservative rhetoric. This potential "mirror game" can become a rhetorical device itself by the discourse of the new conservatism. What provokes the "mirror game" is, therefore, a re-active rhetorical technique.

This distinction also reveals a remarkable degree of normative polarization quite at odds with the realities of immigration policy as enacted by the current European context. Each must be considered as an approach that helps define immigration policies. Broadly speaking, these two discourses becomes a way of identifying the basic issues confronting a debate about the normative foundations of political discourse on immigration and diversity.

To differentiate RD from PD we use two main categories: the category of population and the category of conflict. Considering first the population criterion, we can imagine two concentric circles as the diagram below:



The historical process that promotes this new global dynamics is a widening gap between population (outer circle) and citizenship (inner circle). These two categories went together in the past. This means that with the arrival of immigrants (part of the population, but not citizenship) an increase in this separation process is becoming the norm. From the point of view of *politics of discourse*, we can have a recipient (target audience) only in the citizenship or in the entire population (that includes immigrants). If we have only national citizens, we have a re-active discourse (“I just do what the citizens request me to do”, or “I just do what the population ask me to do” say most government representatives, as if immigrants were not part of the population as well), since we ignore immigrants from the semantic range of political sentences, who remain outside the reach of discursive wave. The *pro-active politics of discourse* is one that has the general population into account, and therefore is directed to the outermost concentric circle.

According to the overview of European discourses we have done, the structural fact is that the political system generally promotes re-active discourses, since it is also built under the premise of equalizing this gap

as a separation between voters from non-voters. Hence, the importance of defending the political rights of immigrants, because they affect one of the root-problems of the absence of a favorable structural environment to pro-active politics of discourse.

Secondly, the criterion of conflict is paramount, since there are two ways to understand this. First, as “conflict of interests”, and therefore in the classical sense of power relationship; and as a process of socialization, and therefore as an indicator of change in society. The RD has a notion of conflict in terms of interests: citizens’ interest versus (as opposed) to the interest of the immigrants, and PD has a sociological notion of conflict as functional factor of progress: without conflicts, there cannot be progress in society.¹¹ From this view, conflicts promote social innovation and creativity.

Having drawn this differentiation between RD and PD, let further study re-active discourse, which is what we are interested in monitoring.

Two re-active discourse’s rhetoric: citizenism and new-populism, traditionalism and new-conservatism

In this section our aim is to develop the politics of discourse governed by the rhetoric of tradition (*traditionalism*) and the rhetoric of national citizenship (*citizenism*).

Citizenism or the Populist rhetoric

Populist rhetoric often uses the argument of democracy, in the sense of appealing to the interests of national citizens and wanting to satisfy them. What actually does is to appeal to a sector of society but on behalf

¹¹ This sociological view of 'conflict' comes from Simmel (2003), for whom the social conflict are interpreted as basic elements of socialization and main indicators of the change process that is occurring in our cities.

of the whole society. It, then, creates confusion between the interests of a part of society (national citizenship) against another part of society (the immigrant). This rhetoric draws the referent "popular", "people", and links security and maintenance of socio-economic level. This rhetoric can be called as "*citizenism*" while appealing to a misunderstood notion of citizenship, which politically instrumentalizes the concept. Our premise is that today's populist rhetoric is not expressed through the concept "people" as its root suggests, but through the concept of "citizenship". Hence, it is most appropriate to refer to as *citizenism* rhetoric.

Citizenism uses the concept of citizenship not as an aim, but rather as means to hide other intentions (capture votes is an intention). *Citizenism* is, in fact, a "misunderstood democracy". It aims to address the interests of society, but actually goes to a sector of society (the non-citizen immigrants, for example) that faces another sector (the citizen-voter, for example). This rhetoric goes so far as to abuse of the term "citizen", that it essentializes the audience interest to the point that it becomes the sole source of legitimacy, without critically engage the interest of the citizen, and regard it as being also the result of a process socialization. *Citizenism* is not a discourse that unite and vertebrate society, but one that create fractures and invertibrates society. *Citizenism* built its arguments focusing most of the time on the (actual or supposed, real or virtual) "complaints" and "fears" in order to be translated into social action against other sectors of society, confusing reality and the ideal of society , sedating the social and political responsibility required by these issues that have immediate effects on the stability and social cohesion.

Citizenism builds protective discourses of acquired social rights, nurture emotions aimlessly having citizenship, and has a language that mixes the protection of national identity with physical security and maintaining stability. *Citizenism* has an "essentialist" component because the interests and needs of citizens are seen as immutable, and as the only criteria to build a public policy on diversity-related conflicts. It often also uses the perception of democratic citizenship as the truth, to the point that it

endorses the statement that "the interest of the citizen is my interest." *Citizenism* also has a dualistic logic providing arguments to the point of emphasizing the fact that the needs (social, economic, political) of non-citizens are incompatible with the needs of citizens.

From the suggestive analytical distinction of Y. Meny & Y. Surel (2000) of "people" as sovereign / class / nation, there are several ways of expressing *citizenism*, not always compatible. The following table shows different rhetorical forms. Populist rhetoric uses these forms without distinction. In fact, this confusion is what nurtured *citizenism*.

Table 3: Different rhetorical forms of *citizenism*

Vision Citizen	As collective notion (citizenship)	Dimension	Conflict definition	rhetorics
As Sovereign	Demos-cracy	Political <i>citizenism</i>	Citizen power	Common citizen
As social class	Proletariat/working class	Socio-economical and welfare <i>citizenism</i>	Socio-economic	Poor citizens
As Nation	Etnos	National (ethnic) <i>citizenism</i>	identity	Patriots citizens

Source: Own elaboration

First, *citizenism* usually mixes the meaning citizen-sovereign-class citizen (low-class), and citizen-nation. As a collective concept, the citizen is seen, respectively, as part of the *demos* (the immigrant is a *no-demos*), as part of the most popular and working class, and as an expression of a single culture (ethnic). Hence, it can be divided, as rhetoric between political *citizenism* (the defender shown sovereignty of the citizen versus non-citizen), a socio-economic *citizenism* (shown defending the interests of socio-economic, the benefits of the welfare system construct arguments protective of acquired social rights) and a cultural *citizenism* (or sovereign national ethnic). In the definition of conflicts diversity-related it often has clear referents: respectively, the power of the citizen (versus powerlessness of the "other" immigrant), the identification of conflicts as

being either socio-economic-based or identity-based. According to each identification, *citizenism* is presented as truth ombudsman of “common and the poor citizens” (that is, the poor citizens versus the poor non-citizens), and, finally, as exalting the national patriotic pride. In this sense, *citizenism* looks to reduce the distance between the people (citizens) and the elite (P. Hassenteufel, 1991, 95), or simply protest, as representative of the the anti-establishment movement (P. Taguieff, 2002, 123-125).¹²

Traditionalism or the conservative Rhetoric

The rhetoric of the tradition uses a set of opinions, practices, customs, beliefs and values, which are seen as shared by all in a homogenous society. It is at the core of the conservative discourse opposing modification to traditional standards of the public sphere in the name of diversity. It employs arguments based on national political identity and majority culture. Its basic framework is that tradition, understood as a set of established values and beliefs transmitted from generation to generation,¹³ is jeopardized by immigration diversity-related. The word ‘tradition’ derives from the Latin *tradere* which means to transfer or to deliver. Tradition is a defense of the sacred chain of the self and his/her history. It has, then, a vital function in the political body, as the sacred purpose of maintaining social cohesion. This new rhetoric is opposed to the process of change in which we find ourselves, since diversity immigration-related affects the values of the most essential tradition: values tied to identity and community. Long before the process of structural change provoked by the politics of cultural pluralism, this rhetoric would seek, in the words of Albert O. Hirschman (1991), to “turn the clock back” (Hirschman , 1991:9)

¹² For additional information on populist rhetoric in general, see, among the most recent works: Taggard (2000), Perrinau (2001), Meny & Surel (2000) Ihl et al., (2003), Taguieff (2004), Laclau (2005).

¹³ We follow the main definition of the seminal study of Friedrich (1972:18).

But this it is not a historical exception. In all processes of structural change, beginning with the French revolution, a conservative re-active line of thought is generated. Indeed, the conservative tradition began to produce its arguments inspired by the context of the French structural revolutionary change.¹⁴ Edmund Burke's framework of reference, for example, was to defend the respect of the tradition of the English revolution against the pretensions of the French one, which literally broke the chain of historical transmission (Burke, 1987). The more recent rhetoric of new conservatism uses tradition as the main producer of arguments. It argues for the Apostolic, Catholic-Roman, and Christian tradition as a source of identity, against other religious sources of identity. Tradition is "our" cultural *alter ego*. It nourishes the politics against the demands of cultural pluralism exalting the traditional cultural homogeneity. It legitimizes the traditional logic of seeing cultural homogeneity as normal and cultural heterogeneity as abnormal. Tradition is the last source of recognition and plays an almost sacred role, since from some initial rational arguments we can penetrate easily to strong emotions directly related to our political communitarian identity.¹⁵

Taking into account the Weberian distinction between three forms of legitimating power: the rational, the charismatic and the traditional, and by defining tradition as "something that has always existed" (Weber, 1964: 29), we see a link between the management of diversity and the legitimacy of power, which is based on traditional values. Hence, the increasing importance of the sacred role of tradition for justifying reaction against whatever social or/and structural change due to diversity in general, immigrants demand in particular.

¹⁴ See, for instance, Mannheim (1986), Nisbet (1986), Honderich, (1993).

¹⁵ Friedrich (1972) reminds us that "the term [tradition] has a religious or ecclesiastical root [...]. The very words of the founder and leader must be transferred and delivered from generation to generation" (p. 14).

The following table summarizes both rhetorics of Re-active discourse.

Table 4: Two rhetoric of re-active discourse: citizenism and traditionalism

Rhetoric	Form of expression	Population Framework	Position towards “conflict areas”	Basic political orientations
Populism	Citizenism	Citizens-voters / identity / homogeneous culture	Citizenship interest prevails	Defence of material interest and socio-economic conditions and welfare of citizens
Conservatism	Traditionalism		Preservation of tradition and original identity conflict	Defences of symbolic and identity interests

Source: Own elaboration

2. The interdisciplinary foundations: from theory to practice

This section aims at presenting different theoretical perspectives to the study of how xenophobic political discourse is constructed and how these perspectives can be interrelated and combined in practice to design an analytical tool that can systematically and objectively monitor xenophobic political discourse. In this way, this chapter serves as a link between theory and practice in which we will present the main theoretical perspectives and the practical elements we take from each of them in order to design the proposed analytical framework (whose main categories would be developed in next chapter).

Accordingly, for the purpose of such a design, we are considering three main perspectives belonging to the disciplines of political science, sociology and linguistics. Each of these perspectives has their own theoretical arguments about how xenophobia is discursively constructed and legitimated. It is our purpose here to present these arguments and to explore how they can be observable and detected in discourse. In this

way, by combining these three perspectives, it is aimed to identify the necessary analytical tools to monitor xenophobic political discourse and assess the rhetoric used to legitimize it.

As a preliminary step, it is important to bear in mind that we are dealing with two well distinguished dimensions of discourse here. The first dimension is related to how xenophobia is discursively constructed and, thus, entails the meaning construction of xenophobia. The second dimension has to do with the justification and legitimacy of xenophobic political discourse and, hence, involves how xenophobic rhetoric is articulated. This distinction is relevant because rhetoric is not xenophobic by itself. Rather, meanings are the ones that make discourse xenophobic, while rhetoric is the use of particular persuasive strategies to justify and legitimate such meanings. In this sense, we are combining the three mentioned perspectives to monitor how xenophobic discourse is constructed and only linguistic and political perspectives to monitor its rhetoric.

Accordingly, we will start by looking at how the different perspectives define xenophobia and how it is constructed. After the three perspectives have been explored and their main analytical tools identified, we will move into the description of how linguistics and political science are combined to assess xenophobic rhetoric.

2.1. Political perspective: the construction of xenophobia as a political ideology

The political perspective conceptualizes and defines xenophobia as a political ideology. In particular, according to this perspective, xenophobic political discourse is articulated around three main political ideologies: nationalism, protectionism and identitarianism.

Nationalism

Nationalism is the ideology that involves the attachment of group members towards their country, which is expressed by a sense of

belonging, love, loyalty, pride, and care towards the group and land (Bartal, 1997). In particular, Miles & Brown (2003) pointed out that, in order to understand xenophobia and racism, it is necessary to understand not only 'race' and class, but also nation and nationalism. Indeed, the importance of language, culture, vernacular literature, religion, law, history, and geography contribute to the formation of a nation's self-consciousness. Further to this is the presumption that a nation, in promoting its own identity, necessarily defines itself against other nations, races and ethnicities in terms more favourable to itself and detrimental to the other. As Van der Valk (2002) puts it, when the principle of 'national preference' is overtly supported, it implies excluding the 'Other' on all social, economic, and political levels.

Consequently, *nationalist* discourse is based on the need to defend national culture, tradition, identity, language and values. In this sense, diversity is constructed as a cultural threat from which defense is needed (Triandafyllidou, 2013). Such a threat is the base for discriminatory tendencies that are not only transmitted by the policies, but also by the discourse that political parties produce against diverse communities.

Nevertheless, it has been proved that this discriminatory discourse, when it is manifested openly, there is normally public rejection towards it (Betz, 2009). On the contrary, if less visible direct or indirect forms of discrimination occur, it is easier to move public opinion and develop consensus. In this sense, this representation of diversity and immigration as a threat through discourse may not be obvious and may need to be carefully assessed in order to be detected.

The discursive mechanisms used by political parties to represent diversity as a threat may range from the construction of interpretative meanings, to the interposition of negative associations, but also the use of rhetorical strategies that involve a presupposition of such a threat in its premises. Accordingly, the representation of immigration as a threat may be detected at all levels of discourse, but it can be especially observable through three main strategies:

- Strategies that tend to present a concrete conflictive situation as being typical and representative of the whole attitude or behaviour of a particular social group (*generalizations*)
- Strategies that maximize and turn into a problem the phenomenon of immigration or the consequences produced by the presence or the arrival of immigrants (*hyperboles*)
- Strategies that conceptualize immigration or the arrival of immigrants as a threat (*metaphors*)

Protectionism

Protectionism is an economic term that involves the development of an economic policy to protect the national products and industry by limiting the entrance of foreign products. As a political ideology related to the construction of xenophobia it entails the tendency to safeguard the host society's economy of the presupposed economic damages that immigration causes to it. This ideology relies on the reproduction of fears about the instability that immigrants may suppose for the economic and welfare state (Fekete, 2011). One example of these fears is that if immigrants lack the skills that employers demand and find it difficult to adapt, immigration may significantly increase the costs associated with income maintenance programs as well as exacerbate the ethnic wage differentials already in existence in the host country (Borjas, 2003).

Consequently, the main discursive arguments of this protectionist ideology involve the degradation of working conditions because of immigrants and the (ab)use of public resources by them. In this sense, immigrants suppose an economic charge for the host society and, consequently, there must be an intensification of restrictions and control for immigration (Chauvin & Garcés-Mascreñas, 2012).

It seems obvious that continuous references to the burden that immigrants suppose for the host society implicitly conveys once more the representation of immigration as a burden and this can be observed by coding such references in two dimensions: the dimension of meaning construction (by assessing *topics* associated with immigration and

identifying how they are *constructed*) and the dimension of *rhetorical* construction (by detecting references to these burdens that serve as a way to legitimize certain political decisions and attitudes related, for example, to the increase of control of immigration).

Identitarianism

Identitarianism is the ideology that involves the emphasis on the membership of individuals to particular social groups because they share culture, religion, language or place of birth (Phinney et al, 2001). The emphasis on these shared values is countered to the de-emphasis of immigrants' values (Bauman, 2004). This ideology polarizes between a positive-us and a negative-them by representing *Their* values as backward, different and even incompatible with *Ours* (Betz, 2009). By focusing on the difference, it is presupposed that it is very difficult to adapt immigrants to *Our* (modern and developed) society (Rydgren, 2005, 2012). Consequently, identitarian ideologies entail also contrasting interests between host society and immigrants.

Furthermore, appealing to the majority's identity values involves promoting feelings of belonging and positive attitudes towards the larger society and places society in a defending position towards those who threaten common shared values (Fenton, 2011).

In particular, Muslim communities are collectives that can easily be identified as having different values and identities, due to their (presupposed) distant culture and different religion. And, precisely, after the September, 2001 attacks in New York and the March, 2004 in Madrid, public discourse began to identify, to a much greater extent than before, Muslims as suspect communities whose loyalty was constantly questioned and their members have been generally demonized by distrusting them not only in terms of security issues, but also in terms of their religious and cultural values (Fekete, 2009). In this sense, once again, xenophobia is constructed as an ideology in which immigrants, and particularly Muslims, are represented negatively and as a threat to

majority identity values and security. Similarly, immigration is linked with insecurity, delinquency, the degradation of neighbourhoods and the educational system. Consequently, identity seems to involve, not only diverse values, but also other negative associations (such as delinquency and degradation) that are posed as part of the cultural and behavioural identity of immigrants.

Accordingly, in order to monitor such an ideological construction of xenophobia, it should be coded in discourse, on the one hand, explicit and implicit *polarizations* between a positive-us and a negative-them, by paying specific attention to the negative ones. And, on the other hand, it should be coded when discourse justifies, or at least does not argue against, a particular conflict in terms of contrasting interests.

2.2. Sociological perspective: the construction of xenophobia as negative social representations

One of the aspects which have been widely studied in sociology is the formation of social groups, how these groups are defined and identified and how they define and identify other social groups (Esses et al, 2001, 2005). For our purposes, we are considering here how political parties define immigrants by looking at two main aspects: on the hand, the theory of social representations, since this is crucial to understand how social groups are depicted and defined; on the other hand, and as part of these social representations, the reproduction of stereotypes and prejudices as the base for the development of xenophobic attitudes.

Social representations

Social representations are defined by Moscovici (1981, 2001) as cognitive systems which do not represent only opinions and attitudes towards a particular social reality, but also offer theories and knowledge branches that provide guidelines for organizing such a reality, by the inclusion of illustrative systems and codes that allow and ease people such an organization. Therefore, representing a social reality implies not only

repeating and reproducing such a reality, but also reconstruct and change the perception people have of the social issue or of the particular social actors.

Accordingly, social representations allow individuals to construct a particular reality and influence other individuals by shaping opinions, ideas and attitudes about such issue (Deuax & Philogène, 2001).

Similarly, Martín Serrano (2004) points out that social representations are the proposal of the interpretation of a particular reality in which some topics are referred to in detriment of others which are not mentioned or are relegated. In the same way, some values and assessments are promoted instead of others, depending on how immigration is framed by political leaders (Goffman, 1974; Feldman, 2007).

Accordingly, xenophobia here is defined as negative social representations of immigrants. In particular, social representations of immigrants in public discourse are repeatedly associated with the declining economy, overpopulation, pollution, increased violence, depleted social resources (i.e., medical and educational), erosion of cultural values, and terrorism (Cowan, Martinez, & Mendiola, 1997). Similarly, immigrant individuals are often portrayed as criminal, poor, violent, and uneducated (Munro, 2006). When it comes to monitoring these representations in discourse, it is not only important to detect how immigrants are socially represented, but also how actually such a representation is created through discourse, how the whole phenomenon is conceptualized, what is said, but also what is not said but implicated and what values are promoted. In other words, it is necessary to assess how global meanings are constructed and how social actors are represented.

Consequently, on the one hand, a semantic analysis of *global meanings* will be useful to understand how immigration is socially represented and identify which meanings are emphasized or mitigated. It seems obvious

that if immigration is always associated with negative topics such as insecurity or delinquency, the social interpretation of immigration will be equally negative.

On the other hand, we should assess the social *representation of immigrants* and national citizens through the different *roles* and *attributes* attached to them in discourse.

Prejudices and stereotypes

In the sociological perspective, prejudices and stereotypes are the base for racism and xenophobia. In particular, the studies of Allport (1977) and Pettigrew and Meertens (1995) have influenced and serve as base for later theories about racism and xenophobia. Allport defines prejudices as a hostile attitude from one person (or social group) to another because this other belongs to another group. The stereotype, following Hamilton and Trolier (1986), is a cognitive structure with knowledge, beliefs and expectations about particular people or social groups. It is a simplification of characteristics that allows us to identify individuals in a collective and generalised way. Accordingly, while stereotypes can be positive, negative or neutral, prejudices involve always a negative attitude.

Consequently, while Allport settled the bases for prejudices formation and reproduction, Pettigrew and Meertens moved a step forward and distinguished between subtle and blatant prejudice. According to these authors, blatant prejudice is hot, close and direct, while subtle prejudice is cool, distant and indirect. The first is perceived as a threat from the *outgroup* and a rejection of it, together with an opposition to any emotional attached or direct contact with the *outgroup*. Subtle prejudices, however, are characterised by a defence of traditional values, an exaggeration of cultural differences and a denial of positive emotions towards the *outgroup*. This is particularly relevant since, as we will see, xenophobic political discourse takes more the shape of a subtle, rather

than a blatant expression and, hence, needs a closer analysis to be detected.

It seems obvious that the reproduction of *stereotypes* and *prejudices* in public discourse has a direct negative repercussion on the perception and interpretation of immigration in society. In this sense, it is important to monitor such stereotypes and prejudices in discourse, especially when they are used as the base to legitimise particularly restrictive policies or negative attitudes towards immigration.

2.3. Linguistic perspective: the construction of xenophobia as a selection of particular meanings

The linguistic perspective, and in particular the perspective of discourse studies, relies on the construction of realities based on the selection of particular words and meanings, since this selection is intentional and shapes the audience's interpretation of this particular reality.

The base of this perspective is that pure synonyms do not exist (Van Dijk, 2003), and the use of a particular word instead of another promotes particular connotations and meanings and favors an interpretation of reality from a specific point of view. For example, to designate one person or one social collective involves a definition of this group and promotes a particular way of social interpretation, because designating is done by a specific point of view in detriment of others. As Ribas (2000: 211) puts it, by designating, what is referred to is continuously constructed and reconstructed with each reference.

Furthermore, the promotion of particular meanings that are emphasized in contrast with those that are mitigated or de-emphasized is also ideological and intentional. Similarly, what is mentioned or not mentioned, and what is said explicitly and implicitly can be also an indicative of how a particular reality is depicted. This perspective relies on the analysis of the selection of meanings as a way to understand the underlying ideologies, opinions and attitudes behind this selection. In

this sense, discourse is understood as a social practice in which an interpretation of reality is expressed and communicated (Van Dijk, 2009, Martín Rojo et al, 2003). This reality changes and it is constructed and reconstructed through discourse and the selection of particular (explicit or implicit) meanings.

In particular, xenophobia is defined as a complex social and cognitive system of domination based on racial or ethnic inequality. The social system involves, on the one hand, discriminatory social practices at the micro level and, on the other, relationships of power abuse by organizations and institutions at the macro level. The cognitive subsystem has to do with the perceptions and interpretations of particular events which are mental representations of people and can lead to prejudices and racist ideologies (Van Dijk, 2001). Accordingly, through discourse these perceptions and interpretations can be modified, influenced and emphasized or mitigated, because discourse can construct forms of inclusion and exclusion through the different (intentional and strategic) selection of meanings and topics (Wodak, 1999).

Consequently, in order to monitor xenophobic political discourse it is necessary to assess the construction of meanings (as already stated) but also the particular selection of lexicon. Depending on the objectives, the selection of *lexical strategies* to be coded can vary, and we should consider only those specific *lexical strategies* which can help us measure how much xenophobic discourses are. The quantification of these will help us determine the general attitude of a particular party towards immigration. In particular, association of particular *origin countries*, *religion* or *languages* to negative contexts, as well as the preferences for particular ones (in detriment of others) can help to measure the degree of xenophobic tendencies in discourse, since such a negative references entail somehow discrimination towards particular social groups. In this sense, the more these references are, the more discriminatory discourse is. In the same way, (implicit or explicit) references to *negative values* associated with

immigrants are other *lexical strategies* that can also help to graduate discourse.

However, as it has already been stated, we cannot forget that semantic analysis (analysis of meanings and representations) will be one of the most straight forwards way to understand how xenophobic discourse is constructed.

Once it has been described how we are combining the three theoretical perspectives in order to practically monitor how political xenophobic discourse is constructed, we shall move onto the description of the combination of the linguistic and the political perspective in order to monitor how xenophobic rhetoric is constructed.

2.4. Discursive and political rhetoric

The linguistic and the political perspectives offer different approaches to the assessment of xenophobic political rhetoric. While the linguistic perspective focuses on the general socio-cognitive strategies used to convince, persuade and manipulate the audience to make them accept as right and true the arguments offered by a particular political party, the political perspective deals with the ideological realization of particular strategies in order to legitimize xenophobic discourse by appealing to particular values or interests. It is our aim here to present both perspectives and, in particular, the approaches we have selected for the design of our analytical framework.

Discursive rhetoric

In the perspective of linguistics there have been several attempts to assess rhetoric and argumentation from different points of view: By assessing persuasion and its effects (Walton, 1996), by focusing on the internal logical construction of arguments (Perelman & Arnold, 1982) or even more theoretical value-based approaches (Bench-Capon, 2003).

However, there are mainly two approaches that seem to have become stronger and most widely accepted by scholars, which also best suit our purposes: the argumentation theory of the *discourse-historical approach* (Wodak, 2006; Reisigl & Wodak, 2001) and the *pragma-dialectical approach* (Van Eemeren & Grootendorst, 2002, 2004).

On the one hand, the *discourse-historical approach* is a theoretical and methodological framework that attempts to integrate all available background information in the analysis and interpretation of the many layers of discourse (Wodak & Meyer, 2009). This argumentation theory relies on the identification and assessment of content-related argument schemes that connect directly the argument with the conclusion (each of this content-related arguments are called *topos*; in plural *topoi*). In particular, Reisigl & Wodak (2001) have developed this theory by appointing some of the most common *topoi* appearing in discriminatory (immigration-related) discourses.

On the other hand, the *pragma-dialectic approach* proposes ten rules for the critical discussion that are essential for the resolution of any dispute. The assessment of such rules allows to identify if they are respected or violated. A violation of one or more of these rules is understood as a *fallacy*, since it prevents the resolution of the discussion.

Next chapter will cover more in depth the notion of *topoi* and *fallacies* but, for the moment, let us say that *Persuasion* consists of producing a change in the opinion or beliefs of the audience from one initial state to a new one. *Persuasion*, then, is only achieved if the speaker convinces the hearer to accept the arguments proposed by the speaker (Walton, 2007). In this sense, while the *topoi* allows to identify *argumentative strategies* used to achieve *persuasion*, we understand that *fallacies* activate some kind of *manipulative strategies* to achieve such a *persuasion*, since it is related to arguments that cannot be judged; arguments that seem to be logically valid, that appeal to particular emotions rather than logically valid structures to convince. In this sense, we will consider the (ab)use of

fallacies to convince is an indicator of a manipulative discourse, since as Maillat & Oswald (2009) argue, these fallacies block possible counter-arguments because they prevent the advance in a cooperative discussion.

Political rhetoric

The political perspective is more focused on the kind of underlying ideology that serves as a frame for the type of rhetorical arguments employed to legitimate xenophobia. In particular, following Zapata-Barrero's research (2009), we are distinguishing between two main rhetorics: conservative and populist.

On the one hand, *Conservative rhetoric* (as we will see in detail in next section) aims at preserving national citizenship values and interests by appealing to tradition, to customs and to cultural national elements passed from one to another generation. On the other hand, *Populist rhetoric* tries to preserve citizens' interests and it is characterized by using ambiguous concepts and a big range of images (and metaphors) that reproduce stereotypes.

It should have become apparent at this point how the three theoretical perspectives have been assessed and combined in order to identify the minimal analytical tools necessary to design the analytical framework to monitor xenophobic political discourse.

To conclude, the following table summarizes the combination of the different theoretical perspectives and the analytical tools identified for each of them within each of the two mentioned dimensions.

Table 5: Dimensions, perspectives and tools

Dimensions	Perspectives		Tools
Xenophobic construction	Political	Nationalism	Generalizations, hyperboles, metaphors
		Protectionism	Thematic and rhetoric burdens construction
		Identitarianism	Local polarization
	Sociological	Social Representations	Global meanings
		Stereotypes and prejudices	Stereotypes and prejudices
	Linguistic	Lexical selection	References to origin countries, religion, language & values
Xenophobic rhetoric	Linguistic	Persuasion	Topoi
		Manipulation	Fallacies
	Political	Conservatism	Appeal to traditional values
		Populism	Appeal to citizens' interests

Source: own elaboration

3. Concepts and measurements. Setting the standards

The aim of this section is to describe the methodological and theoretical tools we are proposing to monitor xenophobic political discourses. Therefore, we will, firstly, start presenting some preliminary clarifications and distinctions concerning the design of the framework. Secondly, we will offer a general description of the framework by focusing in the three tools we are proposing. Finally, we will describe in detail the standards proposed within each of the methodological tool.

3.1. Preliminary clarifications and distinctions concerning the framework

Before entering in to the description of the analytical framework we are proposing, it is necessary to present some preliminary clarifications and distinctions that will allow us to further justify our methodology and also

to establish some basic definitions about the foundations of the framework.

Methodological principles: reliability, transparency, replicability

This analytical framework has three main methodological principles when thinking of its application:

- Reliability: we propose clear consistent standards for measurement.
- Transparency: we propose unambiguous standards that can be detected, identified and revised.
- Replicability: we propose standards that can be identified by whatever social scientist having the same discourse to analyze. In particular, even if some standards require a closer analysis and certain degree of expertise, the aim is that the basic application of the framework can be implemented by everyone.

Differences between racism and xenophobia

There is a necessary distinction we need to make between racism and xenophobia, provided that there is not an established dividing line in the current literature. Most times these two terms are used interchangeably, as if they were synonymous.

Let us start by saying that ‘racism’ is based on the belief that humanity is divided into distinct biological/cultural groups, which are superior or inferior. In this sense, racism is a discriminatory attitude that consists of thinking that people with particular physical features or cultural practices, as for example the colour of the skin or the practice of specific religion, are consequently inferior from an intellectual, moral or social view.

However, xenophobia is a dislike or fear towards people from other countries or towards people that are perceived as foreign or strange. This discriminatory attitude has more to do with people feeling fear or rejection towards immigrants, mainly because they feel threatened by the presence of them. This threat can take many different forms, but all of

them involve some kind of perceived decrease for the *ingroup*'s welfare, or else fear to lose the *ingroup* identity.

In this sense, xenophobia conveys a complex social system of domination based on non-national inequality. Following Van Dijk (2001), this social system involves, on the one hand, discriminatory social practices at the micro level and, on the other, relationships of power abuse by organizations and institutions at the macro level.

It seems obvious that we are interested here in the first subsystem (i.e. in the reproducing of xenophobia at the macro level). Precisely because xenophobia and racism are not innate, but they are learned and acquired through communication and, as we have already suggested, political discourse has privileged access to massive communication. However, in the context of Europe it is more likely that political discursive discrimination comes in the form of xenophobia (promoting fear towards the other or representing immigration as a threat), rather than in the form of racism (emphasizing the difference and the inferiority of immigrants, just because they belong to another ethnic or race).

These are the reasons why we focus here on xenophobic political discourses rather than on racist political discourses.

Why focusing on immigrants and not other ethnic minorities

It is true that xenophobia in its global meaning targets not only immigrants, but also other ethnic minorities, such as Jews, Roms, etc. But in the context of Spain and Catalonia xenophobic manifestations in political discourse are much more widely addressed to immigrants, while the presence of other ethnic minorities is almost inexistent in political discourse.

We are fully aware that this specific issue is not the case for other countries of Europe, where the presence of ethnic minorities in the media and political discourse is much stronger. In this sense, for this particular exploratory study we focus on immigrants, but we understand

that the focus should expand to other collectives while analyzing other European countries' political discourse.

Opening and closing the scope of the main concept as a strategy to provoke confusion to the population: differences between immigrants, foreigners and national citizens

The difference between immigrants and citizens is obviously important, but the dividing semantic line of these two concepts is not so clear. This lack of shared meaning illustrates most of the time that these categories are used to legitimize certain interpretations of the reality (perceived reality). This conceptual "elasticity" can then be a resource to identify discriminatory tendencies, going beyond the juridical and political distinctions.

'Immigrant' is a person who lives in a country but does not have citizenship status. Here the difference with 'foreigner' is straightforward, since most of the time these two terms are intentionally mixed. A foreigner is a person who is not national, and does not live in the country. For instance, a tourist is a foreigner, not an immigrant. Also a criminal working for an international illegal organization can come in a country to commit crime during a limited period, but is not living in the country, and has no intention to settle down.

This key distinction came out as something relevant to take into account in the different meetings with social and political representatives we have held during the process of designing this framework. The fact is that sometimes statistics mixes these two terms specially when counting non-nationals in prisons, or from a media point of view taking certain foreign internal criminal as if they were immigrant residents. Xenophobic discourses tend also to break this distinction and intentionally provoke confusion between these two concepts. However, for our purposes, we will not go in depth into this distinction because what it is important to us is how immigrants are represented through political discourse in global terms. In this sense, we will not explore for each specific term if

this confusion applies or not, but rather if the representation of immigrants is positive or negative.

A citizen can of course be national or of immigrant background. Most of the time, even if judicially people fall both under the category of citizenship, xenophobic discourse tends also to make visible this distinction reinforcing the social difference between citizens who are native or national, and those who are by acquisition through naturalization for instance. In this case, and contrary to the first two categories, here xenophobic discourse intentionally wants to make visible this difference, in order to focus strictly discourse on a concrete targeted population: national citizens.

To summarize, these distinctions will be considered while implementing our framework, precisely by taking into account that xenophobic political discourse tends to provoke conceptual confusion about these two areas. In particular, it tends, first, to mix up immigrant and foreigner, and second, to differentiate between national and non-national citizens.

How to transform this framework into a social critical instrument?

One final key question is the use of this analytical framework. It is obvious that the category system is rather academic and technical, coming from the political, sociological and linguistic literature. It then probably needs to be “policy translated” without losing their purposes in a rather conceptually simple categorization system. If we want the analytical framework to be used by social and political actors, and be a tool to formulate critical claims, making visible those who surpass the *threshold of xenophobia*, then maybe a certain “translation” is necessary.

This translation will be done in section 4, where the reader will find a guide to easily implement the analytical framework we are presenting here. But previous to this guide, it is necessary to define in detail the

theoretical foundations of the standards we are proposing for this framework.

3.2. The analytical framework

As we have already stated, the problem the project seeks to address is contextual-based. Given the current economic downturn in Europe, there is a need to construct a framework to monitor xenophobic political discourses. Accordingly, the general purpose of this project is to construct an *analytical framework* that allows us to identify and counter whatever tendency of political parties of radicalising their position towards xenophobia. In this sense, this tool aims at offering a straightforward way to make visible xenophobic discursive tendencies.

In order to do so, on the one hand, we take as departure point three main premises. Firstly, the interpretative framework proposed by Zapata-Barrero on re-active political discourses and two main rhetoric's (populism and conservatism), which will be operative through this framework. Secondly, we seek also to strengthen the argument that the perceived threat that feeds xenophobia is mainly a political and media construction. And, hence, the way immigration is represented in political discourse influences the way society interprets such reality. Thirdly, we understand that xenophobic discourse is mainly intentional and seeks to create a perceived reality on immigration and diversity, which is basically negative and counter-progressive. However, there might be some xenophobic discursive tendencies that convey subtle negative representations of immigration, which are not intentional, but rather political parties might be reproducing them without being aware of. This is why our framework might be also useful to make parties be aware of the presence of such xenophobic tendencies, in order to help them self-regulate their discourse.

To summarise in terms of basic aims, the *immediate purpose* is to propose a methodological tool to make visible xenophobic discursive tendencies through objective criteria, and contribute to limit its expansion. The

ultimate purpose is to provide with objective arguments for decision-making process to avoid the production and reproduction of xenophobic political discourses and to contribute to what we may call an *ethics of political discourse on immigration and diversity*.

In this sense, we will consider that xenophobic political discourses are speeches and declarations made by politicians (mainly leaders) in social and political arena with a clear intention to provoke and nurture attitudes and behavior towards national citizens against non-nationals diversity-related, flowing the racist logic of positive-us vs. negative-them (Van Dijk, 2003). This political intention is what we have called the “politics of discourse”. The preliminary assumption is based on the premise that politicians are much more concerned with answering the question of *what to say* than the question of *what can we do*, and then interpretation and rhetoric become an ideological criteria to a political discourse building-process.

In line with the previous, xenophobic political discourses generate their main logic of argumentation through an interpretative framework that we call “re-active political discourse” (the theory informing the framework), which is a discourse that constructs its argumentative system always as a “reaction against” the process of change (institutional, social, political) arising by the presence of immigrants and diversity dynamics. The main challenge of the mechanism we want to construct to identify and graduate xenophobic political discourse is how to define this discourse in terms of standards, namely how to make operative this re-active political discourse.

The main methodological purpose is to propose a mechanism that allows us to identify the *minimal standards* that certify with objective and impartial criteria what we call *discriminatory tendencies*. Just one *discriminatory tendency* does not make necessarily a political discourse xenophobic, but a series of them presented in a systematic way by the same political party or political document shows a clearer xenophobic discursive pattern. In the same way we refer to discourse as politics, we

also speak about *discursive political strategies*, stressing the fact that xenophobic discourse as a whole is intentionally *discriminatory*. However, more subtle forms of xenophobic tendencies might not be intentional. With these premises as reference framework, we have constructed all our analytical distinctions and lens.

Each of the *Standards* sets up minimal requirements for labelling discourse as xenophobic and graduate it, while also illustrates reference criteria¹⁶ that have to be fulfilled by discourses. In this sense, *Standards* will help us establish uniform criteria and a common core on how to make visible xenophobic discourse.

These *Standards* or minimal requirements will be used with three different, but complementary, interpretative tools: *Kitemarking*, *Framing*, and *Benchmarking*. The three of them are technical tools for monitoring discourses.

Following the technical use of *kitemarking*, *framing* and *benchmarking* in monitoring different aspects of immigration policy, discourse and urban openness, we propose to use these tools to monitor xenophobic political discourses. We know that these techniques come from different backgrounds. *Framing* comes from discourse analysis (Goffman, 1974), and *kitemarking* and *benchmarking* from business and trade, and have been transferred to policy analysis only recently. At its origin, *Framing* seeks to draw the basic contours of discourse; and the other two procedures seek to measure effectiveness and quality of a product in a given market.¹⁷ What interest us is that these three technical tools produce objective information, which provoke trust and reliability to consumer, or give a certain idea of progress in the stage we are in a given process.

¹⁶ A “reference” can be a word, a phrase, a number, a sentence, a paragraph or several paragraphs and may or may not even be present verbatim, but being understood implicitly.

¹⁷ See, www.kitemark.com, www.bsigroup.com

In particular, *Kitemarking* is inspired by the use made by Opencities.¹⁸ A *kitemark* represents a standard that should be reached for a specific issue in a specific field. As it is also stressed by Opencities, *kitemarking* includes judgements and is thus never neutral. Being applied at the urban level, and with the aim to measure the openness of a city, we can adapt it to our concern of identifying xenophobic political discourse. Therefore, a *Xenophobic Discursive Kitemarking* (XDK) is a technique that allows us to certify that discourse has xenophobic tendencies because it meets certain minimum requirements.

Framing is used in discourse analysis and it suggests that people rely on an interpretative scheme to understand and act in a given event. In other words, we understand and organize our world through particular reference frames that allow us to define concrete social situations. In this sense, a frame is a particular interpretative scheme that allows us to define, identify, categorize and situate concrete realities defined in specific terms. For our purposes, the way discourse on immigration is framed has consequences on the way the reality of immigration will be interpreted by society. In accordance, the use of particular words or meanings instead of others helps to frame in one way, or another, the phenomenon of immigration. Thus, each of the standards within this analytical tool will represent one negative way of framing immigration. Therefore, the greater presence of each of these standards, the more xenophobic discourse will be considered.

Benchmarking consists on the creation of a reference point to measure according to specified standards in order to compare them and improve one's own product.¹⁹ It is basically a tool for systematic comparison²⁰. It

¹⁸ Measuring, Benchmarking and Representing Open Cities: A feasibility study for the British Council and Ubbact Bakbasel

http://opencities.britishcouncil.org/web/download/feasibility_report.pdf.

See also: Greg Clark (ed) Towards Open cities, British council, 2008

¹⁹ <http://www.thefreedictionary.com/benchmark>

²⁰ Opencities mention Bakbasel Economic's International Benchmarking, benchmarking is used to compare systematically economic indicators of regions across

has been transferred from business to immigration public policy by the Migration Policy Group with European Commission support,²¹ as a standard by which something can be measured or judged. According to our reading, it is a set of questions that serve as indicators to draw an ideal frame of reference of a xenophobic rhetoric. The presence of such indicators will allow us to identify xenophobic rhetoric. Questions posed as a standard are usually qualitative and can be answered by a yes/no (by identifying the presence or absence of such standards).

These three tools are complementary, but can, of course, be used separately. *Kitemarking* has a synchronic function in the sense that it helps us to identify the minimum standards to label a discourse as having xenophobic tendencies. Once identified, *framing* has a descriptive function, in the sense that it helps to have a first minimum picture of how a discourse promotes certain words and meanings instead of others while dealing with immigration. Accordingly, *framing* has the function to graduate how much xenophobic discourse is. Comes, then *benchmarking*, which can help us identify the main political and discursive rhetoric operating in discourse. The following Table describes and summarises the function of each of these technical tools (“nuts and bolts”).

Europe. Using the background of a long-term endogenous growth model, the benchmarking analysis looks both at economic performance and the relevant location factors behind.


²¹ Applied by the European Union. EU Legislation and Open Methods of Coordination as benchmarking instruments See: Setting up a system of benchmarking to measure the success of integration policies in Europe, European Parliament Committee on Civil Liberties, Justice and Home Affairs, 31.01.07 www.migpolgroup.com (IP/C/LIBE/ST/2005-93)

Table 6: Tools used for measurement of xenophobic political discourse

Tool	Description	Function	Standards
Kitemarking	Identify 3 minimal requirements. Each of these requirements represents a standard that shows one particular discriminatory tendency. If the 3 of them are detected in a given discourse, it is enough to certify it as having xenophobic tendencies	Certify discourse as having xenophobic tendencies	Total: 3 standards
Framing	Identify globally the 7 minimal lexical and semantic strategies.	Graduate how much xenophobic discourse is	Total: 7 standards: • 4 lexical strategies • 3 semantic strategies
Benchmarking	Identify the minimal rhetoric strategies that will allow us to graduate the type of rhetorics operating up for comparison	Capture the main rhetoric strategies: discursive and political	Total 4 standards: • 2 discursive rhetorics (argumentative & manipulative) • 2 political rhetorics (conservative & populist)

Source: Own elaboration

Finally, but not least important, there is also a consequential logical order, which involves that *Framing* and *Benchmarking* should be applied only if *Kitemarking* (first stage analysis) certifies discourse as having xenophobic tendencies. If, by contrast, discourse does not show such tendencies, there is no need to continue with the graduation, neither with the assessment of xenophobic rhetoric. Hence the following Diagram:



For our policy purposes, the application of these three techniques can help us to introduce a critical claim within the public debate with objective common criteria (standards) to certify and graduate xenophobic political discourse. This visibility, which is our *immediate purpose*, will certainly contribute for a debate of seeking better mechanisms to avoid its expansion, as *ultimate purpose*.

In this sense, especially *Kitemarking*, since it is easy and quick to apply, is designed with the aim that can be applied by citizens, journalists, social stakeholders, and whatever individual/actor that need to base their criticism on objective and academically supported criteria. In the same way, this tool can be useful for political parties to self-regulate their own discourse or by other parties to have objective arguments to regulate other parties' discourse.

Once the main analytical tools have been defined, it is our aim to define the standards used to *kitemark*, *frame*, and *benchmark* xenophobic political discourse.

3.3. Kitemarking (certifying) xenophobic discursive tendencies

For *kitemarking* xenophobic discursive tendencies, we propose three minimal requirements. Grounded on the re-active discourse concept, xenophobic discourse is a politics of discourse that interprets diversity as a framework of relationship between citizens (separating those that have an immigrant background from those that do not) and immigrants (mixing them with simple foreigners), who constantly are in a conflict of interests, and that always identify the negative consequences of diversity in almost all the domains of life. Therefore, this type of discourse interprets diversity as a threat, always oversizing the disadvantages of diversity.

As a category, diversity falls within the domain of the “negative-others”, and can even been typified as a political euphemism. Semantically, there

is always a clear separation between citizens and immigrants, and there is an identification of the population as the national citizenship domain. Due to this conflict, diversity is always polarized in negative terms and priority is always given to citizens (this is the most effective “citizens first!”). Similarly, we assist to a generalization of immigrants as a homogenous group, static, and their situation is always described by using negative conceptualizations and representations.

Accordingly, in order to certify political discourse as having xenophobic tendencies it is required that the following three minimal standards are detected in discourse:

1) Target population

This can be identified when discourse recipients are explicitly or implicitly only national-citizens, voters and/or national culture, rather than the whole diverse population.

2) Polarization

This can be identified when there is an explicit or implicit polarization between a positive-us and a negative-them, and discourse justifies, or at least does not argue against, a particular conflict in terms of contrasting interests.

3) Local negative representations

This can be identified when discourse activates negative local representations of immigration or diversity issues through the use of particular semantic moves. This can be seen in four main semantic cases:

- *Use of negative generalizations*: according to Van Dijk (2000) this is one of the most classical discriminatory resources and it occurs when a concrete conflictive situation (fact or action) is presented as being typical and representative of the whole attitude or behaviour of a particular social group. Generalizations do not consider exceptions and this is why they are

the base for prejudices and stereotypes. An example of this is when it is assumed that “all immigrants are potentially delinquents”.

- *Use of negative hyperboles*: this is probably a variant of the first one, but has its own semantic mechanism. It happens when the generalization is dramatized and exaggerated. For instance, when in a given discourse the political leader says that “the massive arrival of immigrants is provoking a national crisis”.
- *Use of negative metaphors*: it mobilises cognitive resources that shape and communicate particular conceptualizations of different realities. The power of metaphors to conceptualize and shape realities has been widely studied in literature. In particular, Semino (2008) remarks that metaphors have a great power to conceptualize abstract and complex realities based on concrete experiences that are more familiar and accessible for the audience.

But the election of one or another metaphor to conceptualize realities will influence the way this reality is understood and interpreted, which aspects are emphasized or hidden, and what evaluative and emotional associations are transmitted (Fairclough, 1997, 2000). Hence, the representation of the arrival of immigrants as a natural disaster (using terms such as *waves*, *avalanches*, *tsunamis*, etc.) will reinforce the conceptualization and interpretation of immigration as a threat.

Particularly, Chilton (2004) emphasizes the trend in political discourse to construct countries as a body, a person, a building, a container or a family. Thus, while metaphors related to body, person and family activate scenarios of hierarchy and interrelations based on friendship and enmity with other groups, metaphors related to buildings and containers activate the domains of home and strength and the mental schemas which counter the ones that are inside the container, with the ones that are outside. In this way, emotional associations of defence and resistance are particularly prominent in this kind of metaphors, which, once more, reinforce the representation of immigration as a threat we need to defence from.

Finally, Charteris-Black (2004, 2005) shows that metaphors in political discourse have the role to communicate political arguments and ideologies, but they also intensify the emotional impact and influence the audience’s opinions and attitudes. In political discourse, metaphors exploit the conscious beliefs of people, but also the emotional unconscious associations in order to project particularly powerful representations about different groups and communities. Therefore, metaphors in political discourse have a persuasive aim so that the audience can adhere to the politician’s views and

construct a sense of identity and unification in the *ingroup* that is opposed to the sense of polarization and division of the *outgroup*.

Hence, as we have seen, metaphors are a very powerful persuasive resource which can be an indicator of how politicians conceptualize and represent immigration. And, in concrete, metaphors of natural disasters and those that conceptualize countries as persons and containers will be particularly relevant.

- *Use of dehumanizing terms to refer to immigrants*: this semantic mechanism promotes the objectification of immigrants. The presence of dehumanizing terms to refer to them (such as *illegal*, *criminals*, *dirty*, *ugly*, *dangerous*, *violent*, *freeloaders*, *liars*, etc.) invites to avoid empathy with immigrants, since their human side is de-emphasized.

It seems obvious that the presence of such terms obeys to an ideological or strategic move with an intrinsic persuasive effect and also conveys a negative representation of immigrants, by de-emphasizing their human part. Furthermore, speaking of “immigration” when referring to the people (“immigrants”) can be also considered in particular contexts an example of dehumanization, since making reference to the phenomenon, instead of to the people, may obey to strategic intentions.

3.4. Framing (graduating) xenophobic discursive tendencies

Framing, as stated, has to do with the construction of a particular perspective in detriment of others. Representing a social reality implies not only repeating and reproducing such a reality or social actors, but also reconstruct and change the perception people have of that social issue or actors. Martín Serrano (2004) states that *Framing* is the proposal for the interpretation of a particular reality in which some topics are referred to, in detriment of others, which are not mentioned or relegated. In particular, some values and assessments might be promoted instead of others, depending on how immigration is framed by political leaders (Goffman, 1974; Feldman, 2007).

In this sense, the application of *Framing* through the standards we are proposing will help to detect how meanings about immigration are globally constructed and to graduate how much xenophobic political

discourse is. Precisely, because, as stated, each standard corresponds to a particular intentional discriminatory tendency. Therefore, the more presence of these standards in a given discourse, the more xenophobic discourse will be. We will distinguish here between lexical and semantic strategies.

a) Lexical strategies

Lexical strategies have to do with the particular word selection and the meanings accompanying such a selection. Choosing one word instead of another to speak about a particular phenomenon involves a perspective and promotes a particular way of social interpretation in detriment of others. A lexical analysis will be useful to detect the underlying intentions when focusing on the reality of immigration.

Lexical selection in political discourse is, hence, intentional and shapes the audience's interpretation of a particular reality. Furthermore, what is mentioned or not mentioned can be also an indicative of how a particular reality is depicted. The fact that the discourse always mentions Muslims, when it is just one part of the whole immigrant population, falls under this lexical strategy.

According to these insights, there are some specific lexical strategies, which can help us to measure how much xenophobic discourses are. The quantification of these categories will help us determine the general attitude of a particular party towards immigration. It goes without saying that this analysis alone is not enough to categorize discourse as xenophobic, but it helps to understand a first picture of how immigration is lexically framed.

Depending on the objectives of the research, the selection of lexical strategies to consider can vary. For our purposes, we are proposing four standards:

4) References to origin countries

The analysis concentrates in identifying which countries are mentioned in negative contexts and which countries are mentioned as preferred. This can help to interpret if discourse makes more references to one particular nationality in detriment of others, and to detect if there is an explicit gap between the countries referred and the current number of countries with more presence in the country (according to the last statistics). *Framing* analysis here aims at identifying if references to some particular countries, which might or might not be the ones with more presence in the specific region, obey to ideological reasons and, thus, have discriminatory intentions. Accordingly, frequent references to one or more particular country are an indicator of discriminatory tendencies, especially, if these countries are culturally distant, in terms of visibility (language, religion, skin color). Similarly, explicit or implicit preference for particular countries of origin shows also a discriminatory tendency towards the rest of non-preferred countries.

5) References to religion

The analysis identifies which concrete examples/issues religion-related are referred to explicitly or implicitly (through designation of various specific practices such as pray, mosque, burqa, etc, or areas such as education, administration, etc.) in negative contexts. *Framing* analysis aims to detect if frequent mentions to one particular religion obey to ideological reasons and, then, it is an indicator of discriminatory tendencies. Similarly, explicit or implicit preference to particular religions shows a discriminatory tendency towards the rest.

6) References to language

The analysis considers which languages are explicitly and implicitly referred in negative contexts. *Framing* analysis aims at finding out if there are frequent mentions to particular languages that obey to ideological reasons and, then, it is an indicator of discriminatory tendencies.

Similarly, explicit or implicit preference to particular languages shows a discriminatory tendency towards the rest.

7) References to values

The analysis identifies which explicit and implicit values are associated with immigration, such as (im)morality, (in)tolerance, (in)equality, fanaticism, radicalism, (in)adaptation, etc. *Framing* analysis has the objective to detect if there is a *majority* of negative values associated with immigration, since this is an indicator of discriminatory tendencies.

b) Semantic Strategies

Semantics is the study of meaning that is used for understanding human expression through language. But semantics does not only account for denotative meanings, it also deals with connotative meanings, such as cultural or emotional associations that words or phrases entail. Hence, semantic strategies have to do with the construction and reconstruction of meanings through discourse. A semantic analysis will be useful to understand how immigration is socially represented and study which meanings are emphasized or mitigated. The purpose, thus, is to detect which meanings are emphasized in detriment of others. *Framing* analysis aims to identify if immigration or immigrants are frequently associated with negative topics (or framed in negative terms), since, in that case, the social interpretation of immigration will be equally negative.

In particular, firstly, the semantic analysis of how immigration is conceptualized may help to get a broad idea of how the phenomenon is globally constructed. Secondly, the analysis of the different thematic areas and issues appearing on discourse will be useful to determine which topics are more (or less) frequent and, hence, which ones have more (or less) importance for the political party. Thus, it will be especially relevant to see what percentage is dedicated to the different topics in order to understand what the particular priorities are, while

dealing with immigration. In the same way, it is important to detect if these topics are positively, neutrally or negatively constructed.

Thirdly, the analysis of the semantic representation of immigrants and national citizens will help us understand if there is a global negative representation of immigrants and, in such a case, this would be an indicator of discriminatory tendencies. Accordingly, the three standards we propose in such a framework are:

8) Conceptualization of immigration

The analysis considers how immigration is conceptualized. *Framing* analysis aims at checking the textual references accompanying the word “immigration”, in order to find out if there is a majority of negative conceptualizations of immigration, as a *problem*, a *conflict* or a *concern* in contrast with more positive terms, such as *opportunity*, *challenge* or *investment*. It seems obvious that a majority of negative conceptualizations is an indicator of discriminatory tendencies.

9) Global Meanings

The analysis helps to understand what topics are more (or less) frequent while dealing with immigration and how they are discursively constructed. Hence, two analytical distinctions are considered here: frequency of each topic and its discursive construction (positive, negative or neutrally). Construction will be evaluated by assessing if immigration is associated with positive, neutral or negative meanings, and/or if these topics are by nature positive, neutral or negative. For example, when speaking about integration a positive construction would be that it is emphasized the good will that immigrants have to integrate and become involved in society. A negative construction, by contrast, would be emphasizing some of the integration problems that immigrants cause. Similarly, topics like insecurity or delinquency are negative issues by nature, while social cohesion and progress are positive ones.

Therefore, the analysis will take into account the highest frequency of particular policy areas, as well as the highest frequency of particular policy issues. *Framing* analysis aims at detecting if there is a majority of negative topics, since this is an indicator of discriminatory tendencies.

10) Global representation of national citizens and immigrants

The analysis identifies the different roles and attributes attached to citizens and immigrants. These roles and attributes can vary, for example, from victims to saviours, from benefactors to aggressors, or from beneficiaries to losers. It should be obvious that a majority of negative roles and attributes assigned to immigrants is another indicator of discriminatory tendencies. Furthermore, social actors can be represented as active or passive agents of the different actions they perform. We understand social actors as any group, sector, class, organization or movement that intervene in the social, political and/or cultural development of a community (Coleman, 1990).

Active agency refers to the capacity of individuals to act independently and to make their own free choices. Passive agency, by contrast, may be regarded as a tendency to dependency and lack of activity. Hence, active actors will generally be more positively perceived than passive ones and, consequently, an abuse of representation of immigrants as passive actors will be another indicator of discriminatory tendencies. In particular, the general tendency in discriminatory political discourse is to represent immigrants as passive victims of their lives and acts, as not being able to decide, or as active aggressors, invaders or delinquents, with no will to adapt to “our” norms and values (Rubio-Carbonero, 2010).

To summarize, the analysis will identify, in general, how national citizens and immigrants are represented. *Framing* analysis aims at assessing if there is a majority of negative representations of immigrants (with or without contrast with positive representations of national citizens), since this is an indicator of discriminatory tendencies.

3.5. *Benchmarking (assessing and comparing) xenophobic rhetoric*

Benchmarking analysis aims at assessing xenophobic rhetoric. In other words, it seeks to identify the discursive and political strategies used by political parties in order to legitimate and justify xenophobic political discourse. Understanding this will allow us to detect what kind of rhetoric operates to legitimate such a discourse. In this sense, we make a distinction between discursive rhetoric and political rhetoric.

a) Discursive rhetoric

This type of rhetoric involves the general socio-cognitive strategies used to convince, persuade and manipulate the audience to make them accept as right and true the arguments offered by a particular political party. Within this discursive rhetoric we are proposing a distinction between argumentative and manipulative strategies.

Persuasion is, as defined by Walton (2007), the act of producing a change in the opinion or believe of the audience from one initial state to a new one. Persuasion, then, is only achieved if the speaker convinces the hearer to accept the proposition made by the speaker. This can be achieved by many different discursive ways (mainly through semantic moves, as we have seen), but, for our purposes, we will distinguish here between argumentative and manipulative strategies as the main ways to persuade audience.

The difference between argumentation and manipulation is that the first is achieved by constructing logically-valid arguments, while the second rather constructs arguments that cannot be judged and do not respect the rules for critical discussion offered in 2002 by Van Eemeren, Grootendorst & Snoeck Henkemans (see below); in other words while argumentative rhetoric constructs its legitimacy through *topoi*, manipulative rhetoric constructs it through *fallacies*.

As we will see, *fallacies* seem to be logical arguments but, in fact, they are rather based on sociological structures which appeal to emotions (see

Nocetti, 1990). We will consider the (ab)use of fallacies to convince as an indicator of manipulative rhetoric, since as Maillat and Oswald (2009) argue, these fallacies block possible counter-arguments because they prevent the advance in a cooperative discussion.

Bearing this key distinction in mind, let us move to the presentation in detail of what it is meant by *topoi* and *fallacies* and how they are going to be applied in the framework we are proposing. The analysis of this discursive rhetoric will allow us to see if the discourse of a party, when legitimating xenophobic discourse, is more argumentative or manipulative.

11) Argumentative rhetoric (*Topoi*)

Topoi are argumentative strategies based on a supposedly shared belief that is presented in a general way and that, since it appeals to common sense, it is established as an unquestionable truth, which does not need to be justified. It is, thus, a self-sufficient argument. Consequently, *topoi* will always have a logical internal structure such as: *if X, then Y*.

A *topos* (in plural *topoi*) is a social belief shared by a cultural community that depends on values and norms valid in a given context, but that it is presented in a general way as if it was an unquestionable truth. In this sense, since it is considered to be shared, it does not have to be explained (Ducrot, 1995: 10-54). Therefore, it evokes a network of collective experiences, already assessed and codified, and appeals common sense.

Furthermore, the *topos* is general, since it establishes a correspondence between two dimensions through a rule presented as general, without considering the exceptions. And the *topos* is also gradual, since it involves different degrees and establishes a relationship among them. Following Wodak (2006:74), *Topoi* can be described also as parts of argumentation which belong to the obligatory, either explicit or inferable, premises. They are content-related warrants or 'conclusion rules' which connect

the argument or arguments with the conclusion, the claim. As such, they justify the transition from the argument or arguments to the conclusion.

The *Topoi* that most frequently appears in xenophobic discourse²² are the following²³:

- *Topos of threat*: if a political action has threatening consequences, then this action should not be performed.
- *Topos of burdening*: if an actor (person/institution/country) has specific problems, then these burdens have to be diminished.
- *Topos of advantage*: if an action is useful or benefits someone, then it has to be done. This *topos* is divided in three types: *topos of pro bono eorum* (for their own good), *pro bono nobis* (for our own good) and *pro bono public* (for the good of everyone).
- *Topos of disadvantage*: if an action is useless or damages someone, then something has to be done. This *topos* is also divided in three types depending on who the victims are (us, them or all).
- *Topos of reciprocity*: if someone offers something to another, then it is right to ask the other something in return.

12) Manipulative Rhetoric (fallacies)

Van Eemeren, Grootendorst and Snoeck Henkemans (2002:182-183), following a pragma-dialectic approach point out ten rules for the critical discussion that are essential for the resolution or any dispute. A fallacy is the violation of one or more of these rules, since it prevents the resolution of the discussion and it is considered to be, hence, a way of manipulation. For our purposes, we are proposing four most frequent fallacies when dealing with immigration and diversity issues:

- *Fallacy of emotions*: it is a violation of what Van Eemeren et al present as the *Relevance rule*, in which the defence of the standpoint uses non-argumentative means of persuasion, but plays on the emotions of the

²² The criteria for establishing the most frequent categories of *topoi* and fallacies are based on previous research about discourse on immigration carried out by Rubio-Carbonero (2010, 2013)

²³ Most formulations about different *topoi* are taken from Wodak (2006).

audience. This fallacy can take different forms depending on what emotions are appealed. In particular, in political discourse on immigration we can distinguish among:

- *The appeal to fear*: it is a fallacy in which politicians attempt to create support for their ideas by playing on existing fears and representing immigration as a threat to society.
- *The appeal to pity*: it is a fallacy in which politicians try to win support for their arguments by exploiting their opponent's or audience's feelings of pity or guilt.
- *Fallacy of authority*: it is a violation of what Van Eemeren et al present as the *argument scheme rule*, since the standpoint is presented as right because an authority says it is right. In Spanish and Catalan political discourse authorities are frequently:
 - International institutions or other political models or countries (such as European Union, France, Germany).
 - Statistics (for instance, territorial concentration of immigrants or ghettoisation, numbers of criminal behaviour of immigrants, etc) and negative opinion surveys.

These authorities are referred to as providing incontestable arguments which do not need to be justified, explored or put in doubt. In this way, arguments are right simply because the European Union, Statistics say they are right.

We acknowledge that the appeal to statistics or other authorities does not necessarily involve a fallacy in all cases, since there might be cases in which these authorities are just referred to as a way to support one's arguments. However, it becomes fallacious when these references are decontextualized, when they cannot be checked, when the source and the context are not referred to or when numbers are manipulated (usually by decontextualizing them). In other words, when arguments are not logically valid, but contextually dependent, and, thus, cannot be countered.

- *Fallacy of prejudices and rumours*: it violates what Van Eemeren et al present as the *starting point rule*, since the evidence given for an argument is as much in need of proof as the argument itself. In this case, prejudices and rumors are established as commonly accepted premises where arguments are built on.

b) Political rhetoric

Political rhetoric has to do with the ideological realization of particular strategies in order to legitimate xenophobic discourse by appealing to particular values or interests. The interpretative framework we follow distinguishes between conservative and populist rhetoric.

13) Conservative rhetoric

This rhetoric has the gaze in the past and is opposed to the innovation and social change that diversity and immigration brings. The main objective of this type of discourse is to preserve national citizenship values and interests. It appeals to tradition, to customs and to cultural national elements passed from one to another generation. In this sense, conservatism uses national history to legitimate actions and as a cohesion element for the group.

This rhetoric frames the diversity debate within the interpretative framework of national majority and ethnic minorities. It reproduces dualism between majority national culture and minority diversity of immigrants' national culture, and promotes national values and traditions, symbolism and national identity interests. Since it is a xenophobic discourse, it has arguments that polarize population in an "immigrants-diversity-negative-them" versus a "national majority-tradition-positive-us" power relationship. In this argumentation, we will find arguments that emphasize how immigration affects values stability and provoke national division.

From a discursive strategically perspective, the discourse gives priority to citizens' national identity and communitarian values of the society of reception, regardless of consequences, as a matter of principles, defined

by public duties towards citizens. From a political strategy this rhetoric defends assimilation as the only priority for governance.

14) Populist rhetoric

This rhetoric tries to preserve citizens' interests and it is characterized for using ambiguous concepts and a big range of images (and metaphors) that reproduce stereotypes. It is also characteristic the use of empty meanings and number arguments, that appear out of context. Populist rhetoric appeals to emotions in order to legitimate their arguments. It also promotes dualism between majority citizens' interests and minority immigrants' interests, prioritizing always citizens' material interests, their socioeconomic conditions and welfare. Therefore, arguments privilege citizens and emphasize how immigrants take profit of local institutions and resources. This rhetoric abuses of negative emotions.

From a discursive strategy perspective, it follows a *nationalist consequentialist perspective*.²⁴ Namely, discourse gives priority to citizens and receiving society's interests, taking into account the negative consequences and impact of the entrance of migrants on the society.

From a political strategy point of view this rhetoric seeks to limit participation and representation of immigrants from the bodies of governance (specific consultative bodies, voting rights, access to public bodies) by pointing to the negative consequences of such recognition. Precisely, Mudde defines *populism* as "a thin-centred ideology that considers society to be ultimately separated into two homogenous and antagonistic groups, 'the pure people' versus 'the corrupt elite,' and which argues that politics should be an expression of the general will of the people" (2004: 54).

²⁴ We are following basic evaluative ethical framework proposed by Zapata-Barrero (2010). See also the special issue edited by Zapata-Barrero & Pécoud (2012)

Accordingly, by doing a benchmarking analysis, it should become clear if we are dealing with a more argumentative or manipulative discursive rhetoric and with a more conservative or populist political rhetoric. It is important to bear in mind that these rhetorics are not exclusionist. On the contrary, a political party may combine argumentative and manipulative elements and may have some conservative and populist elements operating in its rhetoric. But, in global terms, this analysis is relevant to understand how xenophobic discourse is justified and legitimated through discursive and political strategies.

To finish up, it should be stated that the presentation of the main categories of the framework is not enough to practically apply it. Next section has the aim to show the practical tool we have designed as a guide to actually implement it and to offer the necessary information and tips to systematically identify and graduate xenophobic discourse, as well as to assess xenophobic rhetoric.

4. The analytical framework: categorization system

This section has to do with the presentation of the framework together with the necessary tips and guides to effectively apply it. For each of the standards, evidences of references are requested.

4.1. Kitemarking xenophobic discursive tendencies

Description: Kitemarking has to do with minimal requirements that allow us to **certify** discourse as having xenophobic tendencies.

Tip: For each standard, write “1” if discriminatory tendencies are detected (see the Tips) or write “0” if discriminatory tendencies are not detected. Total: 3 minimal standards.

1) Strategies of target population

Description: Consider if discourse is explicitly or implicitly addressed to national citizens or to the whole population.

Tip: Discourse addressed mainly to national citizens indicates discriminatory tendencies.

2) Strategies of polarization

Description: Consider if diversity and/or immigration is represented explicitly or implicitly in polarized terms (contrasting interests, positive-us vs. negative-them).

Tip: Polarization of nationals vs. immigrants indicates discriminatory tendencies. Also explicit or implicit references to national preference is an indicative of discriminatory tendencies.

3) Strategies of negative representation

Description: Consider presence of local strategies to represent diversity and/or immigration negatively:

Strategy	Description	Exemplification
Generalizations	Presenting a concrete fact or action as if was a typical and representative element	“All immigrants are delinquents”
Hyperboles	A type of generalizations which are dramatized and exaggerated	“the massive and constant arrival of immigrants is creating a national crisis”
Negative metaphors	Cognitive resources that shape and communicate particular conceptualizations of different realities	“the arrival of waves/avalanches/tsunamis of immigrants”
Dehumanizing terms	Terms that deny or mitigate the “humanness” of immigrants	“illegal, criminals, dangerous, violent, freeloaders, liars”

Source: Own elaboration

Tip: Negative representation of diversity/immigration is an indicator of discriminatory tendencies. If one or more of these local strategies are found, write “1” in this standard.

4.2. Framing xenophobic discursive tendencies

Description: Framing has to do with the construction of a particular perspective in detriment of others. It will be useful to detect how xenophobic discourse is globally constructed and will allow us to graduate it. Two main analytical distinctions are considered:

- a) Distinction between explicit references²⁵ and implicit references. Both types of references will be counted.
- b) Distinction about how lexical and semantic strategies are discursively constructed: positive, neutral and negative contexts. Only negative contexts will be counted.

Tip: If obtained three points in kitemarking (xenophobic tendencies are certified), check how much xenophobic discourse is. For each standard write “1” if discriminatory tendencies are detected (see the Tips) or write “0” if discriminatory tendencies are not detected. Total: 7 minimal standards.

a) Lexical strategies

Description: Lexical strategies have to do with the particular word selection and the meanings accompanying such a selection. Choosing one word instead of another to speak about a particular phenomenon involves a perspective and promotes a particular way of social interpretation in detriment of others. A lexical analysis will be useful to detect the underlying intentions when focusing on the reality of immigration. Total: 4 standards.

²⁵ A “reference” can be a word, a phrase, a number, a sentence, a paragraph or several paragraphs and may or may not even be present verbatim, but being understood implicitly.

4) Countries of origin referred or preferred

Description: Consider which countries of origin are explicitly and implicitly referred in negative context. State if there are preferences to some countries of origin.

Tip: References mainly to some particular countries, in detriment of others, which might or might not be the ones with more presence in the specific region, obey to ideological reasons. High number of mentions to one or more particular countries in negative context is an indicator of discriminatory tendencies. Especially, if these countries are culturally distant, in terms of visibility (language, religion, skin color). Furthermore, a clear preference for some particular countries of origin is also an indicator of discriminatory tendencies.

5) Religions referred or preferred

Description: Consider what religions are referred explicitly (if more than one, state percentage) and what religions are referred implicitly through designation of which specific practices (pray, mosque, burka, etc) or areas (education, administration, etc.) in negative contexts. State if there are preferences to particular religions.

Tip: Frequent mentions to particular religions in negative context obey to ideological reasons. High number of mentions to one or more particular religions (in negative terms) is an indicator of discriminatory tendencies. Furthermore, a clear preference for some particular religions is also an indicator of discriminatory tendencies.

6) Languages referred or preferred

Description: Consider which languages are explicitly and implicitly referred in negative contexts. State if there are preferences to particular languages.

Tip: Frequent mentions to particular languages in negative contexts are indicators of discriminatory tendencies. Furthermore, a clear preference for

immigration with a particular language is an indicator of discriminatory tendencies.

7) Values referred

Description: Consider which explicit and implicit values are associated with immigration ((im)morality, (in)tolerance, (in)equality, fanaticism, radicalism, (in)adaptation, etc.).

Tip: Majority of negative values is an indicator of discriminatory tendencies.

b) Semantic strategies

Description: Semantic strategies have to do with the construction and reconstruction of meanings through discourse. A semantic analysis will be useful to understand how immigration is socially represented and identify which meanings are emphasized or mitigated. Total: 3 standards.

8) Conceptualization of immigration

Description: Consider how immigration is conceptualized:

- a) Positive (challenge, opportunity, investment)
- b) Negative (problem, conflict, concern)
- c) Neutral (phenomenon, issue, matter, topic)

Tip: Check textual references to immigration and the words accompanying to understand how it is conceptualized. Majority of negative conceptualization of immigration is an indicator of discriminatory tendencies.

9) Global Meanings

Description: It has to do with the areas and issues that are more (or less) frequent while dealing with immigration and how they are discursively constructed. For each topic state if it is negative, positive or neutrally constructed.

Taking into account the whole number of sources:

1. Which policy areas are more frequent:

- Migration (admission, flows)
 - Integration (work, house, education, welfare, others)
 - Citizenship
 - (Co-)development and international relations
 - Other areas (please, specify)
2. Which policy issues are more frequent:
- Legal issues
 - Welfare issues
 - Security issues
 - Economic issues
 - Identity issues
 - Others issues (please, specify)

Tip: Majority of negative areas and issues is an indicator of discriminatory tendencies.

10) Global representation of national citizens and immigrants

Description: In global terms, identify how national citizens and immigrants are represented.

Table 8: Global representation of actors

Actor (Immigrant/national citizen)	Role	Agency (active, passive)
	Victim	
	Aggressor	
	Benefactor	
	Beneficiary	
	Others	

Source: Own elaboration

Tip: Negative representations of immigrants especially of there is a contrast with positive representations of national citizens is an indicator of discriminatory tendencies.

4.3. Benchmarking xenophobic discourse

In all cases, evidences of references are requested.

Description: Benchmarking has to do with the graduation of the type of rhetoric being used to justify and legitimate xenophobic political discourse. It will be

useful to assess **xenophobic rhetoric**. Graduate what discursive and political rhetoric prevail.

Tip: check how xenophobic discourse is justified and legitimated. Total: four standards.

a) Two types of discursive rhetoric

Description: Discursive rhetoric has to do with the general socio-cognitive strategies used to convince, persuade and manipulate.

Tip: State percentages for each topos and each fallacy to find out if it is a more argumentative (majority of topoi) or manipulative (majority of fallacies) discourse. It may happen that one party combines both rhetorics.

11) Argumentative strategies

Description: Consider which *topoi* are used and how many times. *Topoi* analysis will be useful to understand if discourse is argumentative.

Table 9: Argumentative strategies

Strategy	Description	Exemplification
Topoi of threat	<i>If a political action has threatening consequences, then this action should not be performed.</i>	<i>“If we allow every one enter the country, then we won’t be able to cope with it”</i>
Topoi of burdening	<i>If an actor (person/ institution/ country) has specific problems, then these burdens have to be diminished.</i>	<i>“Since immigrants suppose and economic charge, then we cannot host everyone”.</i>
Topoi of advantage	<i>If an action is useful or benefits someone, then it has to be done. This topos is divided in three types: topos of pro bono eorum (for their own good), pro bono nobis (for our own good) and pro bono public (for the good of everyone).</i>	<i>“Since immigrants have norms and values different (worse) from us, then it is necessary that we teach them our norms and values for their own good”.</i>
Topoi of disadvantage	<i>If an action is useless or damages someone, then something has to be done. This topos is also divided in three types depending of who the victims are (us, them or all).</i>	<i>“Since immigrants are exploited by mafias, then it is necessary that we control and stop their entrance to our country”</i>
Topoi of reciprocity	<i>If someone offers something to another, then it is right to ask the other something in return.</i>	<i>“Since we have welcomed them, then they should adapt to our rules, norms and values”</i>

Source: Own elaboration

Tip: High frequency of arguments representing immigration, as a burden or as a disadvantage or emphasizing the negative aspects (threats) of immigration reveal a tendency of discriminatory rhetoric.

12) Manipulative strategies

Description: Consider which *fallacies* are used and how many times. Fallacies analysis will be useful to understand if discourse is manipulative.

Table 10: Manipulative strategies

Strategy	Description	Exemplification
Fallacy of emotions	Appeal to emotions: to fear to justify	“delinquent immigrants threaten our security and, thus, they must be expelled out”
	Appeal to emotions: to pity to justify	“Many immigrants die when they come to our coast, so it is necessary to control and stop the arrival of immigrants”
Fallacy of authority	Appeal to authority; to International institutions or other political models (EU, France, Germany,..) to justify	“It is a EU’s compulsory rule” “France is doing the same”
	Appeal to authority: to statistics to justify	“It’s not me, statistics link immigration and delinquency”
Fallacy of prejudices and rumors	Appeal to existing prejudices or rumors to justify	“Immigrants have many more social benefits than national citizens”

Source: Own elaboration

Tip: High frequency of fallacies representing immigration as a threat, immigrants as victims or that reproduces prejudices and rumors, reveal a tendency of discriminatory rhetoric.

b) Two Types of political rhetoric:

Description: Political rhetoric has to do with the ideological realization of particular strategies in order to legitimate xenophobic discourse by appealing to particular values (tradition or national citizens’ interests).

Tip: State percentage of references for both rhetorics to find out which one prevails more for each party. It may happen that one party combines both rhetorics.

13) Conservative rhetoric (traditionalism)

Description: Consider strategies that have the aim to preserve national values. Identify if arguments are justified by appealing to tradition or symbolic national values.

Tip: References to (the defense of) tradition and national values (in detriment of others) show a tendency of xenophobic rhetoric.

14) Populist rhetoric (citizenism)

Description: Consider strategies that have the aim to preserve national citizens' interests or limit immigrants' action. Identify if arguments are justified by appealing to national citizens' interests.

Tip: References to (the defense of) national citizens' interest (in detriment of immigrants' interests) show a tendency of xenophobic rhetoric.

III. Implementation of the framework: the pilot study

As it has already been stated, it is our aim to apply our framework to the concrete case of Catalonia as a pilot study in order to test its feasibility and applicability. Therefore, this chapter involves the presentation of such a pilot study. In particular, we start by describing the general context of Catalonia, and then move into the presentation of the documentary sources we will consider for the purpose of our study. Finally, we briefly describe how the framework will be implemented.

1. The context of Catalonia

This section aims to present the general context of Catalonia by focusing mainly in two main dimensions. On the one hand, it is intended to offer a general overview of the political parties we will consider. On the other hand, we will describe the overall context in which our pilot study is embedded, by concentrating mainly on the political debate on immigration and diversity issues during the selected period of time, so that we can frame the particular discourses we will be analysing and understand the broader context in which such discourses occur.

1.1. General overview of the political parties considered

Catalan political system is regulated by the Parliament that has three main functions: to exercise the legislative power; to pass the budget of the Generalitat;²⁶ and to control and promote the political and governmental action. The Catalan Parliament is composed by a minimum of one hundred members and a maximum of one hundred and fifty elected by universal suffrage for a period of four years.

As we will see in detail in next chapter, for this pilot study we are considering Plenary sessions from 2007 to 2012 (both inclusive), electoral programs and interviews during last two Catalan Autonomic Elections (2010, 2012²⁷) and last two Catalan Municipal Elections (2007, 2011).

During this period of time, there have been two governments at the head of the Parliament of Catalonia. The first government was in the hands of the so-called *Tripartite*. This is a coalition that was made out of three main Catalan political parties (ERC, ICV-EUiA, PSC) that was in power from 2003 to 2010. After 2010 elections, CiU won and got the presidency of the Generalitat of Catalonia and currently continuous in such a position. Furthermore, we are also considering for our pilot study PPC, one party that in Catalonia has always been in the opposition, but it belongs to PP (*Partido Popular*), which is one of the two main political parties at the state level and the one that is currently in the government in Spain since 2011. Besides these mainstream political parties, we are also considering PxC, which has an explicit xenophobic discourse as a way to contrast it with the more expected subtle ways that mainstream parties may have.

²⁶ It is the institution under which Catalonia is politically organised. It consists of the Parliament of Catalonia (unicameral legislative power), the government of Catalonia (executive power) and the President of the Generalitat (chief of the executive power).

²⁷ Even though next elections were supposed to be in November, 2015, Artur Mas (President of Generalitat) moved them two years ahead.

As a preliminary step, we will offer a necessarily brief description of each of the political parties considered as well as their results in the mentioned elections.

a) CiU (Convergence & Union)

It is nowadays the strongest political force in Catalonia and the group with a wider Parliamentary representation. It is currently at the Catalan government and is considered to be conservative and nationalist. In particular, it is an electoral nationalist coalition composed by two main parties: *Convergència Democràtica de Catalunya* and *Unió Democràtica de Catalunya*. This coalition has been in power for most of the democratic history of Catalonia. It started in 1980s with Jordi Pujol as the leader and remained until 2003. Then, with Artur Mas as the leader, it served in opposition to the centre-left *Tripartite* government from 2003 to 2010. From November 2010 on, they have been in power thanks to the results of the two last autonomic elections (see results on the table 11).

b) ERC (Republican left of Catalonia)

It is one of the three political parties that formed the *tripartite*. Its basic political principles are defined in the Statement of Ideology approved at the 19th National Congress in 1993. This is organised into the three areas that give the organisation its name: *Esquerra* (commitment to the Left's agenda in the political debate), *República* (commitment to the Republican form of government vs. Spain's current constitutional monarchy) and *Catalunya* (Catalan secessionist nationalism). Oriol Junqueras, ERC's current president, is also currently the leading opposition at the Parliament.

c) ICV-EUiA (Green Initiative for Catalonia & United and Alternative Left)

It is an electoral left and ecologist coalition that started in 2003. This coalition was another of the three political forces that formed the

tripartite, and hence, was in government until 2010 elections. Following ICV-EUiA's own ideological definition, it is an organization of the national (Catalan) green left-wing that fights for a society of free and equal men and women in a habitable planet and that, with the widest citizens' participation. It aims at constructing a socio-political majority of left wing in Catalonia.

d) PPC (Popular Party of Catalonia)

It represents the right and conservative wing both at the autonomic and state level. Even if in Spain this political party is one of the strongest political forces and the one that it is in power currently in the Spanish State, in Catalonia it is only the fourth political force in Parliament. In the last autonomic elections, it got 19 seats, which is the maximum that this party has historically got in Catalonia. It has, therefore, never been in power at the autonomic level.

e) PSC (Socialist Party of Catalonia)

It is the third of the three parties that formed the *tripartite*. It has a social-democratic ideology and, as an alternative for the Catalan self-government, it promotes federalism. It is the second Catalan group, after CiU, with political representation in the Spanish Parliament. In the Catalan Parliament is nowadays the third force, after CiU and ERC. At the municipal level, PSC has always been prominent in the four big cities of Catalonia: Barcelona, Tarragona, Lleida and Girona.

f) PxC (Platform for Catalonia)

It is a far-right political party that has an openly fight against Islamism and immigration. It does not have Parliamentary representation but in the last year it has grown quite a lot in terms of representation in Catalonia. For example, in the elections of 2007 this party got 17 city councillors and, in 2011 they got 67.

Furthermore, in order to understand the scope and representation of each political party, it is also necessary to state the results of each of them for the mentioned elections (table 11). While for the municipal elections we will remark the number of councilors won in the whole territory of Catalonia, for the autonomic elections we will note the number of Parliamentary seats obtained by each party (check the footnotes to see different coalitions between parties):

Table 11: Political parties electoral results

Parties	Municipal 2007	Municipal 2011	Autonomic 2010	Autonomic 2012
CiU	3.387	3.860	62	50
ERC	1.581 ²⁸	1.384 ²⁹	10	21 ³⁰
ICV-EUiA	451 ³¹	398	10	13
PPC	284	473	18	19
PSC	2.570	2.117 ³²	28	20
PxC	17	67	75.321 votes	60.142 votes

Source: own elaboration out of the news in El País

As it can be seen, in the period considered, at both municipal and autonomic level, CiU has been the majority party, followed by PSC and ERC. Then with far less representation there is ICV-EUiA, PPC and finally PxC.

1.2. The Context of Catalan political discourse on immigration and diversity issues

For the elaboration of this section, we will consider mainly two sources of information. On the one hand, we will describe the main issues dealing with immigration and diversity appearing in the Plenary sessions at the Parliament, to understand and frame the main topics and issues in each of the years considered. On the other hand, we will present the

²⁸ In coalition with Acord Municipal (AM)

²⁹ In coalition with Acord Municipal (AM)

³⁰ In coalition with CAT SÍ (Catalunya Sí)

³¹ In coalition with EPM (Entesa pel poder municipal)

³² In coalition with PM (Progrés Municipal)

main immigration and diversity related topics and issues appearing in the media during each of the years, in order to have a wider perspective on the overall context in which these issues/conflicts appeared, as reflected in the media.

In order to get information from media publications, we have used the Factiva database, which stores top media outlets, web media, trade and consumer publications sources of many different written media publications. It stores, then, publications by all Spanish and Catalan newspapers. In a first search, we obtained more than 6000 relevant news on immigration and diversity issues during the period of time considered. Obviously, these reflected the publications of different newspapers of the same piece of news and a selection process was developed. In particular, in order to select the information to be described in this section we have used two different criteria: on the one hand, we have selected the news that were covered by a greater number of newspapers, discarding, then, those news that only appeared in a few of them. On the other hand, we have selected the related issues and topics that were most widely repeated during each year, discarding, then, those anecdotal issues that only were referred once or twice.

In order to offer an accessible comprehension of the contextualization of Catalan immigration and diversity issues during the period considered, we will be answering to four main questions:

- 1) What were the main topics and issues related to immigration and diversity issues during this year reflected both in Parliament and media?
- 2) What parties were leading such a debate?
- 3) What stance did each party adopt in each of these issues?
- 4) What were the main social or political reactions towards such a debate?

Thus, for each of the year considered, we will be answering to each of these questions in order to offer a more accessible perspective to the vast amount of information selected.

Main immigration and diversity issues during 2007

At the Parliament, there were two main topics on immigration and diversity issues during 2007. The first one was related to the search for tools to improve the increasing unemployment rate among immigrants promoted by CiU in the shape of an urgent demand to the government. The subsequent motion demanded the government to present a report on the situation of immigration in Catalonia with regards to (un)employment by emphasizing the need to contract immigrants in their countries of origin and to investigate in depth the submerged economy. PPC supported such proposals but, finally the motion was not passed.

The second main topic was the need to provide immigrants with the right to vote promoted by ICV-EUiA and accepted by PSC as a proposal.

In the media, most political discourse disseminated had to do with the right of immigrants to vote that was supported also by ERC and CiU and only at the end of the year by PSC. PPC, however, did not support such an initiative at all. By contrast, PPC appeared frequently in the media during 2007 proposing some quite restrictive initiatives towards immigrants to avoid their presupposed abuse of social services and to forbid the use of Burqa in public places. In line with this, PPC showed a clear preference for immigrants coming from South America, especially promoted by Alberto Fernández (that was the candidate of PPC for Barcelona's mayoralty).

Regarding integration issues, there was a clear cleavage: while ERC, ICV-EUiA and PSC constructed a discourse focusing on how to find new ways of integration and provide immigrants with more rights (for example, the right to vote). PPC, by contrast, focused more on the problems that immigrants cause to society and the need to state clearly the duties that immigrants have. CiU, however, did not show a clear tendency since it focused more on the need to increase social services in order to cope with the new population (*El País*, 19/05/07).

However, it should be stated that in spite of the general more neutral position of CiU, Duran i Lleida (CiU) during the whole year, but especially during the campaign, focused on the need to increase the control of the foreign family reunification (*El Periódico*, 15/05/07) and Artur Mas (CiU) associated the presence of immigrants with the increase of Islamic terrorism in Catalonia.

Apart from that, during the electoral campaign it is remarkable that PPC in Badalona distributed a DVD in which several citizens showed their rejection to problems associated with the presence of immigrants, such as insecurity and the proliferation of overcrowded flats (*El País*, 09/05/07). While Josep Piqué (PP) supported the video, the government ordered its retreat. In spite of that, PPC based its main discourse on immigration during the electoral campaign creating quite a negative representation of immigration by focusing on the link of immigration and insecurity (*El País*, 12/05/07) and by associating imams with fundamentalism (*El Periódico*, 13/05/07). Furthermore, insisted on the danger that social services were suffering due to the increase of immigration, on the need to forbid the burqa and on the preference for Latin American immigrants (*ABC*, 23/05/07).

What every political party seemed to share was the need to create more social services to cope and offer a better service to new citizens.

After the elections, the debate on immigration reduced considerably its presence in media, but still some main issues were dealt with. In particular, the need to make more prominent Catalan language at schools with more presence of immigrants was quite present during the year. In this case, ERC launched the initiative to extend the presence of Catalan and the *Tripartite* supported the need to improve and extend the linguistic immersion. However, PSC did not agree on the exclusiveness of Catalan language at secondary school, as proposed by ERC (*Gaceta de negocios*, 10/07/07). There was an extensive debate on whether learning Catalan should be compulsory for immigrants or an option and towards the end of the year the government announced that the integration

courses will be recommended for all immigrants but not compulsory (*El País*, 02/10/07).

Debate on integration issues seemed to be one of the most frequent in media during this year and, as a response to that, Fundació Grup Set³³ and IESE³⁴ celebrated in July, 2007 a session for civil society to promote a reflection about immigrant youth, companies and society. In such a session they instigate political parties to sign a State Agreement (*Pacte d'Estat*) for the integration of immigrants (*ABC*, 04/07/07)

Precisely because of that, the government announced towards the end of the year that in September, 2008, would release a National Agreement for Immigration (*Pacte Nacional per a la Immigració*). This agreement would count with the advice of four experts: Josep Oliver (Autonomous University of Barcelona) that would deal with the management of migration flows; Eduardo Rojo (Autonomous University of Barcelona) that would manage the working area; Jordi Sánchez (Jaume Bofill foundation) that would deal with the section of public policies; and Ricard Zapata-Barrero (Pompeu Fabra University) that would offer some reflections about a model of society based on common public culture (*El País*, 01/10/2007).

Main immigration and diversity issues during 2008

At the Parliament, during 2008, three main issues were dealt with while debating on immigration and diversity. Religious affairs were chronologically the first issues discussed in the Plenary. In particular, it was proposed by the government to create particular centres to cope with the different religions coexisting in Catalonia. PPC and CiU rejected such a proposal by presenting emendations to the whole draft law. However, PSC, ERC and ICV-EUiA voted against such emendations and, thus, the draft law was passed.

³³ <http://grupset.org/>

³⁴ It is a business school: <http://www.iese.edu/>

The second main topic was about the policies to get immigrant students into Catalan Schools. On the 15th of January, PSC announced that the government was creating specific classrooms (“reception classrooms” (*aules d’acollida*)) for immigrants, with the opposition of ERC and ICV-EUiA in the very same day. On the 7th of February, CiU made an urgent demand to the government about this issue that was quite spread in the media, and asked further explanations about how the situation was going to be managed. After such an urgent demand, CiU presented a subsequent Motion in which government was asked to better define the scope of these “reception classrooms” and which students could benefit from them, to create these classrooms also in state subsidised schools, to redefine the ratio of students per classroom and to reinforce those zones with higher percentage of immigration. However, CiU specified that the party did not support these “reception classrooms”, but rather suggested the implementation of specific programs for immigrants within the common classroom. All in all, the modifications presented by CiU were passed.

The third main issue was related to the management of immigration policies presented in a way of urgent demand by CiU in which government was asked about the National Agreement for Immigration and about (the control of) the family reunification policies. The subsequent motion asked the government to develop a report on the number of immigrants in Catalonia and to clarify the government’s (unique and agreed) position towards the “reception classrooms” and the family reunification policies. The debate went on the discussion about the National Agreement for Immigration and the need of cooperation by all parties.

It seems that integration continues to be one of the main areas of concern for political parties during 2008, but once again the approach of each political party is different. CiU proposed the knowledge of Catalan language for immigrants as a necessary requirement for integration and the need to test immigrants in order to integrate them and to assign

them a credit system according to their degree of integration. PPC proposed a kind of contract of integration to obtain the permit to stay. By contrast, ERC, ICV-EUiA and PSC proposed the (finally voluntary) integration courses for immigrants. Three different approaches to the same issue.

Regarding media, the topics of “reception classrooms” and family reunification were the most prominent ones during 2008, together with the debate on the National Agreement for Immigration. However, religious issues and affairs were not covered by media, while they were present at the Parliament.

At the same time, there were some issues that were extensively covered by media and, by contrast, were not so much present at the Parliament. If we had to summarize these topics by highlighting each party’s position as covered in media during 2008, we would start by pointing the proposal of CiU to establish Catalan and Spanish as compulsory for immigrants, as well as the acceptance of Catalan culture and democratic values as necessary requirements to get the permit to stay. While ERC supported the initiative of establishing Catalan language as a necessary tool for integration, ERC proposed that this knowledge should be voluntary and not compulsory. PSC and ICV-EUiA insisted on the need to guarantee particular social and economic rights to immigrants and ICV-EUiA, particularly, insisted on the need to allow immigrants to vote. This last proposal was passed by the government in December and allowed nationalized immigrants to vote in municipal elections.

Regarding the three main issues covered by media, it is important to remark that there was a complete reaction by civil society towards the creation of specific “reception classrooms” for immigrants. In particular, the three main trade unions of education rejected such creation, together with the support of *SOS Racisme* and other major associations of parents, students and immigrants of Catalonia. At the same time, as it has been stated, the following day that the government (PSC) announced such a proposal, ERC and ICV-EUiA immediately positioned themselves

against it (*El País*, 25/01/08). In spite of such a reaction, in July the government announced that they would open from September on these new centres for immigrants in Reus and Vic.

In the same way, the proposal of restricting the control of family reunification policies also provoked a very negative response by society. In this case, there were several demonstrations called by CCOO (trade unions) and more than twenty-eight immigrants' associations to protest against such proposal (*Gaceta de negocios*, 28/01/08).

Regarding the National Agreement for immigration, it was released for the first time in April, 2008, with eleven challenges and fifty new measures to guarantee a good coexistence and social cohesion. It was passed by the Generalitat in December and initially CiU and PPC were not going to sign such an agreement. CiU argued that in such an agreement there should be some limitation for family reunification to extend it only to the partner and the children of the immigrant. Similarly, they considered that the minimum of legal residence to obtain the nationality should be of ten years and not only five, as stated in the agreement. In the same way, CiU remarked some contradictions between what was written in the agreement and the law of religious affairs and education, both of them passed during the year at the Parliament. In spite of these claims, CiU signed the agreement in the last minute, but forced to introduce that the right for immigrants to vote would be restricted to immigrants with a permanent permit to stay and that in order to get such a permit, immigrants should have lived legally in Catalonia for ten years. Such an incorporation provoked that, at the end of the year, SOS Racisme and CCOO did not sign the agreement (*ABC*, 20/12/08). PPC, by contrast, did not sign at all the agreement because, according to them, such an agreement did not reflect the current reality of immigration.

Main immigration and diversity issues during 2009

At the Parliament during this year there were two major topics. The first one, once again, had to do with the draft law about the centres for worship promoted by the government to guarantee diversity and social cohesion within the religious area in Catalonia and provide with the necessary centre of worship for such diversity. This draft law was fully rejected by PPC for considering such a law unnecessary. In the same way, CiU also fully rejected such a proposal for not considering it necessary and useful and because it did not rightly cope with the problem. But, once again, ERC, ICV-EUiA and PSC voted against the proposals done by PPC and CiU and, hence, the draft law was passed.

The other major issue was the presentation of the draft for the *Bill of Reception (Llei d'Acollida)* of immigrated people presented by the government. Such a law had, as the main change, that the welcoming service would be a universal right for all immigrants regardless their legal status. It was also relevant the establishment of Catalan language as a necessary lingua franca. In this sense, immigrants would be offered three main things: the right to take a course to learn Catalan language; training about the working market, and information about Catalan society model as well as the rights and duties expected for immigrants. After such a course, immigrants would get a certification of attendance that would allow them later on to justify their settlement certification after confirming at least three years of residency in Catalonia.

This law did not forced anyone to learn Catalan as a necessary requirement to get the certification, but it would be needed to certify at least a minimum of attendance to guarantee that immigrants have a certain level of knowledge about Catalan language and Catalan society.

This draft law was fully rejected by PPC and partially rejected by CiU that presented some amendments to be done. In spite of this, the draft law was passed and was applied as a pilot to three municipalities of

Catalonia, as a first step to the full implementation to the whole territory that was expected to happen in 2015.

In media, once again, the whole debate on religious affairs was not covered, but the debate about the new bill of reception it was widely covered by contrast. Especially controversial for the media was the fact of establishing Catalan as the lingua franca and putting Spanish language, thus, in a second place, only to be taught if required by immigrants after Catalan had been learned. In accordance with this, it was also present in media the intention of the government to reinforce the immersion of Catalan language in primary school for immigrants. In this sense, particular newspapers (especially *ABC* and *El Mundo*) show some criticism towards this.

Apart from that, SOS Racisme and CCOO even if they remarked that they were present in the decision-making process of the law and, in general, agreed with the result, they showed some concern about the fact that immigrants were supposed to pay some taxes for the social services and training offered by the law (*ABC*, 04/06/09).

Apart from these main issues, media also dedicated some space to speak about PxC and its growing xenophobic explicit discourse (*El Mundo*, 16/08/09)

Main immigration and diversity issues during 2010

At the Parliament, during 2010 there were two main issues. Once again the draft law of welcoming immigrated people was presented by the government. In this second round, PPC presented more than 21 emendations to the law, mainly because they did not agree that Catalan language could be considered as a price to pay in order to get integrated. CiU also presented a few emendations but all in all the emendations presented by both parties were rejected and the law was passed.

The second main issue at the Parliament was the management of irregular migration that came in the form of an urgent demand

presented by PPC to the government. In such an urgent demand, PPC spoke about unemployment in immigrant people, the perception of immigration in Catalan society as a problem and finally about the need to legislate and regulate irregular migration as well as establish clearly the rights and duties of immigrants. The subsequent motion was fully rejected by all political parties and, hence, it was not passed.

Other minor topics had to do with the demand to the government about the actions to support municipalities in the management of immigration, promoted by ERC and about the actions taken to avoid the reductions of the funds for welcoming and integrating immigrants, promoted by CiU.

However, while in media the first half of the year was fully dedicated to the census of Vic, this issue was only referred at the Parliament but not further developed or assessed. In particular, media reflected that in January the major of Vic, Josep Maria Vila d'Abadal (CiU), announced that he would not register in the census irregular immigrants. The partners of Vila d'Abadal at the municipal government (PSC and ERC) dissociated themselves from such an initiative but they continued in the government. The public defender's office stated that not registering irregular immigrant was illegal and Vic complied with the sentence, but CiU took the case to the European Union.

In April the European commissioner Cecilia Mälström assured that Spain must expel out or regularize non-legalized immigrants. In accordance with the sentence, the major of Vic announced that he would denounce all irregular immigrants that register in the city. At the end of April, Vila had a meeting with the government commissioner, Joan Rangel, to finish such a crisis with the census and no denunciations about irregular immigrants were finally made on his part. However, this whole issue brought a lot of confrontations between all mainstream political parties that were accusing one another of supporting one or other attitude and promoting xenophobia.

The second main issue widely covered by the media was the entrance of a number of (autochthonous) neighbours in a Plenary session of the council of Salt to claim for more security in the municipality in February.

These two main issues provoked a social alarm about the possible proliferation of xenophobia. In particular CCOO (trade unions) and CONFAVC (neighbours association of Catalonia) instigated political parties to adopt a combative stance in defence of coexistence and social cohesion.

This also provoked that in March all the parties (but PPC) thought about the need to acquire a commitment of not turning immigration issues into an electoral weapon. But CiU decided not to participate in such a commitment because they were accused of being behind the xenophobic acts in Salt by the councillor of Innovation, Josep Huget, and that fact damaged the commitment of CiU with the National Agreement for Immigration (*El Periódico*, 20/03/10).

The third issue was the actions carried out by the major of Badalona, Xavier García Albiol, who published several brochures in which immigration and delinquency were linked and there was an open rejection towards Romanians.

This whole problem provoked that in May finally CiU decided to meet with the *tripartite* in order to negotiate the terms of how to deal with immigration in the political debate (*El Periódico*, 03/05/10). Furthermore, the government and SOS Racisme decided to take legal actions against the major of Badalona.

The fourth main issue was the debate on the banning of burqa in public spaces that confronted all political parties. In Barcelona, this issue was launched by PPC but did not obtained the support of any of the parties, but CiU, that decided not to vote in favour or against it. However, in Lerida this motion was launched by CiU (*La Vanguardia*, 19/05/10).

Later on, in October The Taula Intercultural del Raval published a manifesto³⁵ where political parties were asked to sign and commit themselves not to use immigration as an electoral weapon, avoid discriminatory discourse and any other form of discourse which could be considered offensive for immigrants. Only PSC and ICV-EUiA signed such manifesto (*El Periódico*, 27/10/10).

Finally, during the electoral campaign PPC released a videogame in which the representative of PPC for Catalonia, Alicia Sánchez Camacho, appeared casted as Lara Croft and shooting irregular immigrants. In this case, all mainstream political parties and a number of associations forced PPC to retreat and change such a videogame.

As it can be seen, 2010 is by far the year when more issues about immigration emerged in media and also at the Parliament, and there were several attempts by mainstream political parties to reach an agreement, so that immigration did not become politicized. However, at the end of 2010, this agreement failed to arrive.

In November, 2010, autonomic elections were held and CiU won them. ERC, ICV-EUiA and PSC dissolved as the *tripartite* (even before the elections) and become separated members of opposition.

Main immigration and diversity issues during 2011

At the Parliament, chronologically, the first main issue was the urgent demand interposed by PPC to the government about the policies of integration. In such an urgent demand, PPC constructed a critique towards the governments' action in which it was stated that the only action that the government was taking to integrate immigrants was to teach them Catalan language and that they were not paying attention to the key problems and main issues produced by the presence of immigrants. In the subsequent motion, all the political parties presented

³⁵ See the Manifesto in Catalan:
<http://acciosocial.org/wp-content/uploads/2010/10/manifest-raval.pdf>

emendations to such a motion that were not accepted by PPC and, thus, such a motion was rejected by a great majority.

The second main issue, during 2011, was the draft law for the creation of a contract of integration for immigrants launched by PPC. Such a contract would oblige immigrants to follow particular behaviours and to integrate according to the norms and values of the host society, in some case, forcing them to adopt the national cultural and religious identities. All the political parties fully rejected such a draft law and, hence, the draft law was not passed.

Apart from these main issues, there were minor debates on the particular negative events happening in Salt at the beginning of the year (see below) and on the following actions to take in the framework of the National Agreement for Immigration.

In media, the case of Salt was widely covered. In particular, some people were protesting by burning containers and causing several disturbs against the death of a young Moroccan when he was running away from police.

Another main issue was the announcement by several municipalities of Catalonia (the main ones: Lleida, Vic, Salt, Badalona) that they would not offer the permit to stay to antisocial immigrants that they do not have a will to integrate. These enchainned announcements were provoked by two main facts. The first one was the announcement of the government about their intention to prize those immigrants with a will to integrate, by easing up their access to the permit to stay (ABC, 31/01/11). The second one was the announcement by García Albiol, Badalona's major, that he would not spend any money on Romanians that do not integrate (*El País*, 02/03/11). These two facts combined were the detonation for a number of municipalities announcing the will to join the initiative and to penalize those immigrants that were not integrating according to their criteria.

The topic of the obligatory nature of the knowledge of Catalan language, as a need to evaluate and assess immigrants' will to integrate, was something quite present during the year. Finally, it was announced by the government that, even though taking courses of Catalan language would be something compulsory for immigrants in order to get the settlement certificate, it would not be compulsory to test them in order to get it.

The draft law proposed by PPC about the contract for integration and the subsequent rejection of all political parties was also very much covered by media.

The final main issue was the continuous references of PPC, and particularly of García Albiol, to the need to be stricter with immigrants and to expel out those immigrants that commit any criminal offence. In Barcelona, both CiU and PSC criminalized such discourse used by PPC in which immigration and delinquency was intrinsically related in brochures delivered by the party (*La Vanguardia*, 17/05/11). SOS Racisme and the Federation of Gypsies Association presented a lawsuit against García Albiol in November.

To a lesser extent, media covered with special interest the declarations made all over the year by Duran i Lleida (CiU) about the problems that the (presupposed) excess of immigrants cause to host society (*El País*, 07/05/11; *El Periódico de Aragón*, 28/05/11; *Hoy*, 16/11/11). As a response to this, many immigrants' associations denounce such a discourse (*Europa Press*, 21/11/11).

Finally, it should be stated that at the end of the year, 25 new entities joined the National Agreement of Immigration and more than seven municipalities joined the initiative promoted by Barcelona City Council to dismantle prejudices and rumours about immigrants (<http://www.bcnantirumors.cat/>).

Main immigration and diversity issues during 2012

During 2012, at the Parliament there was only one urgent demand in the Plenary dealing with immigration and diversity issues as a central topic. This low level of initiatives was also reflected in media coverage that was also quite low.

In particular the urgent demand was launched by PPC to the government to establish some minimal requirements in order to provide immigrants with housing certificates and allow them to exercise family reunification. For the subsequent motion, ERC, PSC presented some emendations, which were rejected by PPC, and CiU and ICV-EUiA completely rejected the motion. Accordingly, the motion was rejected.

However, in media the widest coverage was dedicated to the new law imposed by the Spanish state about retreating the health card to irregular immigrants. Such a law was announced by the Minister of Health, Ana Matos (PP), in April and provoked an important social disturbance.

Many communities rejected such a law and, in particular, Catalonia decided to postpone the application of such measures and to press so that the law became a draft law and, thus, some emendations could be introduced. Furthermore, in August it was published that five autonomies (Catalonia, Andalusia, Asturias, Canary Islands and Basque Country) would not comply with the law and would offer universal health care for immigrants (*El País*, 16/08/12).

Another main topic covered by media, during 2012, was the declarations of different members of PPC about the need to expel out immigrants that had committed any kind of criminal offence and to reduce the access of immigrants to social services (*El Mundo*, 13/11/12).

By contrast, in January the CAPSIF (The advisory board for Social and Family Policies for the Generalitat of Catalonia) launched its fifth

report³⁶ on the situation of political discourse on immigration and diversity in Catalonia. In this report, the board showed an overview of the political discursive situation on immigration and diversity and presented some concerns about the increasing presence of political discourse that, instead of promoting cohabitation and social cohesion, promotes xenophobic and racist attitudes and acts. Accordingly, they proposed five recommendations:

- To make parties sign a commitment so that immigration is not used as a tool especially during electoral campaigns.
- The commission of the National Agreement for Immigration should monitor such a commitment and produce an annual report of the situation.
- To promote pedagogic political discourse by:
 - Socializing the advantages of diversity and emphasizing the benefits for the whole population.
 - Managing with responsibility the information and the opinion always contrasted with reality, with explicative arguments that create the maximum possible objectivity.
 - Avoiding making immigrants responsible for the problems of our society.
- To establish judicial and social mechanisms to make easy for citizens to fight xenophobic public discourses.
- Promote an ethical code of discursive behaviour elaborated by political parties, media, institutions and the civil society.

To sum up, the following table shows the most frequent issues identified for each year at both Parliamentary and media:

³⁶ The title of this report was: *La situació del discurs polític sobre la immigració i la diversitat a Catalunya. Propostes per a promoure una cultura pública de la diversitat* and it can be checked at: http://www20.gencat.cat/docs/Departament_de_la_Presidencia/Ambits_actuacio/CA_PSIF/Informes/Informe_CAPSIF_immigracio_diversitat.pdf

Table 12: Main immigration and diversity issues from 2007 to 2012

2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012
<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Unemployment • Right to vote • Social services abuse • Abolition of burqa in public spaces • Integration • Insecurity and delinquency • Increase presence of Catalan language 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Religious affairs • Reception classrooms • National Agreement for Immigration • Catalan language & integration • Control family reunification policies 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Religious affairs • Bill of reception • Catalan language & integration • PxC's growing xenophobic discourse 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Bill of reception • Irregular migration management • Census of Vic • Conflict in Salt • Badalona major (PPC): immigration & delinquency • Abolition of burqa in public spaces • PPC's videogame 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • Integration • Contract of integration • Conflict in Salt • Will of integration & permit to stay • Catalan language & integration • PPC asks for more strict measures for immigrants • Duran i Lleida's controversial discourse 	<ul style="list-style-type: none"> • More control on family reunification • Heath card for immigrants • PPC's discourse on expelling out delinquent immigrants

Source: Own elaboration

It seems obvious that 2010 was the year when there were more social conflicts related to immigration and diversity issues reflected on the media. But it also seemed that the topic of immigration was most widely used by politicians during the campaign to gain particular votes. This politicization of immigration was also present at the Parliament. By contrast, in 2012, conflicts on immigration and diversity issues were extremely infrequent in both Parliament and media.

To understand if this descent in the use of immigration as an electoral tool is something made on purpose by political parties or if, by contrast, it is something collateral due to the fact that political parties during the last campaign were more focused on other issues, we would need to wait for the next elections. Accordingly, with a further perspective, we would be able to assess if this is a general (improving) tendency of political

parties of it is just something that obeys to particular contextual circumstances.

What it seems clear is that during the period of time considered there have been plenty of conflicts and issues related to immigration and diversity, reflected both at the Parliament and in media.

As stated, these necessarily brief contextualization will help us to frame the sources will be considering for our pilot study. Let us now turn in more detail into the description of such sources.

2. Documentary sources: variables and framing

This section is, firstly, intended to describe in detail the variables considered for the collection and selection of the documentary sources for the purpose of the pilot study. Secondly, it is aimed to introduce and frame the selected documentary sources in order to provide a general picture of the discourses to be analyzed.

2.1. Variables considered

In order to select the documentary sources we are considering for the implementation of the framework, we have contemplated four main variables:

- **The parties:** as already stated in previous chapter, the following political parties/coalitions have been selected due to their relevance and prominence in the Catalan context: CiU (Convergence & Union), ERC (Republican left of Catalonia), ICV-EUiA (Green Initiative for Catalonia & United and Alternative Left), PPC (Popular Party of Catalonia), PSC (Socialist Party of Catalonia) and PxC (Platform for Catalonia).

Apart from the five mainstream political parties of Catalonia, PxC has also been considered because this party plays a prominent role in the political discursive construction of immigration and diversity issues in the context of Catalonia and, hence, needs to be included in order to understand how Catalan political discourse is constructed.

- **The channel:** collection of three main channels, as sources for discourses to be encoded: electoral programs, Plenary sessions and written interviews done to political leaders of the selected parties. It is important to be aware that we are dealing with different sources with different discursive, structural and contextual particularities. However, if there is something that all these channels have in common is that they are formal ways for communication of politicians with the electorate. There are other informal ways that have not been considered, such as, for example, punctual declarations during electoral campaign, actions developed in the streets. It should not be forgotten that political parties, while communicating, above all, are doing politics and their main aim is to persuade the absent audience. In this sense, even though they might be discussing with other politicians or with a journalist, their main addressee is the electorate they are willing to convince.

Furthermore, these channels have their own particularities and their own limitations. By combining the selection of three different channels with different discursive and contextual characteristics, it is our aim to minimize the particular limitations of each of them.

Concretely, firstly, *electoral programs* allow political parties to choose freely the topics they want to cover and the ones that do not want to include. However, discourse must be performative and direct and it is constrained by space and by the particular characteristics of the channel, since it does not allow parties to elaborate opinions, but rather, present solutions to problems.

Secondly, in *Plenary sessions* political parties have the opportunity to elaborate their opinions and perceptions, but they are limited by the time and the formal structure of the debate, which in Spain and Catalonia is very strict, and carefully regulated by the president of the session.

Thirdly, regarding *interviews*, political parties may express their opinions more freely about particular issues, but the selection of topics is done by the interviewer and there is an editing process that may alter the actual word selection of the politician. Consequently, by being aware of these limitations and by combining different channels, it is expected to minimize them and to use them productively.

- *The territorial scope*: collection of electoral programs and interviews produced at both the autonomic and municipal levels. Plenary sessions have been considered obviously only at the autonomic level.
- *The time*: collection of documentary sources in the last two autonomic and municipal elections for the electoral programs and interviews. Consequently, we have collected the electoral programs of May, 2007 and May, 2011 (municipal elections), and November, 2010 and November, 2012 (autonomic elections) and the interviews done to political leaders about immigration during the period corresponding to each of the electoral campaigns. However, regarding Plenary sessions, we have considered the whole period from January 2007 to December 2012.

We are fully aware that this analytical framework as a critical tool of discourse analysis, has two main limits to reach its purposes, but these limits have a methodological justification: it is centered in words and sentences, rather than actions; it considers mainly formal discourses rather than occasional, circumstantial or informal speeches. This means that this analytical framework has not been thought to be applied to analyze xenophobic actions (such as, distributing flyers during the electoral campaign with clear xenophobic messages, as it was the case in the local election in the city of Badalona) neither informal speeches done by political leaders when dealing with particular conflicts and circumstances, but rather in most formal ways of political discourse, as stated: in electoral programs, Plenary sessions and interviews.

2.2. Framing documentary sources

This section has the objective to describe the main discursive characteristics of each of the selected documentary sources, as well as framing each of the sources by presenting their nature in detail.

Electoral programs

Electoral programs are one of the most premeditated ways that political parties have to communicate with electorates, since they correspond to the identity and ideology of the party. In these programs, political

parties offer several aspects about their will and intentions in case they are elected. In this sense, electoral programs are a summary of the main government programs (which are more extensive and normally for internal use). One of the main discursive characteristics of *electoral programs* is that they are simple, direct and easy to read, since they must be understood by all kind of readers. Particularly, language is not very elaborated and it avoids technical terms, so that it clearly presents all the proposals for each of the different social and economic areas.

Electoral programs have, by nature, a pro-active and assertive discursive structure. Generally, all the proposals are grouped by broader thematic areas. For each area, there is an initial introduction that frames the problem, followed by the proposals to improve the particular situation. In some cases, the most direct ones, the problem is produced by the (bad) management of the issue by the current government. In these cases, the government is interposed as the main responsible for the problems of society and the signing party as the main solution for such problems.

Accordingly, electoral programs work as the letter of presentation of the party and, hence, its discourse is persuasive and forceful. This means that the details on how they are actually going to manage situations are not so important (and, furthermore, these details would complicate the understanding of the program and would be, hence, less effective). Rather, it is more important that proposals sound decisive, convincing and reliable.

Besides, the discursive structure of electoral programs is quite constrained. Politicians are not supposed to express their opinions, but rather, their attitudes towards particular problems. However, some electoral programs start with a letter signed by the president of the party in which the electorate is directly addressed. In such a letter, discourse is more flexible and opinions are easily introduced. This letter provides some proximity of the party with the society and, in a way, gives a sense of a party who cares about people. But leaving apart such an

introduction, the remaining discourse of the program is formal but, at the same time, easy to read and understand.

Consequently, even though discourse in electoral programs is addressed to the electorate, apart from the letter, it is difficult to find formal discursive traces of that (such as “you”). In theory, discourse should be addressed to everyone in general terms but, as we may see, in some cases it is exclusionist and is only addressed to a particular sector of society (mainly national citizens). This kind of exclusionism might be clear and open in some programs (for example, the one of PxC), but it will be normally quite subtle and, hence, it needs a closer and careful analysis, in order to be detected.

Once the most relevant discursive and structural characteristics of electoral programs have been introduced, let us move to the presentation of each of the selected sources. The following tables show for each election how much of their program each party dedicate to immigration and diversity issues.

Table 13: Immigration and diversity issues in the selected electoral programs

Political Party	2007	2010	2011	2012
CiU	5.12%	3.62%	5.15%	1.3%
ERC	1.32%	3.19%	5%	1.26%
ICV-EUiA	4.88%	1.3%	4.25%	0.54%
PPC	Not released ³⁷	4.5%	2.19%	2.82%
PSC	6.09%	2.3%	4.27%	0.74%
PxC	20.16%	17.95%	38.65%	10.96%

Source: Own elaboration

As it can be seen, for all the political programs with the exception of PPC, immigration and diversity issues were consistently less prominent in 2012 than in any of the other selected years. This might be explained by the fact that in 2012 elections the main debate was more focused on the right for Catalan society to decide about their own sovereignty and

³⁷ PPC did not release any Electoral program for the Municipal elections of 2007 in Catalonia.

hence, immigration and diversity issues, as probably any other issue, became secondary.

It seems as well that in general, the presence of immigration and diversity issues is bigger in municipal elections (2007, 2011) than in autonomic elections (2010, 2012). And, at the same time, for all the parties, but PPC and PSC, the year in which immigration and diversity issues are more prominent is 2011. However, for PPC is 2010 and for PSC is 2007.

It is also remarkable that, while in municipal elections for almost all political parties the prominence of immigration and diversity issues remains more or less the same, for ERC it grows almost five times more in 2011 and for PxC is almost double.

Plenary sessions

Catalan parliament is composed by five main organs:

- The representatives' assembly: it is composed by the representatives of each party, the president of the parliament and a general secretary. Its functions are to establish the criteria to ease the tasks and debates of the parliament and decide what commission will operate to study projects, non-legislative proposals and initiatives.
- The parliament board: it is the guiding organ of the parliament and it is composed by a president, two vice-presidents and four secretaries that are elected in the Plenary. Its main functions are to plan the parliamentary tasks, to interpret the regulations and to direct the services of the parliament.
- The Plenary: it is the functional working organ and it is composed by all the members of the camera, as long as more than half are present. It works through Plenary sessions which can be ordinary or extraordinary. While the first ones are developed within the two periods of sessions (from September to December and from February to June), the latter are called by the president of the government, the permanent council or the absolute majority of parliamentary members. It has a concrete agenda and the session cannot be closed until all the points of the agenda have been covered. Its

main function is legislative and supposes the highest representative of Catalan sovereignty.

- The Permanent Council: it is composed by 23 members elected by the parliamentary groups. Its main functions are to act as the Plenary between the session periods, when the legislature is finished or when the camera has been broken up.
- The commissions: they are composed by reduced groups of members of the parliament proportional to the number of members of each parliamentary group in the Plenary. They are specialized in one of the areas dealt by the Plenary and they can be legislative or specific. The first ones are created by the Plenary and the regulating commission and its main functions are preparing the discussion for the Plenary that correspond to their area, receive information from the members of the government of the *Generalitat*, the councils and their management, pass resolutions and call the particular councilors to control and supervise the administrative tasks. The second ones have a concrete function or they have to get involved with particular public institutions.

As stated, the main political and legislative decisions are taken and voted in the Plenary. Furthermore, Plenary sessions' diaries are easily accessible to society through the Catalan Parliament website³⁸ and are also the ones that are reproduced by media coverage. In this sense, the Plenary is the most public organ of the parliament. For these reasons, we have selected Plenary sessions as one of our sources for this pilot study.

It should be born in mind that time is rigorously measured and accomplished in parliamentary discourse. The president of the Plenary session has the power to give the floor and interrupt and stop those who exceed the stipulated time. Depending on which type of intervention it is, times can be from 3 to 30 minutes per intervention. Having these premises into account, parliamentary members have very few tools to intervene in the agenda in a spontaneous way, only with applause or catcalls. However, if these become too often, the president has the power

³⁸ www.parlament.cat/web/

to stop them. Obviously, this very constrained structure limits enormously the interaction between different parliamentary members, and this has an influence in their discourse, which is formal and does not sound very natural.

The Plenary has three main functions that are carried out through different activities each of them with particular discursive characteristics. The three main functions are:

- **Legislative:** it is the typical function of the parliament which consists of passing laws. It is carried out by draft laws and legislative proposals. Laws are typically born by proposals done by the government. In such a case, the initial text to be discussed in the Plenary is called draft law. When the proposal is made by another parliamentary group or by the different members of the parliament the initial text to be discussed is called legislative proposal.

From the discursive point of view, these two activities are quite similar. Both of them start with the presentation of the particular proposal to be discussed. In the case of draft laws, the proposal is presented by a representative of the government; in the case of the legislative proposal, it is presented by a representative of the opposition. Both of them should state the reasons and the precedents of such a proposal and should not last for more than 10 minutes. After that, all the other representatives of each party have a maximum of five minutes to express their attitudes and positions.

- **Control:** It is a control made by other parliamentary members to the government and is carried out by oral questions and urgent demands. Oral questions are realized by any member of the parliament (including the ones belonging to the party/parties in power) and they are addressed to a particular member of the government about different issues, and the whole process of question posing and answering should not exceed five minutes.

From the discursive point of view, oral questions normally serve as a preamble to express some criticism to the government. Generally, when a question is posed, the member of the government answers to it very briefly.

From such an answer the member that poses the question normally states a critique to the government about the particular topic. After such an intervention, the member of the government has another opportunity to defend him/herself from the criticism or to clarify or explain more in detail a particular issue. Oral questions are particularly relevant for understanding the position of different parties about particular issues.

The urgent demands have the function to ask the government for an explanation about a particular topic and allow an exchange of information and points of view about different conflicts. The government is obliged to explain in detailed the different issues posed by the urgent demand. Urgent demands generally finish with a motion that forces the government to solve a particular problem. The urgent demand is normally done by a member of the opposition to the government. The presentation of the demand should not last for more than 10 minutes, and answers to these should not exceed 5 minutes each.

- Political orientation: It is carried out by non-legislative proposals and **motions**. Non legislative proposals are made to ask the government to take action about a particular issue, to show publicly the majority opinion of other members of the parliament and to settle the bases for a particular action with the public administration. In our corpus, as we will see, we have not found any of these non-legislative proposals dealing with immigration or diversity issues during the selected period of time. Motions are always subsequent to an urgent demand and it is here where all the parties have the opportunity to express their political orientation towards a particular issue. Motions should be presented at least from a tenth part of the members of the parliament and they finish with a voting that should reach the absolute majority. From the discursive point of view, **motions** start with the presentation of such a motion by one of the members of the opposition that, without any restriction of time, will explain why this motion is presented. After such an intervention, one member of the government has the right to answer, without any restriction of time, to the questions and critiques posed previously. After that, one representative of each party has 30 minutes to present their position towards the motion presented. In this sense, motions are quite revealing since, time constrictions are much more flexible and all the parties can offer their points of view.

Thus, while oral questions and urgent demands are realized only between two parties (normally from one member of the opposition to a particular member of the government), draft laws, legislative proposals, non-legislative proposals and motions allow all the parties to express their position towards a particular issue. It also seems obvious that time constrains play an important role on the discursive structure and characteristics of each activity. Consequently, while in the firstly mentioned activities time constrains the possibilities for different parties to express more freely, in **motions** political parties have more options to develop their opinions and attitudes due to the fact that they have more time to express themselves.

It is our aim to show now how many of each of these activities have been selected for the purpose of our study in each of the years of the period considered. As it has already been said, only those initiatives in which the central topic was immigration or diversity issues have been taken into account. By contrast, those initiatives where immigration was tangential or just mentioned have been discarded. In particular, the table 14 shows the different activities (and functions) developed in Plenary sessions, and how many of them have been selected during each year, because they deal with immigration or diversity issues.

Table 14: Activities in Plenary sessions dealing with immigration and diversity issues 2007-2012

Function	Activity	2007	2008	2009	2010	2011	2012	Totals
Legislative	Draft law		1	2	1			4
	Legislative proposal					1		1
Control	Oral Question	3	1	2	5	2		13
	Urgent demand	1	2		1	1	1	6
Political orientation	Non-legislative proposal							0
	Motion	1	2		1	1	1	6
Totals		5	6	4	8	5	2	30

Source: Own elaboration

As it can be seen, of the total of 30 activities selected during the whole period considered, 2010 is the year with more activities dealing with immigration and diversity issues. The year with less activities, by contrast,

is 2012. This is coherent with the length dedicated to immigration and diversity issues in the electoral programs for 2012. In other words, it seems that within the period considered, 2012 is the year when less attention was paid to immigration and diversity issues in the Catalan Political agenda.

For the rest of the years, as it can be observed, the average of activities per year is 5. And the year with more activities is 2010. This sample of more parliamentary activity on immigration and diversity issues during 2010 may explain why for most political parties issues on immigration and diversity were more prominent in their electoral programs for the 2011 municipal elections.

After providing a general overview in numbers of the Plenary sessions selected, it is important to show, year by year, which particular activities have been considered and which political parties are involved in each of them.

Table 15: Plenary sessions in 2007 (PSC, ERC, ICV-EUiA³⁹ in the government)

Political Parties involved	Activity	Date
From Ciutadans to PSC	Oral question	14/02/2007
From ERC to PSC	Oral question	30/05/2007
ICV-EUiA to PSC	Oral question	03/10/2007
CiU, PSC,	Urgent demand	15/11/2007
CiU, PSC, PPC, PSC, ERC, ICV-EUiA, Mixed Group,	Motion	28/11/2007

Source: Own elaboration

³⁹ As stated, the coalition of these three parties was known as the *tripartite*, starting on the 20th of December, 2003 and finishing on the 11th of may, 2006.

Table 16: Plenary sessions in 2008 (PSC, ERC, ICV-EUiA in the government)

Political Parties involved	Activity	Date
ERC, PPC, CiU, PSC, ICV-EUiA, Mixed Group,	Draft law	06/02/2008
CiU, PSC,	Urgent demand	07/02/2008
CiU, PPC, PSC, ERC, ICV-EUiA, , Mixed Group	Motion	21/02/2008
CiU, PSC	Urgent demand	02/07/2008
PSC to PSC	Oral question	16/07/2008
CiU, ERC, PSC, PPC, ICV-EUiA, Mixed Group	Motion	17/07/2008

Source: Own elaboration

Table 17: Plenary sessions in 2009 (PSC, ERC, ICV-EUiA in the government)

Political Parties involved	Activity	Date
PSC to PSC	Oral question	18/02/2009
ERC to PSC	Oral question	18/03/2009
PSC, Mixed Group, PPC, ERC, CiU, ICV-EUiA,	Draft law	15/07/2009
PSC, Mixed Group, PPC, ERC, CiU, ICV-EUiA,	Draft law	14/10/2009

Source: Own elaboration

Table 18: Plenary sessions in 2010 (PSC, ERC, ICV-EUiA in the government. After elections CiU in the government)

Political Parties involved	Activity	Date
ERC to PSC	Oral question	27/01/2010
PPC to PSC	Oral question	27/01/2010
CiU to PSC	Oral question	10/03/2010
CiU to PSC	Oral question	15/04/2010
PSC, ERC, PPC, Mixed Group,	Draft Law	18/03/2010
ICV-EUiA to PSC	Oral question	27/04/2010
PPC, PSC	Urgent demand	28/04/2010
PPC, CiU, PSC, ERC, Mixed Group,	Motion	13/05/2010

Source: Own elaboration

Table 19: Plenary sessions in 2011 (CiU in the government)		
Political Parties involved	Activity	Date
CiU to CiU	Oral question	09/02/2011
PPC, CiU	Urgent demand	23/03/2011
PPC, PSC, ERC, Mixed Group, ICV-EUiA, CiU,	Motion	14/04/2011
PPC, PSC, CiU, ERC, Mixed Group,	Legislative proposal	04/05/2011
PSC to CiU	Oral question	21/12/2012

Source: Own elaboration

Table 20: Plenary sessions in 2012 (CiU in the government)		
Political Parties involved	Activity	Date
PPC to CiU	Urgent demand	14/03/2012
PPC, ERC, Mixed Group, PSC, CiU, ICV-EUiA,	Motion	28/03/2012

Source: Own elaboration

As it can be seen, during the period of the Tripartite in the government, PSC was the speaker responsible for answering to the urgent demands and oral questions done by any party. In particular, in 2007 and 2008 the two urgent demands and the subsequent motions done to the government are lead by CiU, while in 2010, 2011 and 2012 all the urgent demands and motions were lead by PPC. It can be said, thus, that right wing seems to be more active in performing the control function to the government when they are at the opposition.

Interviews

The general structure of interviews is much more open than the ones of electoral programs and parliamentary debates. All the interviews start with a headline that is normally a sentence said by the interviewed political leader. This sentence does not necessarily have to be the most relevant or informative, but rather it is usually the most appellative one.

After the headline, it is frequent to continue with an opening paragraph. This paragraph can be an introduction about the interviewee or a description of the place where the interview was carried out.

The body of the interview generally appears following the structure of question-answer, as if it was a dialogue. Furthermore, questions and answers are visually distinguished not only by different paragraphs, but also by using visual elements, such as dashes. Broadly speaking, questions are short and concrete. Sometimes the journalist presents an opinion as a declarative sentence before introducing the question, but most frequently the question is posed without preambles.

Similarly, in the written format presented to the public, the answer of the political leader must be necessarily short. It is not that the interviewer times the answer, but for the sake of the dynamism of the interview, it is expected that the answer is short, concrete and direct. It is important to bear in mind that interviews are edited before being published, which means that interruptions and reformulations may not appear in the final version.

Regarding the answers, politicians are not expected to fully answer to the questions posed (as it is expected in the parliament). Often, the politician chooses to answer partially or not to answer at all, by moving to another related topic. Generally, these no-answers have to do with the preservation of the positive image of the politician or the party s/he represents or with the intention to manage the possible negative image.

Interesting enough, often if a politician does not answer to the question, the journalist does not insist in remaking the question or demanding him/her to answer. Rather, the general tendency is that after an answer, another question comes without considering the content of the previous answer.

It seems obvious, then, that the journalist is the one that selects the thematic line of the interview by interposing those aspects that, to his/her mind, can be of greatest interest for the general public. However, politicians have room in their answers to emphasize and de-emphasize particular topics, depending on his/her own interests (or, rather, the interests of the party they represent).

We should also take into account that the final version of the interview is edited and, hence, the discourse might not be verbatim as the politician put it. This means that, even though the semantic meaning should be the same, the exact words might not be exactly the same used by the politician. Consequently, it is necessary to bear in mind these limitations when carrying out an analysis. Nevertheless, we understand that the discourse we will analyze, mediated or not by the editing process, has been approved by the politician that produced such a discourse, and these are the ones that finally arrive to the audience having the power to create and shape opinions and attitudes.

Once having described the main structural and discursive characteristics of interviews, let us show the different interviews selected for each electoral campaign. Let us remind that we have only considered written interviews done during the electoral campaign period to any political leader belonging to the selected political parties in which immigration or diversity issues was a central topic. The following tables show for each campaign, the political leader interviewed, the political party s/he belongs to, the media in which the interview was published and the date.

Table 21: Interview during Municipal elections 2007 (10/05-27/05)

Political leader	Political party	Media	Date
Xavier Trías	CiU	La Vanguardia	23/05/2007

Source: Own elaboration

Table 22: Interviews during Autonomic elections 2010 (11/11-28/11)

Political leader	Political Party	Media	Date
Xavier García Albiol	PPC	El Mundo	23/11/2010
Josep Anglada	PxC	El Mundo-Catalunya	20/011/2010

Source: Own elaboration

Table 23: Interviews during Municipal elections 2011 (05/05-22/05)

Political leader	Political Party	Media	Date
Alicia Alegret	PPC	El Punt	14/05/2011
Jordi Serra	PSC	El periódico de Badalona	20/05/2011
Alberto Fernández	PPC	El País	20/05/2011

Source: Own elaboration

Table 24: Interviews during Autonomic elections 2012 (09/11-25/11)

Political leader	Political Party	Media	Date
Oriol Amorós	ERC	Grundmagazine	10/11/2012
Juan Carlos Villamizar	ICV-EUiA	Grundmagazine	20/11/2012
Josep Anglada	PxC	Alerta Digital	18/011/2012
Montserrat Torres	ERC	Grundmagazine	19/11/2012
Ernesto Carrión	PSC	Grundmagazine	20/11/2012
Josep Anglada	PxC	Diario el Prisma	21/11/2012
Susana Clerici	PPC	Grundmagazine	23/11/2012

Source: Own elaboration

As it can be seen, a total of 13 interviews have been selected and, at least there is one interview for each of the parties considered. Besides, PPC and PxC are the parties with more interviews. This may be explained because these two parties are the ones that make more public movements and speak more about immigration and diversity issues in media, during the period taken into account.

Contrary to the general tendency observed in electoral programs and Plenary sessions, in 2012 electoral campaign is when there are more interviews about immigration and diversity issues published. This might be explained by the fact that Grundmagazine decided to make interviews to political leaders on the topic of immigration. In this sense, we can say that the quantity of interviews does not depend on the political interests of these parties or the potential interest of society on immigration and diversity issues, but rather on the interest of the media itself. This is another reason why, as we have already stated, in interviews the selection of topics is frequently done by the interviewer or the media s/he belongs to, while political leaders have not much freedom to deal with other topics that s/he might be interested in dealing with.

Finally, let us remind that the three selected documentary sources have their own particular characteristics in terms of functions, context, discourse and structure; and each of them has its own opportunities and limitations for the purpose of our analysis. However, being aware of

these limitations and combining the three different channels, it is expected to minimize such limitations and use the opportunities productively.

3. Implementation of the framework

The aim of this section is to describe how the actual implementation of the framework will be developed.

As stated in 3.1. (part II), our framework is designed in such a way that the first step is to apply *kitemarking* to the documentary sources and, only those discourses that accomplished the three minimal requirements would be considered xenophobic. Accordingly, for the rest of discourses, the implementation of the framework would finish here, since discourse is not considered xenophobic and, thus, it cannot be graduated and its xenophobic rhetoric does not have to be assessed. By contrast, for discourses that *kitemarking* results certify as xenophobic, the rest of the framework should be implemented in order to graduate how much xenophobic discourse is (*framing*) and assess how this xenophobic discourse is justified and legitimated through rhetorical strategies (*benchmarking*).

However, for the purpose of the pilot study, and in order to get more details about how Catalan political discourse is constructed on immigration and diversity issues, we will implement the whole framework for all the documentary sources (independently of the results obtained in *kitemarking*). This will allow us to understand other important issues such as which values are associated with immigration, which policy areas and issues are more frequent when dealing with immigration and diversity issues, how immigrants are socially represented and how each party constructs its rhetoric (even if not xenophobic) about immigration and diversity issues.

In order to classify the whole range of documentary sources, we will divide them by political parties (ordered alphabetically according to their acronyms) and organize them along with the following order: Firstly, electoral programs, then Plenary sessions and finally interviews.

Furthermore, within each of them, sources will be chronologically ordered (starting in 2007 and finishing in 2012).

For the purpose of the analysis, and in order to consider the background context as much as possible, in Plenary sessions we have grouped urgent demands together with its respective subsequent motions, since as stated in 2.2 (Part III), a motion comes as a consequence of the urgent demand and, thus, the central issues dealt with in both are the same. Considering that, we have a total of 66 documentary sources (23 electoral programs, 30 Plenary sessions, and 13 interviews). However, if we consider all the interventions done by all the political parties in Plenary sessions we find a total of 71 interventions (15 by CiU, 14 by ERC, 12 by ICV-EUiA, 13 by PPC, and 17 by PSC). This means that we will have a total of 107 individual implementations (20 by CiU, 20 by ERC, 17 by ICV-EUiA, 21 by PPC, 23 by PSC, 6 by PxC) of the framework and, hence, each of these implementations will be registered in one individual template.

Accordingly, in order to systematically implement our framework with such a large amount of sources, it is necessary to carry out an analysis in four levels.

3.1. Level one: qualitative microanalysis

In level one we will carry out a qualitative microanalysis of each of the 107 interventions separately following the same template (see analysis template in appendix 1) and we will group these templates, following the already described criteria. In this level we are interested in identifying the presence or absence of each strategy without considering the number of times that each strategy occurs in most cases. Therefore, for more cases we will just register a representative example of the strategy (it may

happen, then, that the same reference appears in more than one strategy, if this example is particularly clarifying or illuminating).

There are particular cases, though, in which we will consider the frequency. Those are the cases of the global meanings and the discursive rhetoric. For the global meanings we will only register for each documentary source those two most frequent policy areas and those two most frequent policy areas (both of them considering either they are positive, negative or neutrally constructed). In this way, we will register for each source only the most prominent ones, discarding those minor or anecdotal policy areas and issues appearing in a given discourse. The same comes for discursive rhetoric. In this case, we will register for each documentary source the three most prominent argumentative and manipulative strategies. Accordingly, we will discard, once again, those argumentative or manipulative strategies that are not used to construct the main rhetoric of a given discourse, but rather appear only once or to justify one minor argument. This first preliminary qualitative analysis has been done by four different coders with distinctive academic backgrounds,⁴⁰ in order to minimize the possible subjectivity of one simple coder.

3.2. Level two: quantitative macroanalysis

Once all the templates have been filled in, we will move onto the quantitative macroanalysis (see analysis template in appendix 2). In this second level, our interest is to understand how (in this case Catalan) political discourse is generally constructed. Technically, each standard will be quantified in order to establish a percentage that registers the number of occurrences of each standard in proportion to *two particular* total numbers. In other words, we will work with two different proportions, depending on the internal nature of each standard. In particular, this table shows the criteria established:

⁴⁰ Political science, economics and management, international relations and linguistics.

Table 25: Proportions applied to each standard

Tool	Standard	Proportionally to
Kitemarking	Discourse recipient	Total number of interventions by all parties
	Polarization	Total number of interventions by all parties
	Local Strategies	Total number of interventions by all parties
Framing	Countries, religions & languages referred	Total number of interventions by all parties
	Values associated	Total number of values (positive and negative)
	Conceptualization	Total number of conceptualizations
	Global meanings	Total number of interventions by all parties
	Global representation of immigrants	Total number of interventions by all parties
Benchmarking	Discursive rhetoric	Total number of interventions by all parties
	Political rhetoric	Total number of interventions by all parties

Source: own elaboration

As stated, this key difference between the established proportions has to do with the nature of the standard and the way it is registered in our framework. For most standards, our framework registers all the expected variables that may occur in a given discourse. In this sense, we will consider every time this variable appears in relation to the whole number of interventions done by all the political parties.

However, for the standards related to values and conceptualization not all the expected variables are registered in our framework, since in one intervention done by a political party it might appear more than one value (or even a combination of positive a negative values) associated with immigration and more than one conceptualization of immigration as a phenomenon. Therefore, it is necessary to register all occurrences of such values and conceptualizations, so that they can be proportionally related to the total number of values and the total number of conceptualizations, in order to understand if there is majority of positive, negative, or neutral ones.

Accordingly, by carrying out such a quantitative analysis, we will obtain a proportion that will allow us to see the percentage of use of each standard (and each strategy) by all the political parties (see analysis

template 2 in appendix). Thanks to these percentages, we will be able to mark “1” or “0” in the next level of analysis for each standard.

3.3. Level three: final results

The final results of the implementation of our framework should mark with “1” or “0” each of the standards (see analysis template in appendix 3). As stated before, “1” means that a discriminatory tendency has been detected and “0” means that this has not been detected. In this way, we will be able to identify xenophobic discursive tendencies (if discourse gets 3 points in *kitemarking*), graduate how much xenophobic discourse is (from 4 to 10) and to assess its rhetoric.

Accordingly, in order to assign “1” or “0” values to each standard, we should consider the percentages obtained in level two. More than 50 % in each of the variables of any standard will be enough to mark “1”. For example, if we get that discourse in 60% of the cases is addressed to national citizens, we should mark “1” in the first standard of *kitemarking* (since a discriminatory tendency has been detected). And we will proceed in such a way with the rest of the standards following analysis template 3 in appendix.

As it will be seen, the three templates have exactly the same structure. What it changes is the approach and types of analysis developed in each of them.

3.4. Level four: variables to consider

Once we have all the main results, we can cross over different variables in order to answer the questions we want to find out. For example, we could focus on how each political party constructs its discourse, or on how political discourse is constructed in general. Similarly, we could concentrate on political cleavages, such as right and wing discursive behavior, or give more attention to discursive differences depending on territorial or temporal variables.

Accordingly, it is necessary to set out first the questions we want to address in order to later combine the results to answer such questions, as we will see in the following chapter.

It should be borne in mind, though, that this complex analysis in four levels it is done here due to the large amount of documentary sources we will be using for our pilot study. However, if only one documentary source is assessed, the analysis will be more simple and straightforward, since only level 3 should be applied.

IV. Main findings

This chapter aims at offering an overall perspective of the xenophobic political discourse in Catalonia considering, on the one hand, general questions regarding political cleavages and political systems and, on the other, more concrete aspects following the analytical framework' standards⁴¹ as they have been defined previously. In order to make this section more accessible, we will articulate these findings around key questions and answers.

1. General questions regarding political cleavages and political systems

This first section is articulated around these five key questions:



1. Can political discourse in Catalonia be considered xenophobic?
2. Is there a meaningful difference in political discourse between right and left?
3. Is there a meaningful difference in political discourse between nationalist and Spanish state-based parties?
4. Is there a meaningful difference in political discourse between political parties in government and those that are in opposition?

⁴¹ For a visual presentation of overall results, see appendixes 4 to 6.

5. Is there a meaningful difference in political discourse in the electoral contexts?

1.1. Can political discourse in Catalonia be considered xenophobic?

According to the sources analyzed, most political discourse in Catalonia is addressed to both national citizens and immigrants (67%). Thus, it cannot be said that there is a clear pattern of xenophobic tendency in this sense. In the same way, polarization between national citizens and immigrants appear in 38% of the sources analyzed. However, local strategies of negative representation of immigrants are quite frequent (69%), even if each of them separately does not appear very frequently, as the following charts show:



As it can be seen, the sum of all the local strategies appear in 69% of the sources analyzed. Nevertheless, each of these strategies taken separately is present in a maximum of 19% of the total.

Consequently, only one of the three minimum requirements defined in our framework can be detected. Therefore, even if we cannot say that there is a clear pattern of xenophobic tendencies in Catalan political discourse, we cannot ignore the high percentage of local strategies that represent immigration in a negative way (see details in section 2.1). It is maybe on this representation of immigration that some work needs to be done at the discursive level.


1.2. Is there a meaningful difference in political discourse between right and left wing parties?

A meaningful difference can be observed between left and right wing parties in terms of how they construct their discourse on immigration and diversity issues. While left and centre-left wing parties (ICV-EUiA, ERC, PSC) present a more proactive discourse towards immigration, the right and centre-right wing parties (CiU, PPC and PxC) have shown, each party to different extents and with particular characteristics, more discriminatory tendencies. In this sense, we could say there is an intrinsic relationship between right wing ideologies and the construction of discourse on immigration and diversity issues, according to the sources analyzed. This tendency is not different in comparison to other European countries, where xenophobic discursive construction is basically a right wing phenomenon.

1.3. Is there a meaningful difference in political discourse between nationalist and Spanish state-based parties?⁴²

There is a difference in the way rhetoric is articulated between nationalist and Spanish state-based parties, as the chart 3 shows:

⁴² Apart from the classical right/wing cleavage, Catalan political system has a particular tension between political parties with clear Spanish State orientation and dependency (PP and PSC) and Catalan nationalist orientation and dependency (CiU, ERC and ICV-EUiA). However, even if ICV-EUiA is currently supporting the nationalist orientation, its political discursive behavior in the sources analyzed does not follow the same discursive pattern as the other two nationalist parties.



On the one hand, most nationalist parties (but ICV-EUiA) often appeal to traditional Catalan values to legitimate their proposals, their attitudes and policies, and interpose Catalan language and identity as the one that should be adopted by everyone, in priority terms in relation to the Spanish one. However, there are two meaningful differences in discourse between CiU and ERC: firstly, CiU (55%) articulates this language and national identity rhetoric more frequently than ERC (20%); secondly, while ERC's discourse focuses mainly on the preference for Catalan language, CiU as well establishes Catalan identity, values and principles as preferred. Nevertheless, both parties use more frequently an argumentative rhetoric (CiU: 71% and ERC: 82%), rather than a conservative one.

On the other hand, PPC (19%) and PxC (17%) show also some occurrences of conservative rhetoric, but there are more cases of populist rhetoric (43% and 83% respectively). Hence, both parties appeal mostly to national citizens' interests as a way to legitimate their policies and attitudes. By contrast, CiU and ERC do not use this populist rhetoric at all.


Finally, the rest of the parties (ICV-EUiA, PSC) do not articulate their rhetoric in any of these ways, but rather, use an argumentative discourse focused on the possible advantages or disadvantages that their proposed policies or attitudes can bring to the host society, to immigrants, or to both of them (see details in section 2.11).

Apart from that, this chart also allows us to establish at least two hypotheses that need to be tested in further applications:

- 1) Those parties that tend to use more argumentative strategies do not show a populist rhetoric.
- 2) Populist rhetoric and manipulative strategies tend to go hand in hand, as it is shown in the results of PPC and PxC.



1.4. Is there a meaningful difference in political discourse between political parties in government and those that are in opposition?

We can expect that those parties that appear as being real alternatives to the government in turn will develop different discursive strategies than those that have realistically no power option to win the elections. The results show that in the case of CiU, there is a change in discourse when the party is in the government and in the opposition regarding the recipient of its political discourse. That is to say, while CiU is in the opposition within the period considered (from 2007 to 2010) most discourse is uniquely addressed to national citizens. However, when autonomic elections approach in 2010 and the subsequent period in which CiU is in the government, we see how discourse turns to be addressed to both national citizens and immigrants, as the chart 4 shows:




In the case of ERC, ICV-EUiA and PSC (the *tripartite* in the government within the period considered from 2007 to 2010), we can see a

difference mainly in ICV-EUiA and PSC's discourse in the way immigrants are represented. While these parties are in coalition in the government, the general tendency is to represent immigrants as beneficiaries of the policies and proposals made by these parties. However, when these parties become the opposition, the general representation of immigrants is as passive victims of the (presupposed bad) management of government actions, as the following charts show:



As it can be seen, even if in both parties the representation of immigrants as beneficiaries persists over the years, in 2010 it starts decreasing, and immigrant representation as a victim starts been more prominent from that year on. In this sense, the legitimization of these parties' proposals and policies is done through the victimization of immigrants as a way to construct criticism against government performance. It has to be acknowledged, though, that for ERC this pattern is not as clear as for the other two parties of the coalition.

Similarly, we can also see a difference in CiU's discourse when the party is in government or in opposition. In particular, when CiU is in opposition immigrants are mostly represented as victims (of the government's action). However, when CiU is in government, immigrants are mainly represented as beneficiaries of the policies and proposals offered by CiU, as the chart 7 shows:



As it can be seen, representations of immigrants as victims are quite prominent until 2010, but from that year on there are only representations of immigrants as beneficiaries. Accordingly, as it is the case with ICV-EUiA's and PSC's discourse, we can see that victimization of immigrants is used to construct criticism towards the government while CiU is in opposition. But when CiU starts in the government this representation disappear and immigrants become beneficiaries of CiU's proposals and initiatives.

It seems, then, that immigration is instrumented here to construct the opposition's criticism towards the government in turn.


1.5. Is there a meaningful difference in political discourse in the electoral contexts?

In line with the previous questions, it is expected that those years in which there are elections (2007, 2010, 2011 and 2012) might show a different discursive behavior towards immigration that in those years when there are not elections (2008, 2009). This is why it is relevant to

analyze in detail how the prominence of different standards evolves over the period of time considered.

Broadly speaking, we could say that while in 2008 and 2009, discriminatory discursive tendencies are much less prominent, 2007 and, outstandingly, 2010 and 2011 seem to be the most critical years in the sense that there is more presence of these tendencies. However, it is necessary to acknowledge that 2012 does not show a consistent pattern⁴³.

In particular, the chart 8 shows the evolution over the years of *kitemarking* strategies (certification):




As we can see, political discourse uniquely addressed to national citizens is more prominent during 2007 (16%), and particularly in 2010 (26%) and 2011 (23%), while in the rest of the years the frequency is lower than 13%. Similarly, polarization between national citizens and immigrants is remarkably frequent in the same years. In particular, in 2007 polarization appears in 18% of the sources; in 2010, occurrences are of 24% and in 2011 of 26%. In the rest of the years polarization is lower than 13%.

Furthermore, in 2010 there is a 33% of the total of local strategies of negative representation of immigration, and in 2011 a 21%. But also

⁴³ Let us remind the reader that during 2012 immigration was a very infrequent topic on political discourse as we have shown in the description of the context of Catalonia (chapter III, section 1). This might be the reason why there is not a consistent pattern during 2012.

2007 (16%) and 2012 (18%) show a significant number of them, while in 2008 and 2009, these local strategies appear only in 6% of the sources. The same pattern applies for the main discriminatory strategies belonging to *framing*, as the following chart shows:




As it can be seen, concentrations of more discriminatory tendencies are notorious in 2010 and 2011, and also the frequency is higher in these two years. However, in 2008 and 2009 there are some discriminatory tendencies that are not present and the frequency of the present ones is much lower.

In particular, references to particular countries in negative contexts are more prominent in 2010 (33%), 2011 (33%), 2012 (22%) and 2007 (11%) while in 2008 and 2009 there are not any of these references.

References to Islam religion in negative contexts are more frequent during 2010 and 2011 (both of them in 29% of the sources), while the rest of the years are all lower than 14%.


Besides, immigration is conceptualized negatively mostly in 2010 (33%) and 2011 (26%), and negative values associated with immigration appear also more prominently during these years (31% and 33% respectively). However, it should be noted that during these years, there is also quite a remarkable presence of positive values associated with immigration and a significant number of neutral and, to a much lesser extent, positive conceptualizations of immigration. In this sense, we could say that during these two years there is a high overall presence of values and

conceptualizations. However, while positive values are more equally distributed over the years, negative values are more recurrently concentrated in 2010 and 2011, as the following chart shows:



Furthermore, most negative topics such as the ones related to legal and security issues also are more prominent in 2007, 2010, 2011 and, less frequently, in 2012, while in 2008 and 2009 there are not any of these topics highlighted. Similarly integration constructed in negative terms is also more notorious in those years, while in 2008 is only present in 9% of the sources and in 2009 is not present at all. In the same line, negative representations of immigrants as victims (20% in 2010 and 24% in 2011) or aggressors (27% in 2010 and 2011) are also more frequent during these years.

Regarding rhetoric, we can also see that the representations of immigration in a negative way as a threat or as a burden to legitimize different arguments are more prominent in 2010 and 2011. And there is also more frequency of conservative and populist rhetoric, as the chart 11 shows:



Negative representations of immigration as a burden, in order to legitimize particular proposals and arguments are more frequent in 2007 (29%), 2010 (24%) and 2011 (24%). While in the rest of the years is much lower and in 2009 they are inexistent.

Similarly, representations of immigration as a threat and, hence, the appeal to fear to legitimize xenophobic tendencies is most widely used in 2007 (24%), 2010 (24%) and 2011 (29%). While, in 2008 they are only present in 19% of the sources and in 2009 they are not present at all.

Apart from that, appeals to national values (conservative rhetoric) and to national citizens' interests (populist rhetoric) to justify particular arguments are as well more recurrent during 2010 and 2011. Nevertheless, while conservative rhetoric is present in all the years, populist rhetoric is rather low in 2008 and inexistent in 2009.

As it can be seen, all the discriminatory strategies are more prominent during 2010 and 2011, followed by 2007 (and in most cases, by 2012), while 2008 and 2009 are the years when these strategies are less recurrent and, some of them, even inexistent. Therefore, it seems that most frequent occurrences of discriminatory tendencies appear during the years when there are elections in Catalonia at both municipal (2007, 2011) and autonomic levels (2010, 2012). While the pattern for 2012 is not very consistent, it is clear that 2008 and 2009 are the years with less prominence of discriminatory tendencies detected in discourse. This seems to indicate that immigration is most commonly problematized and used with electoral aims when elections are approaching.

2. Concrete questions regarding discourse construction

According to the presentation of the general findings, in this section we articulate concrete results around twelve questions, corresponding each to one of our standards:

1. To whom is Catalan political discourse mainly addressed?
2. Are national citizens and immigrants polarized?
3. Is there a recurrent presence of local strategies that represent immigration negatively?
4. What countries of origins are referred in negative contexts? Are there implicit or explicit references to any country of origin preferred?
5. What religions are referred in negative contexts? Are there implicit or explicit references to any religion preferred?
6. What languages are referred in negative contexts? Are there implicit or explicit references to any language preferred?
7. What values are associated with immigration and/or diversity?
8. How is immigration as a phenomenon conceptualized?
9. What policy areas and issues are more frequent when dealing with immigration and/or diversity? How are they constructed?
10. What is the global representation of immigrants?
11. How is discursive rhetoric constructed regarding the legitimacy and justification of policies and/or attitudes related to immigration and/or diversity issues?
12. How is political rhetoric constructed regarding the legitimacy and justification of policies and/or attitudes related to immigration and/or diversity issues?

This second section has two main goals: on the one hand, to address and clarify some methodological issues on how we have practically assessed each of the standards; on the other hand, to present the results for each of them. As we have already stated, Catalan political discourse does not show a clear pattern of xenophobic discursive tendencies. However, there are some critical issues that need to be addressed, in order to avoid that discriminatory tendencies expand and to help minimize (sometimes unconscious) negative representations of immigration. Accordingly, for each question, we will firstly present some methodological reflections through some illustrative examples and, secondly, present the concrete results for such a question together with the particular details of each of them.

It is important to remark that the selection of examples does not necessarily correspond to the representativeness of the way political parties construct their discourse. Rather, this selection obeys to a methodological criterion and, hence, examples have been selected for their special illustrative characteristics. Nevertheless, we have attempted to show at least one example of each of the parties analyzed.

2.1. To whom is Catalan political discourse mainly addressed?

In order to better understand how discourse's recipient is identified in political discourse, let us further explain different typologies that can be found. Firstly, there are explicit and textual references that show that discourse is explicitly addressed to national citizens, such as the ones of this example:

[Tu barrio, tu calle, tu ciudad, ven constantemente amenazados el orden social y su identidad como consecuencia de una descontrolada y caprichosa – a veces incluso inexistente – política de control inmigratorio]

[Your neighborhood, your street, your city see its social order and identity constantly threat as a consequence of the uncontrolled and capricious- and sometimes even inexistent- policy of immigration control]
(Electoral program, PxC, 2010)

Here the textual reference of “your” clearly indicates that discourse is addressed to national citizens, who appear as the ones damaged by the presence of immigrants.

Secondly, there are some cases in which there are also textual references to the recipient, but they are not so obvious and need a closer revision in order to be detected, as in:

[Hem de ser una societat oberta i oberta també a la immigració, però sempre que aquesta respecti les lleis del nostre país i tingui la voluntat d'acceptar uns compromisos mínims amb els nostres valors i la nostra manera de viure]

[We must be an open society and also open to immigration, but as long as this (immigration) respect the laws of our country and has the will to accept some minimal commitments with our values and our lifestyle]
(Plenary session. Milián Querol (PPC), 14th, March, 2012)

Here, there is a clear textual reference that distinguishes between us (*our country, our values, our lifestyle*) and them (*immigration*). One could claim that, since immigrants are asked to respect our laws and values, discourse is also addressed to them. However, a closer revision shows that the discourse appeals to national citizens' interests and, thus is addressed mainly to them. Even though immigrants are appealed as well, their interests are not protected, but rather diminished in favor of *our values and lifestyle*. In this sense, we could say that discourse is addressed to national citizens.

Finally, there are more subtle cases in which there is not a textual reference that shows the recipient of discourse, but this can be inferred by the context, such as in the following example:

[Llibertat religiosa, doncs, respectant minories però tenint en compte la majoria i els valors històrics i tradicionals que han constituït la catalanitat]

[Religious freedom, then, respecting minorities but taking into account the majority and the historical and traditional values that have founded the *Catalinity*]

(Plenary session, Renom i Vallbona (CiU), 6th, February, 2008)

Here, even if the religious freedom is acknowledged, it is subjected to the majority historical and traditional values. In this sense, the perspective is done through the majority members (i.e. national citizens) and, hence, discourse is addressed to them, since, once again, it is their values that have to be preserved above other groups' values.

Therefore, as we can see, the range of discourses can vary from very explicit references, to more subtle or implicit references that need a closer analysis to be detected. Subtle forms can be unconscious and they are not detected so easily, since the meaning is implicit and needs to be inferred from the context.

However, what all the cases within this standard have in common is that majority members' interests or values are interposed as preferred among any other values and interests and this is a key indicator that shows that discourse is addressed to these majority members (national citizens).

As stated above, Catalan political discourse is mainly addressed to both (national citizens and immigrants) in 67% of the sources analyzed, while it is uniquely addressed to national citizens in 29% of the sources and only in 4% is only addressed to immigrants. Accordingly, we cannot say here that there is a clear discriminatory tendency.

2.2. Are national citizens and immigrants polarized?

This question is intrinsically related to the previous one. All discourses addressed uniquely to national citizens are very likely to polarize national citizens' interests and values, as we have seen in the previous examples. This is the reason why the percentage of discourses addressed to national citizens (29%) is very close to the percentage of discourses that polarize (36%). Polarization is more frequent because there can be discourses that are addressed to immigrants and national citizens, but still polarize these two groups, as we can see in the following example:

[Un projecte que acull a tothom; els que van néixer aquí, els que van venir amb les primeres onades migratòries d'arreu de l'Estat espanyol i també els que acaben d'arribar]

[Des de esquerra volem mostrar i demostrar que existeix un altre model d'integració, de cohesió social, que existeix un model d'interculturalitat, basat en el respecte en primer lloc a la societat d'acollida donant eines per conèixer el nostra país, la nostre història, la nostra cultura, la nostra realitat com a nació]

[A Project that hosts everyone; the ones that were born here, the ones that arrived with the first migration waves from the Spanish state and also the ones that have just arrived]

[From esquerra we would like to show and prove that there is another model of integration, of social cohesion, that there is a model of interculturality, based on the respect, in the first place, to the host society, giving the tools to get to know our country, our history, our culture and our reality as a nation]

(Electoral program, ERC, 2010)

The first example shows that discourse is addressed to everyone and the electoral program it is actually doing so, but the second example shows a polarization between *our* culture and history as the only one that needs to be known by everyone. In this sense, immigrants' various cultures and

histories are set aside and this is why we consider it a polarization, since the knowledge and respect for the own culture and history is prioritized.

In Catalan political discourse polarization occurs in less than half of the sources analyzed (36%) and this is why we cannot consider it as a clear discriminatory tendency. However, there is still some significant presence of this polarization that could be minimized.

2.3. Is there a recurrent presence of local strategies that represent immigration negatively?

As we have stated, in Catalan political discourse, there is not a high frequency of none of the local strategies in isolation. But all together appear in a 69% of the sources analyzed. In particular, *dehumanizing terms*, *hyperboles* and *metaphors* appear all of them in 19% of the sources analyzed, while *generalizations* appear in 13% of the sources.

Most recurrent *dehumanizing terms* are the ones that refer to immigrants as *illegal* or *irregular*, leaving apart the human side of them. But also very common are the references to *crowded flats* (*pisos patera*) to refer to large group of immigrants that share one only flat. This reference completely hides the existence of people and their dramatic circumstances, since they are doomed to share a flat with a big group in order to survive. In this sense, this reality is not only denied, but also trivialized.

More subtle forms of *dehumanizing terms* are, for example, the ones that refer to immigrants as *those people*, which, in a way, places some distance between the speaker (and the host society) and immigrants and, hence, it makes more difficult to create any kind of empathy towards them.

Most frequent *metaphors* have to do with the representation of the arrival of immigrants as *waves*. Even though this term is very much internalized in political and media discourse, we cannot forget that it has some implicit negative connotations, since a wave is always uncontrolled and it activates the domains of threat and danger. More subtle metaphors are the ones that represent Catalonia as *our house*. Depending on the

context, this metaphor might be harmless, but in a context where immigration is represented as a threat, the representation of Catalonia as *our house* is very powerful to activate a combative stance towards immigration, precisely because people would not let any stranger enter their own houses. Accordingly, these two main metaphors need to be assessed and understood in the context they are embedded, in order to find out whether or not they promote a negative representation of immigrants or immigration.

Most prominent *hyperboles* and *generalizations* tend to exaggerate the arrival of immigrants by focusing on the chaos and the crisis this suppose to the host society and promote some prejudices towards immigrants, as in:

[Perquè mentre nosaltres estem parlant, actualment, hi ha moltes nenes que se les treu dels col·legis a partir dels setze anys. Això és una realitat]

[Because, while we are speaking, currently, there are a lot of children (feminine) that are taken out from school after sixteen years old. This is a reality]

(Plenary session, López i Rueda (PPC), 4th, May, 2011)

This *generalization* is also *hyperbolic* because it exaggerates the reality and focus on a negative aspect of a particular group of immigrants that is extended to the whole immigrants collective, and promotes a negative representation.

The fact that most of these local strategies are subtle, and might even be unconscious, may explain why they are so frequent in political discourse. Precisely because some of them form so much part of the migration discursive repertory, they are never assessed and simply reproduced.

2.4. What countries of origins are referred in negative contexts? Are there implicit or explicit references to any country of origin preferred?

In the sources analyzed there are very few references to particular countries in negative contexts (8%) and also preferences are quite low (7%). Regional areas such as South America and East Europe are set as

the preferred sending zones. These preferences, nevertheless, seem to be very much connected with the cultural/religious proximity that these countries supposedly share with Catalonia and, in general, with the sphere of Christian influence. However, this frequency is rather low to be considered as a discriminatory tendency.

2.5. What religions are referred in negative contexts? Are there implicit or explicit references to any religion preferred?

In this case, not only explicit references to particular religions are considered, but also references to particular religious practices, such as:

[Tenim problemes quan veiem burques als nostres carrers, violentant i violant el que és la dignitat i la llibertat de la dona. Tenim problemes, i no podem mirar cap a un altre costat. Tenim problemes quan Catalunya és una de les regions europees amb més matrimonis forçats a casa nostra (...)després de la desaparició d'un dels principals assassins internacionals, ho hem de dir ben clar: tenim problemes quan ens diuen que Catalunya és un dels principals nius d'islamisme radical]

[We have problems when we see burqas in our streets, forcing and violating the dignity and freedom of woman. We have problems and we cannot turn the head apart. We have problems when Catalonia is one of the European regions with more forcing marriages in our house (...) after the disappearing of one of the main international killers, we have to say it clear: we have problems when they tell us that Catalonia is one of the main dens of radical Islamism]

(Plenary session, López Rueda (PPC), 4th, May, 2011)

In this example, Islamism is not explicitly referred, but it can be inferred by the context that the speaker is speaking about it. It is furthermore referred in very negative and problematic contexts, by associating it with lack of dignity and freedom for women, with forcing marriages and even with terrorism. It seems obvious that these associations produce quite a negative perception of Islamic religion, which is represented as a threat.

It is obvious that only one reference to a particular religion in a negative context does not show a discriminatory tendency. But when there are consistent references to the same religion (and especially if it is only to one particular religion), we can consider it as a discriminatory tendency.

In Catalan political discourse, Islam is the only religion that is referred in negative contexts in 13% of the sources analyzed, while preferences for Christian/catholic religion only appear in 7% of the sources. Once again, this frequency is rather low to be considered as a discriminatory tendency.

2.6. What languages are referred in negative contexts? Are there implicit or explicit references to any language preferred?

In this case, it is important to make a distinction, since, on the one hand, only PxC (in less than 3% of the sources analyzed) emphasizes that it is preferred to receive immigrants that speak Spanish rather than other languages. In this sense, this is connected with the preference of immigrants coming from South America, where shared culture and religions with the host society are presupposed. On the other hand, CiU (in 30% of CiU's sources), ERC (in 40% of ERC's sources) and, to a less extent, PSC (in 13% of PSC's sources) establish Catalan as the language that should be adopted by everyone, in detriment of Spanish language firstly, and other languages secondly. Nevertheless, in total numbers, Catalan political discourse shows a preference for Catalan language in 12% of the sources analyzed, precisely because ICV-EUiA, PPC and PxC do not show such a preference.

Accordingly, while the first indicates a discriminatory tendency towards particular groups of immigrants, the second is more related to the protection and emphasis of Catalan as the language allocated on a priority position, compared to other languages, because Catalan language has less legal and political protections than Spanish one, which is the official language of the State. This allows us to pose an unexpected methodological reflection: since the language standard can be considered an indicator for measuring discriminatory tendencies in national centric States, in States with a multinational character, or in contexts with a clear nationalist/State cleavage, such as the case of Catalonia, the application of the same standard loses this discriminatory meaning. This is justified by the fact that this language preference claim is done in a

context of protection and defense of a language that has not the same resources of protection than the official state one. Furthermore, we have not considered it, because in most cases the acceptance of the presence of other languages (even if they are subordinated to Catalan language) is acknowledged. Consequently, we can say that there is not a discriminatory tendency regarding languages.

2.7. What values are associated with immigration and/or diversity?

This standard considers those explicit values that are textually spotted, as in:

[O expulsar, senyora consellera, aquells estrangers -i això ho hem d'exigir al Govern de l'Estat- que han delinquit, els estrangers que vénen aquí a delinquir, fomentant la inseguretat; i la reincidència]

[Or expel out, councilor, those foreigners- and we have to demand that to the Government of the State- that have committed criminal offence, foreigners that come here to commit criminal offence, promoting insecurity; and the relapse]
(Plenary session, López i Rueda (PPC), 28th, Apri, 2010)

Here, *insecurity* is associated with (a particular group of) immigrants and such a value is present in discourse. Nevertheless, we also consider those values that can be inferred from the context, even if there is not a noticeable textual reference to them, as it happens in the following example:

[Hay que ayudar a los inmigrantes a evolucionar como nosotros lo hicimos hace años. También teníamos una religión, en ocasiones, muy intransigente]

[We must help immigrants to evolve as we did years ago. We also had a religion, sometimes, very intransigent]
(Interview to Xavier Trias (CiU). 23rd, May, 2007. *La Vanguardia*).

In this case, *intransigence* is present in discourse, but there is also the implicit value of *obsolescence* that is not explicitly expressed, but it can be inferred when it is said that immigrants need to evolve.

In Catalan political discourse, there is more presence of positive values associated with immigration (58%) than negative ones (42%). But the

data show that at this point there is a cleavage between positive and negative values that deserve some reflections in the recommendations section. Regarding positive values, the most frequent and common to all parties (but PxC that does not associate any positive values at all) are *social cohesion*, *pluralism* and *equality*. Also quite frequent are values such as *development*, *progress* and *creativity*. By contrast, most frequent negative values are *inequality*, *insecurity*, *maladjustment*, *social disruption*, *intolerance* and *fanaticism*.

Once again, there is a majority of positive values, but the difference between positive and negative values is not very meaningful and there is a high frequency of negative values, which cannot be disregarded. Hence, even if we cannot say that there is a consistent pattern of discriminatory tendency regarding the association of values, we should not disregard the high frequency of negative values associated with immigration.

2.8. How is immigration as a phenomenon conceptualized?

Within this standard we only look for textual references by considering the word(s) that are accompanying *immigration* (topic of immigration, problem of immigration, challenge of immigration, etc.) in order to understand if it is conceptualized with positive, neutral or negative terms. It seems obvious that those discourses that systematically conceptualize immigration negatively as a *problem*, a *conflict* or a *concern* equally represent immigration negatively and this is why we would consider it as a discriminatory tendency.

Catalan political discourse mostly conceptualizes immigration in neutral terms (56%), such as *topic*, *phenomenon* or *issue*. Positive and negative conceptualizations are equally frequent (22%). Most frequent positive conceptualizations include terms such as *opportunity*, *challenge* or *investment*, while negative conceptualizations mostly refer to terms such as *problem*, *concern* or *conflict*. Accordingly, there is not a clear pattern of discriminatory tendencies in this sense either.

2.9. What policy areas and issues are more frequent when dealing with immigration and/or diversity? How are they constructed?

Within this standard we measure the most recurrent areas and issues when dealing with immigration, but we also assess how meanings are constructed, which ones are emphasized or de-emphasized (omitted or mitigated) and which connotations and associations are launched. For example, connecting immigration with insecurity is considered to be negative, because it produces a generalized negative representation of immigration.

Nevertheless, there might be some neutral areas (such as for example, integration) that are constructed in negative terms, as it happens in the following example:

[Els diferents contrastos ideològics, molts que vénen precisament des de la immigració (...) un projecte de llei que no col·labora per res a solucionar el problema i el conflicte social, que no urbanístic, dintre de Catalunya]

[Different ideological contrasts, most of them coming precisely from immigration (...) a draft law that does not cooperate with anything to solve the problem and the social conflict, not urbanistic, in Catalonia]

(Plenary session, Olano i Garcia (PPC), 15th, July, 2009)

In this example, the word “integration” is not mentioned but it is inferred that it is focusing on the problems that immigrants cause to the host society, precisely because it emphasizes “social conflicts”, rather than opportunities. . In examples like this one, in which within a neutral area or issue, negative meanings are emphasized, we have considered them as negatively constructed.

In Catalan political discourse, positive constructions (42%) are more frequent than negative (32%) and neutral constructions (26%). By far the most frequent policy area is *integration*, which appears in 90% of the sources analyzed. However, there are differences in how this area is covered and what meanings are emphasized or de-emphasized. Accordingly, *integration* appears described in positive terms (or framed as something positive) in 47% of the sources. By contrast, *integration* in

negative terms and/or emphasizing negative topics appears in 21% of the sources, while neutral constructions appear in 22% of the total. In this sense, we could say that in Catalan political discourse *integration* is mostly constructed in positive terms.

Regarding the issues that are more frequently dealt with when speaking about immigration and/or diversity, *welfare* issues appear in the first position, in 49% of the sources, mostly constructed in positive terms (26%), while neutral (15%) and negative constructions (8%) are much lower.

However, the second and third most prominent issues are *identity* (48%) and *migration* (43%), which are both of them mostly negatively constructed (21% and 17% of the sources respectively). *Identity* issues constructed negatively have to do with the representation of immigration (mainly Islamic religion) as a threat to the identity of the host society, through explicit discursive forms:

[La immigració islàmica, massiva a Catalunya, posa en perill les nostres senyes d'identitat europees pel que fa a la llibertat personal i col•lectiva, la democràcia com a mitjà de presa de decisions, la cultura grecollatina, la religió cristiana, la llengua pròpia de Catalunya o les tradicions populars.]

[Islamic immigration, massive to Catalonia, puts in danger our identity European signs regarding personal and collective freedom, democracy as a way to make decisions, the Grecian-Latin culture, the Christian religion, our own language of Catalonia and the popular traditions]
(Electoral Programme, PxC, 2012)

Or more subtle ones that interpose the majority identity in a superior position, with respect to other identities:

[Por eso creemos que la integración social en nuestra sociedad se tiene que fundamentar en la necesidad de que todo el que llegue esté dispuesto a abrazar nuestros valores y nuestra cultura.]

[This is why we think that social integration in our society must lay on the foundations of the need that everyone that arrives is willing to embrace our values and our culture]
(Electoral Program, PPC, 2010)

Prioritizing the own identity implicitly conveys a subordination of others, unless there is an explicit recognition or acceptance of such identities. Accordingly, while dealing with identity, when there are explicit rejecting forms of others' identities, we have considered them as negative, but we have also counted those forms in which the own identity is prioritized, without the recognition of other possible identities living together with the own one.

According to our interpretative framework, *migration* issues mostly have to do with flows and arrivals of migrants. We have considered them negative when this arrival is represented as a threat or as a burden for the host society, as in:

[Plataforma por Cataluña se propone como una de sus prioridades devolver el bienestar vecinal, bienestar que se ha perdido en los últimos años por culpa de la llegada de miles y miles de inmigrantes sin ningún tipo de control]

[Plataforma por Cataluña has as one of its main priorities to return to the neighborhood the welfare, welfare that has been lost in the last years because of the arrival of thousands and thousands of immigrants without any kind of control]

(Electoral program, PxC, 2007)

It seems, then, that there has been a swift in political discourse in the last years. While from 2000 to 2007, political discourse was mainly focused on migrations flows, it seems that in the period analyzed discourse concentrates more on *integration* and *welfare* and *identity* issues mainly from a positive approach, while *migration* is being more set aside. However, as we have shown, there is still a high percentage of political discourse that represents immigrants' arrival or identity as a threat for the host society. All in all, though, Catalan political discourse offers more frequently a positive construction of the immigration phenomenon and, hence, we cannot consider as having discriminatory tendencies.

2.10. What is the global representation of immigrants?

In order to assess how immigrants are represented it is necessary to previously detect the main areas and issues and, within each of them, to

explore what representation is interposed to immigrants. Accordingly, for example, in those issues in which immigration is constructed as a threat, immigrants are very likely to be represented as *aggressors* and in those issues in which immigrants appear as in need of particular attention, it is likely that they appear as *beneficiaries*.

In Catalan political discourses immigrants are more prominently represented as *beneficiaries* (60%) of the proposals and policies developed by each party. It is also very frequent the representation of immigrants as *victims* (47%) of the (supposedly) bad management of immigration policies by the government (either Tripartite or CiU). In this sense, it seems that this representation is widely used mainly by parties in opposition as a way to construct their criticism towards the government in turn.

Representations of immigrants as *aggressors* are less recurrent (28% of the sources), but still quite present. Most of the negative constructions of different areas and issues represent immigrants as active or passive aggressors. This is why the number of negative constructions (32%) is so close to the number of immigrants' representations as *aggressors*.

Finally, it is important to remark that representations of immigrants as *benefactors* are rather low (12% of the sources).

All in all, there is exactly the same number of negative representations of immigrants as a *victim* or an *aggressor*, than positive representations as a *beneficiary* or a *benefactor*. Accordingly, it seems that, even if positive and negative representations are equally balanced, the low frequency of representation of immigrants as *benefactors* for the host society indicates that there is a gap between the positive values associated with immigration and the actual representation of immigrants as *benefactors*. In other words, since positive values such as *progress*, *innovation*, *creativity* or *development* are frequently associated with immigration, the representation of immigrants as benefactors that contribute with such

values to society should be equally frequent. However this is not the case here, as we have shown.

Therefore, the relatively high frequency of representations of immigrants as *aggressors*, combined with the low representations of immigrants as *benefactor* shows that in this regard there is room for discursive improvement.

2.11. How is discursive rhetoric constructed regarding the legitimacy and justification of policies and/or attitudes related to immigration and/or diversity issues?

Within this standard, apart from understanding if political discourse on immigration is legitimized mostly through *argumentative* or *manipulative* strategies, it is particularly relevant for our purposes to detect if there are a significantly high frequencies of those strategies that justify arguments by representing immigration as a threat (*appeal to fear*) or as a burden (*topos of burden*), or by reproducing rumours and prejudices (*appeal to rumours*) as main indicators of discriminatory tendencies.

As we have shown at the beginning, in Catalan political discourse, the main discursive rhetoric is clearly argumentative (73%), rather than manipulative (27%). The most common *argumentative* strategy is the *topos of advantage*, by which arguments are justified by appealing to the positive consequences that the proposals offered may bring to the whole society, as in:

[Per seguir tenint una societat cohesionada, el procés d'integració s'ha de basar en l'assumpció de drets i deures dels nouvinguts i en una actuació conjunta, coordinada i amb els recursos suficients entre el món local i el govern del nostre país]

[In order to continue having a united society, the process of integration must be based on the assumption of rights and duties of the newcomers and in a team and coordinated work and with the accurate resources between the local level and the government of our country.]

(Electoral program, CIU, 2010)

Here, the advantage is a united society, which benefits everyone, and such a benefit is used to legitimize the proposal of basing integration in the rights and duties of immigrants. Nevertheless, the benefits of the proposals that serve to legitimate them, can be only for immigrants, as in:

[Un espai d'acolliment, formació i informació que permetrà conèixer i donar resposta de manera eficient a les necessitats que es detectin en el futur alumnat, alhora que els permetrà promoure la seva integració social, el coneixement de la llengua catalana, la realitat cultural del país d'acollida i el seu entorn més immediat: el barri i el municipi]

[A space for welcoming, educating and informing, which will allow to know and to react in a efficient way to the detected needs of the prospective students, and will also allow us to promote their social integration, knowledge of the Catalan language, the cultural reality of the welcoming country and its environment: the neighborhood and the municipality]

(Plenary session, Vilalta Sospedra (PSC), 16th, September, 2008)

Or, on the contrary, only for national citizens, as in:

[Las ayudas, ya sean becas o subvenciones, han de ir a la gente autóctona. Un inmigrante con dos años de empadronamiento no puede beneficiarse de los derechos de los catalanes. Al menos ha de llevar 15 años]

[The social aids, scholarships or grants, must go to autochthonous people. An immigrant registered two years ago cannot benefit from the rights of the Catalan people. They must at least be registered for 15 years].

(Interview, Josep Anglada (PxC), 20th, November, 2010)

In the three cases, then, the benefits of the proposals are interposed as the legitimacy for such proposals. It must be stated, though, that in Catalan political discourse, the advantages and benefits used to legitimize discourse are mostly addressed to the whole society.

The *topos of burden*, however, appears in 20% of the sources analyzed; the *appeal to fear* in 16% and the *appeal to rumors* in 11% of the sources. The *topos of burden* frequently relies in the representation of immigration as a burden in order to legitimize particular arguments, such as in:

[l'increment demogràfic, l'increment de la població ocupada, l'increment del nombre d'alumnes, l'increment de cartilles sanitàries, canvis que comporten contradiccions i, per tant, nous reptes i nous riscos.]

[The demochart increase, the increase of the population, the increase of the number of health system cards, changes that suppose contradictions and, hence, new challenges and new risks.]

(Plenary session, Miralles i Comte (ICV-EUiA), 31st, October, 2007)

The focus on the risks and problems that immigration causes to the host society leads this representation of immigration as a burden. Besides, this is used to legitimize the call for action that ICV-EUiA is proposing framed in the need to improve rights and duties. Once again, it is clear that only one representation of immigration as a burden is not necessarily negative, but when it becomes frequent in a given discourse, it starts to be worrying.

The *appeal to fear* legitimizes its argument through the representation of immigration as a threat, by appealing to fear in order to convince and persuade, as in:

[Expulsión de todos los inmigrantes violadores, incluso si son menores. Las violaciones en grupo perpetradas por jóvenes inmigrantes se están extendiendo por todo el territorio y el patrón se repite; los violadores son musulmanes marroquíes, africanos o paquistaníes y la víctima una joven europea y blanca]

[To expel out all the rapist immigrants, even if they are under 18. Rapes in group carried out by young immigrants, are extended all the territory around and the pattern is repetitive; rapists are Muslims, Moroccan, African or Pakistani and the victim a young white European]

(Electoral program, PxC, 2011)

This example is an obvious *appeal to fear*, but there are other examples in which the threat is not so explicit, yet still present, as it happens in the following example:

[Incrementaremos los controles para detectar y prevenir los guetos, los hacinamientos en los pisos patera y priorizaremos las expulsiones de aquellos extranjeros que hayan cometido delitos o tengan acumulación de faltas]

[We will increase the control to detect and prevent ghettos, the overcrowding in the overcrowded flats (*pisos patera*) and prioritize the expelling out of those

foreigners that have committed any criminal offence of have an accumulation of offences]

(Electoral program, PPC, 2012)

Here even if immigrants are not explicitly accused of being the active responsible of the threatening actions, appear as passive responsible (aggressors) that threat society in a indirect (ghettos, overcrowded houses) or direct (delinquency) way. Such a threat is used to legitimize the need for increasing the control over immigrants.

The *appeal to rumors* relies on the reproduction of rumors and prejudices, that appear as the base of the premises founding the main arguments, as in the following example:

[Entre els nouvinguts hi ha una tendència a agrupar-se en funció del seu lloc d'origen dins l'estructura del municipi. (...) aquest contacte fa que els costums dels llocs d'origen prevalguin davant els del municipi tendint a generar un enfrontament entre els hàbits dels nouvinguts i els de la resta dels ciutadans]

[Among newcomers there is a tendency to group themselves depending on their origin inside the structure of the municipality (...) this contact makes that the customs of their origin countries prevail before the ones of the municipality, which tends to generate a confrontation between the habits of newcomers and the rest of citizens)

(Electoral Program, CiU, 2007)

In this example, integration measures proposed by CiU are justified by appealing to the rumor that (all) immigrants tend to group themselves (ghetto's formation) and that this provokes confrontation. Thus, even if the intention here is to legitimate particular measures, in doing so a prejudiced (negative) representation of immigration is launched.

Therefore, once again, even if Catalan political discourse uses mainly an *argumentative* rhetoric and those strategies that represent immigration in a negative way separated are not so frequent, if we consider the sum of the three of them, it comes up that they appear in 47% of the sources analyzed. In this sense, we can say that there is still some significant presence of such strategies.

2.12. How is political rhetoric constructed regarding the legitimacy and justification of policies and/or attitudes related to immigration and/or diversity issues?

Conservative and *populist* rhetoric intrinsically convey a polarization between national citizens and immigrants and a national preference. We must remember that according to our interpretative framework, conservative rhetoric appeals to the priority of national values and traditions, while populist rhetoric appeals to citizenship and national interests as a way to legitimize arguments.

Conservative and *populist* rhetoric are not very high in Catalan political discourse. In particular, *conservative* rhetoric appears in 19% of the sources, and *populist* rhetoric only in 13%. *Conservative* rhetoric manifests particularly in the shape of Catalan values and identities that should be preserved over the rest, as in the following examples:

[Però per nosaltres és vital que Catalunya segueixi sent catalana, que aquesta és la nostra característica]

[But for us it is vital that Catalonia continues to be Catalan, since this is our characteristic]

(Plenary session, Cleries i González (CiU), 14th, October, 2009)

[Però nosaltres, si volem integrar a Catalunya, hem de basar-nos en la identitat de Catalunya. I Catalunya té una llengua i una cultura comunes que no les volem negar].

[But if we want to integrate Catalonia, it should be based on the identity of Catalonia. And Catalonia has a common language and culture that we do not want to deny]

(Plenary session, Cleries i González (CiU), 23rd, March, 2011)

As it can be seen, the emphasis on Catalan language and identity implicitly conveys a position of preference of such language and identities over other ones, which remain in a way subordinated to the preferred one. As we have already said, these statements need to be contextualized in the Catalan context, where the Catalan identity and language has not the same legal protections than the Spanish state ones.

Therefore, in this sense, this discriminatory tendency applied in Catalan context needs to be played down.

Populist rhetoric manifests mainly by interposing the political leader or political party as the voice of national citizens and the only one fighting for them, as it can be seen in the following example:

[Aquel día comprendí que Badalona pedía a gritos un cambio y que yo podía encarnarlo. (...) La primera preocupación de mis vecinos es la inmigración, pero no sólo en los barrios conflictivos.]

[That day I understood that Badalona was claiming a change and that I could embody such a change. (...) the first worry of my neighbors is immigration, but not only in conflictive neighborhoods]

(Interview, García Albiol (PPC), 23rd, November, 2010)

It seems clear that *populist rhetoric* is based on the assumption that national citizens' have particular needs that are not listened by the rest of the parties and the populist rhetorician would interpose him/herself as the one that listens and follows citizens' interests as a first priority. In this sense, the political leader is represented as the voice of national citizens, and backed by such a voice, all kind of arguments are legitimized.

It is positive that these two types of rhetoric are not very frequent in Catalan political discourse, but, once again, its presence, as the presence of the rest of discriminatory tendencies could be minimized. This is why this tool is useful to detect them, as a first step to avoid their expansion.

To conclude we can say that all in all Catalan political discourse does not show a clear pattern of xenophobic discursive tendencies. However, we have seen some subtle discriminatory constructions that could be minimized. In particular, next chapter deals with some specific recommendations in the light of the results described in this chapter.

V. Policy recommendations and further research

As we have already stated, this is a test-study methodologically speaking. It seeks to apply an interpretative framework, duly founded in the theoretical debate and contextualized in Catalonia that, we argue, can produce objective data. As a second consequent aim, it is expected to produce a social and political impact, since it offers a tool to objectively identify and graduate xenophobic political discourse, and give conceptual resources to civil society to critically control political parties' discursive behavior. Consequently, this final chapter aims at offering some general policy recommendations for political parties that may help reduce the (ab)use of xenophobic discursive tendencies. But also it is aimed for civil society and stakeholders to offer them objective and academically supported arguments to reinforce the pressure they may pursue towards political parties, in order to *avoid that xenophobic discursive tendencies expand* without limits, affecting society opinion and behavior towards immigrants and the diversity process.

We have seen that, in global terms, *Catalan political discourse does not show a very consistent and generalized xenophobic discursive pattern*. However it shows some characteristics, even if they are subtle, which represent immigration in a negative way or associate particular negative issues with the presence of immigrants. Therefore, this tool can be especially useful for these parties that can be unconsciously reproducing a number of discriminatory tendencies through their discourse. Precisely, because *subtle forms of discrimination are also forms of xenophobic tendencies*, this tool can help to correct these tendencies and also to help other parties to have a more combative stance against parties that reproduce them.

We assume there is a first category of parties that explicitly construct their discourse against immigrants and represent immigration with some or the majority of standards of the interpretative framework we have proposed, and they do so voluntarily and strategically. However, there

might be a second category in which parties' use of these negative standards is low. In this second case, the interpretative framework plays the function of *making visible involuntary discriminatory tendencies*. Nevertheless, for the first category of political parties, this tool may not be useful because probably they will not be interested in self-regulating their discourse. However, it will be helpful for NGOs and for other parties and civil society in general, since *this tool provides a simple mechanism that helps to quickly detect xenophobic tendencies*, especially at the three initial certification standards.

Furthermore, within each political party, there might be a combination of positive, neutral and negative approaches to the representation of immigration through the discourse of different political participants. As most literature remarks, there is a *hegemonic tendency of political parties that produce xenophobic discourses* to become a reference discursive frame with its corresponding contagious effects to other parties or other members of the party. This may force parties or political actors to enter into a debate that they have not created. In this sense, this tool can be useful to minimize hegemonic xenophobic tendencies within and among political parties, by offering a solid conceptual tool to parties/political actors, so that they can back up their position with objective and academically reliable arguments, *avoiding that this hegemonic tendency expands*.

Apart from the application of this tool, in the light of the results obtained, and always considering that we have constructed and applied an exploratory methodology as a pilot study, we can also provide the following policy recommendations:

- a. This interpretative framework can be considered as an ethical code to be applied for regulating the limits and a certain threshold of political discourse behavior. This also means that *it is necessary to create a public ethics of political discourse on immigration and diversity*, which allows monitoring xenophobic tendencies of political parties and, at the same time, sets boundaries about what we can or cannot accept as political discourse in a democratic society in terms of principles for action. One of the first

principles of this ethics is the *self-regulation between political parties and within each party*.

- b. To construct an ideal non xenophobic discourse that can serve as self-regulative reference, it is necessary to keep in mind the following considerations:
- *Political discourse on immigration should be addressed to the whole population, not only to national citizens, and should avoid making polarizations between national citizens and immigrants. It is necessary, therefore, to start talking about us and let apart the division between Us and Them. In addition, it is recommended to become more aware of these strategies that represent immigration (or particular groups of immigrants) negatively, primarily as a threat or a burden for the host society, as well as avoid generalizations and hyperboles that maximize and problematize the phenomenon of immigration.*
 - *In line with the above, it is crucial that discourse focuses on the positive aspects of diversity and the presence of immigrants. Therefore, it is important to find a balance, so that the overall result does not only present problems, but also the real opportunities that diversity and immigration can bring to society. In this sense, these opportunities must be described explicitly (as problems are described) and not just simply referred to.*
 - *It is needed to become aware of subtle discriminatory discursive constructions, such as the association of a high number of negative values with immigration, or the recurrent representation of immigrants as aggressors. On the contrary, positive values association should be in accordance with positive representations of immigrants as active benefactors, as playing an active and participative role in creating opportunities for host societies.*
 - *It is advisable that parties acquire a commitment to deal with immigration and diversity issues in a transparent and rigorous way, leaving apart ideological or strategic aspects and, rather, focusing on the description of reality as it is. In this sense, the more a society knows about reality, the more difficult would be that discourses, based on distorted stereotypes, spread out.*

- c. We understand that xenophobic discursive tendencies manifest actively against immigrants. However, we have seen that *there is an implicit (or passive) discriminatory tendency in the nationalist discourse that prioritizes the own identity and nation*, although there is not an active construction of a negative perception about immigrants. In this sense, when there is a protectionist policy and a promotion of the own identity and culture, it would be advisable to avoid strategies that prioritize this identity over others or that subordinate them to the own one. Therefore, it is important that, together with nationalist discourse, there must be an explicit recognition of other identities, which should also be promoted, in order to avoid the establishment of power relations between majority and minority members, which could be the initial premises of new xenophobic tendencies that replace the more obvious polarization between *Us* and *Them*.

- d. We have seen that Catalan political discourses associate a number of positive values with immigration in theory, mainly in their electoral programs, which show the main position, attitude and ideology of each of the political parties. However, there seem to be a gap between this theoretical values and how discourse on immigration is constructed in practice. In other words, while there is a whole range of positive values associated with immigration, these values do not seem to appear in how political discourse is actually constructed when dealing with immigration and diversity issues. For example, in spite of the presence of all the positive values that in theory are associated with immigration (such as *progress, opportunity*), in practice discourse does not entirely represent immigrants as active *benefactors* for the host society. In this sense, this gap may be reduced by actually representing immigrants as active participants in society, by focusing also in the opportunities of such participation, in order to find a balance with the necessary focus on problems and conflicts that political discourse crucially needs to address. Precisely, because *politicians mainly deal with problems to be solved, it is important to find this balance, so that immigration is not only represented or constructed in negative terms*.

- e. In spite of the context of economic crisis, economic issues are not very frequent when dealing with immigration and diversity issues, and references to immigrants as economic burdens are not very frequent either.

In particular, on average considering all the political parties, only 7% of the total of sources is dedicated to such representation of immigrants as an economic burden. In this sense, we could say that *immigration has not been exploited within the context of economic crisis*. However, we have found a significant difference in discourse between when parties are in government or opposition, since the global representation of immigrants is worse when parties are in opposition. In this sense, it seems that *immigration is instrumented when parties are in opposition to construct the main criticism against government's action*, either by emphasizing the (presupposed) damage that immigration causes to society, or by victimizing immigrants, due to the (supposedly bad) government's action. It is, therefore, necessary to avoid using immigration and diversity as a tool to construct the offense or the critique towards government.

- f. In line with the previous point, we have seen that there is more presence of discriminatory tendencies in Catalan political discourse in those years when there have been elections, especially in 2010 and 2011. This also corresponds with the two years when there was more media coverage of declarations of different political leaders and parties about several conflicts related to immigration and diversity issues. In this sense, it is advisable to *avoid using immigration as an electoral tool*, by making it problematic.
- g. The distinction between *non-xenophobic and anti-xenophobic* discourse is, we think, significant. It is clearly positive that political parties mostly construct their discourse without xenophobic tendencies, but apparently it is still a challenge to adopt a combative stance that does not allow other parties to reproduce xenophobic discourses. In this regard, in order to adopt an anti-xenophobic attitude that makes visible when other parties exceed the threshold that a society can tolerate, it is necessary to have a simple tool as the one we propose here, which allows to certify and graduate xenophobic discourse with objective arguments. This is needed, because we have seen that some discursive constructions are xenophobic, even if they do not actively go against immigrants and these discursive forms are more difficult to detect and identify. Therefore, once these more subtle discriminatory forms have been detected, mainstream political parties should adopt a combative attitude towards them, so that they do not become trivialized and/or expand.

- h. In relation with this last recommendation, it is necessary to *request political parties and government bodies to develop instruments to prevent xenophobia* and to encourage them to play a more active role in the prevention of xenophobic tendencies.

As a pilot study, we have chosen Catalonia with the aim to make it reproducible in other territories. With the construction of this tool and its application, the objective is to identify and counter whatever tendency of political parties of radicalizing their position towards xenophobia and racism.

In this sense, we believe that *further research* may be done by applying this tool at other levels and contexts. We can identify at least four new areas of application:

1. We can monitor political discourse on immigration at the *Congreso de los Diputados* (Spanish Parliament), following the same typology of information than the one used in this study.
2. The same approach can also be applied at the European Parliament in order to offer a tool that can help to detect xenophobic tendencies in a systematic way.
3. We also think that the local level is very important and needs more time and resources to be applied by analyzing the debate on immigration in particular city-councils. Maybe a selection of important cities in Catalonia or Spain could be a testing context.
4. We can also take a step further and apply this framework to see how different countries construct their political discourse on immigration and diversity. That possible research would follow almost the same structure and research design we have proposed in this study. The countries that could have a potential for analysis could be Spain, France or England, Germany or Austria, Italy or Greece, Denmark or The Netherlands.

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VII. Appendixes

Due to the whole amount of information presented in this appendix, it is necessary to briefly described what can be found here.

Firstly, appendixes 1, 2 and 3 correspond to the templates we have used for each of the different levels of implementation of the framework.

Secondly, appendix 4 corresponds to the filled template of level 2 showing the quantitative results of the implementation.

Thirdly, appendix 5 corresponds to the filled template of level 3. In this template, results are globally presented by indicating with “1” or “0” the presence of discriminatory tendencies for each standard.

Finally, appendix 6 corresponds to the charts that summarize, in a visual way, the main results obtained in the pilot study for each standard.

1. Analysis template 1: Qualitative microanalysis

Type of information resource:

Title:

Date:

Political party:

KITEMARKING XENOPHOBIC DISCOURSE:

1. **Local strategies of target population:** State if discourse is addressed to national citizens, to immigrants or to both.

	National citizens	Immigrants	Both
Example			

2. **Local strategies of polarization:** State if there is polarization between positive us and negative them. State if there are explicit or implicit forms of national preference.

Example of polarization

3. **Local strategies of negative representation:** State if there are one or more of the following local strategies

Type of strategy	Example
Generalizations	
Hyperboles	
Negative metaphors	
Dehumanizing terms	

FRAMING XENOPHOBIC DISCOURSE:

A. Lexical strategies

4. **Countries of origin referred:** State countries referred in negative contexts. State if there are preferences for particular countries.

Country referred	Country preferred

5. **Religions referred:** State religion referred in negative contexts. State if there are preferences for particular religions.

Religion referred	Religion preferred

6. **Languages referred:** State languages referred in negative contexts. State if there are preferences to particular languages

Language referred	Language preferred

7. **Values referred:** State positive and negative values associated with immigration.

Positive values	Negative values

B. Semantic strategies

8. **Conceptualization of immigration:** State how immigration is conceptualized.

Conceptualization	Term(s) used
Positive	
Negative	
Neutral	

Monitoring xenophobic political discourses

9. **Global meanings:** State the two most frequent areas and the two most frequent issues. State if they are positive, negative or neutrally constructed.

Policy areas	Positive	Negative	Neutral
Migration			
Integration			
Citizenship			
Development & Relations			
Others (add cells to specify)			

Policy issues	Positive	Negative	Neutral
Legal issues			
Welfare issues			
Security issues			
Economic issues			
Identity issues			
Others (add cells to specify)			

10. **Global representation of national citizens and immigrants:** State how national citizens and immigrants are globally represented.

Actor (Immigrant/national citizen)	Role	Agency (active, passive)
	Victim	
	aggressor	
	benefactor	
	beneficiary	
	others	

BENCHMARKING XENOPHOBIC DISCOURSE

A. **Discursive rhetorics:** State the three most frequent argumentative and manipulative strategies. Give an example for each one.

11. **Argumentative strategies**

Strategy	Example
Topoi of threat	
Topoi of burdening	
Topoi of advantage	
Topoi of disadvantage	
Topoi of reciprocity	

12. **Manipulative strategies**

Strategy	Example
Appeal to fear	
Appeal to pity	
Appeal to institutions/countries	
Appeal to statistics	
Appeal to rumours & prejudices	

B. **Political rhetorics:** State what political rhetoric is more frequent. Give an example.

Example	Conservative rhetoric	Populist rhetoric

2. Analysis template 2: Quantitative macroanalysis

KITEMARKING XENOPHOBIC DISCOURSE:

1. **Local strategies of target population:** State percentage of discourse addressed to national citizens, to immigrants or to both.

	National citizens	Immigrants	Both
Percentage			

2. **Local strategies of polarization:** State if there is polarization between positive us and negative them. State if there are explicit or implicit forms of national preference.

Polarization

3. **Local strategies of negative representation:** State percentage of one or more of the following local strategies

Type of strategy	Percentage
Generalizations	
Hyperboles	
Negative metaphors	
Dehumanizing terms	

FRAMING XENOPHOBIC DISCOURSE:

A. Lexical strategies

4. **Countries of origin referred:** State percentage of countries referred in negative contexts. State percentage of country preferences for particular countries

Percentage of country referred	Percentage of country preferred

5. **Religions referred:** State percentage of religion referred in negative contexts. State percentage of preferences for particular religions.

Percentage of religion referred	Percentage of religion preferred

6. **Languages referred:** State percentage of languages referred in negative contexts. State percentage of preferences to particular languages

Percentage of language referred	Percentage of language preferred

7. **Values referred:** State percentage of positive and negative values associated with immigration.

Percentage of positive values	Percentage of negative values

B. Semantic strategies

8. **Conceptualization of immigration:** State percentage for positive, negative or neutral conceptualization of immigration..

Conceptualization	Percentage
Positive	
Negative	
Neutral	

9. **Global meanings:** State percentage of most frequent areas and issues. State percentage of positive, negative or neutrally construction.

Monitoring xenophobic political discourses

Policy areas	Percentage Positive	Percentage Negative	Percentage Neutral
Migration			
Integration			
Citizenship			
Development & Relations			
Others (add cells to specify)			

Policy issues	Percentage Positive	Percentage Negative	Percentage Neutral
Legal issues			
Welfare issues			
Security issues			
Economic issues			
Identity issues			
Others (add cells to specify)			

10. Global representation of national citizens and immigrants: State for each actor the percentage of roles and agency.

Actor (Immigrant/national citizen)	Percentage Role	Percentage Agency (active, passive)
	Victim	
	aggressor	
	benefactor	
	beneficiary	
	others	

BENCHMARKING XENOPHOBIC DISCOURSE

A. Discursive rhetorics State percentage for each argumentative and manipulative strategy.

11. Argumentative strategies:

Strategy	Percentage
Topoi of threat	
Topoi of burdening	
Topoi of advantage	
Topoi of disadvantage	
Topoi of reciprocity	

12. Manipulative strategies:

Strategy	Percentage
Appeal to fear	
Appeal to pity	
Appeal to institutions/countries	
Appeal to statistics	
Appeal to rumours & prejudices	

B. Political rhetorics State percentage of political rhetoric.

	Conservative rhetoric	Populist rhetoric
Percentage		

3. Analysis template 3: final results

Tool	Results	
Kitemarking	Recipient: National citizens	(1/0)
	Polarization of negative-them vs. Positive-us	(1/0)
	Local negative representations	(1/0)
Total	(0-3)	
Framing Xenophobic Discourse	Countries of origin	(1/0)
	Religion	(1/0)
	Languages	(1/0)
	Values	(1/0)
	Conceptualization of immigration	(1/0)
	Negative topics	(1/0)
	Negative representation of immigrants	(1/0)
Total	Framing + Kitemarking	(0-10)
Benchmarking xenophobic discourse	Argumentative discourse	(0-100%)
	Manipulative discourse	(0-100%)
	Type of discursive rhetoric	(Argumentative/manipulative)
	Conservative rhetoric	(0-100%)
	Populist rhetoric	(0-100%)
	Type of political rhetoric	(Conservative/Populist)

4. Level 2: quantitative results

KITEMARKING XENOPHOBIC DISCOURSE:

1. **Local strategies of target population:** *State percentage of discourse addressed to national citizens, to immigrants or to both.*

	National citizens	Immigrants	Both
Percentage	29%	4%	67%

No discriminatory tendency detected

2. **Local strategies of polarization:** *State if there is polarization between positive us and negative them. State if there are explicit or implicit forms of national preference.*

Polarization
36%

No discriminatory tendency detected

3. **Local strategies of negative representation:** *State percentage of one or more of the following local strategies*

Type of strategy	Percentage
Generalizations	19%
Hyperboles	13%
Negative metaphors	19%
Dehumanizing terms	19%

Total percentage of local strategies: 69% → discriminatory tendency detected

FRAMING XENOPHOBIC DISCOURSE:

a) Lexical strategies

4. **Countries of origin referred:** *State percentage of countries referred in negative contexts. State percentage of country preferences for particular countries.*

Percentage of Country referred	Percentage of Country preferred
8%	7%

No discriminatory tendency detected

5. **Religions referred:** *State percentage of religion referred in negative contexts. State percentage of preferences for particular religions.*

Percentage of Religion referred	Percentage of Religion preferred
Islam 13%	Catholic/Christian 7%

No discriminatory tendency detected

6. **Languages referred:** *State percentage of languages referred in negative contexts. State percentage of preferences to particular languages*

Percentage of Language referred	Percentage of Language preferred
Non Latin American 5 %	Latin American 3%

No discriminatory tendency detected

7. **Values referred:** *State percentage of positive and negative values associated with immigration.*

Percentage Positive values	Percentage of Negative values
58%	42%

High number of negative values detected.

b) Semantic strategies

8. **Conceptualization of immigration:** *State percentage for positive, negative or neutral conceptualization of immigration.*

Conceptualization	Percentage
Positive	22%
Negative	22%
Neutral	56%

Majority of neutral conceptualization. No discriminatory tendency detected

9. **Global meanings:** *State percentage of most frequent areas and issues. State percentage of positive, negative or neutrally construction.*

Monitoring xenophobic political discourses

Policy areas	Percentage Positive	Percentage Negative	Percentage Neutral
Migration	11%	17%	15%
Integration	22%	21%	47%
Citizenship	5%	0%	1%
Development & Relations	7%	1%	2%
Others (add cells to specify)	3%	2%	3%

Policy issues	Percentage Positive	Percentage Negative	Percentage Neutral
Legal issues	9%	15%	8%
Welfare issues	26%	8%	15%
Security issues	5%	10%	2%
Economic issues	8%	7%	6%
Identity issues	15%	21%	12%
Others (add cells to specify)	7%	Demochart 6%	4%

42% positive constructions → Majority of positive constructions
 32% negative constructions
 26% neutral constructions

10. Global representation of national citizens and immigrants: State for each actor the percentage of roles and agency.

Actor (Immigrant/ national citizen)	Role	Percentage of Agency (active, passive)
Immigrant	Victim	47% (2% active - 98% passive)
Immigrant	aggressor	28% (70% active - 30% passive)
Immigrant	benefactor	13% (69% active - 31% passive)
Immigrant	beneficiary	60% (15% active - 75% passive)

Majority of representation as passive beneficiary
 Equal frequency of positive and negative representations
 High percentage of aggressor and low percentage of benefactor

BENCHMARKING XENOPHOBIC DISCOURSE

A. Discursive rhetorics

State percentage for each argumentative and manipulative strategy.

11. Argumentative strategies:

Strategy	Percentage
Topoi of threat	4%
Topoi of burdening	20%
Topoi of advantage	32%
Topoi of disadvantage	21%
Topoi of reciprocity	17%

Total Argumentative: 73%

12. Manipulative strategies:

Strategy	Percentage
Appeal to fear	16%
Appeal to pity	6%
Appeal to institutions/countries	8%
Appeal to statistics	7%
Appeal to rumours & prejudices	11%

Total Manipulative: 27%

Majority of argumentative strategies

Negative representations → 47%

B. Political rhetorics

State percentage of political rhetoric.




	Conservative rhetoric	Populist rhetoric
Percentage	19%	13%



Majority of conservative rhetoric

5. Level 3: general results

Tool	Results	
Kitemarking	Recipient: National citizens	(0)
	Polarization of negative-them vs. Positive-us	(0)
	Local negative representations	(1)
Total	(1)	
Framing Xenophobic Discourse	Countries of origin	(0)
	Religion	(0)
	Languages	(0)
	Values	(1) high number of negative values
	Conceptualization of immigration	(0)
	Negative topics	(0)
	Negative representation of immigrants	(1) high number as aggressor, low as benefactor
Total	Framing + Kitemarking	(3)
Benchmarking xenophobic discourse	Argumentative discourse	(73%)
	Manipulative discourse	(27%)
	Type of discursive rhetoric	(Argumentative)
	Conservative rhetoric	(19%)
	Populist rhetoric	(13%)
	Type of political rhetoric	(Conservative)

6. Charts: *Kitemarking, framing and benchmarking*





Xenophobic political discourses are increasing their presence in Europe. It is even in the front door of several national governments and can even be the next headache of European institutions. At a time of economic crisis, political uncertainty and distrust of democratic institutions, political parties can have the temptation in deviating public opinion attention raising negative emotions towards immigrants. The way political discourse on immigration is framed has consequences on the way the reality of immigration will be interpreted by society. Given how xenophobic discourses affect both at the level of society and at the institutional level, the need to monitor them is fully justified. But how do we make it? The present study proposes an analytical framework fulfilling the function of a "road radar" to picture xenophobic tendencies of political parties. The present test-case has been applied at Catalonia for the whole period of 2007-2012. This pilot study has mainly the objective to identify and counter any tendency of political parties of radicalizing their position towards xenophobia, and to help them to self-regulate their discourses, as well as to civil society to accomplish its critical function.



GRITIM-UPF Policy Series

GRITIM-UPF Policy Series aims at disseminating outcomes of studies contributing on the making public policies. The objective is to contribute to the research/policy nexus with a series that can be both a common ground for researcher, policy makers, stakeholders and representatives of civil society committed to the management of immigration and diversity.

GRITIM-UPF (Interdisciplinary Research Group on Immigration) is a multi-departmental group at Universitat Pompeu Fabra made up of researchers from different disciplines who are interested in aspects of innovation in research and management of change processes arising from human mobility and immigration. The group's main objectives are to promote theoretical and applied research related to political and social agendas.